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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
21 July 2005: I am walking back to my hotel in a post-7/7 London, when I
see an unusual deployment of police and firefighters. I start to think that
London could be under attack again. The closed gates of the Underground
and the patrolling armed officers confirm the worst-case scenario.
Approaching an Italian restaurant, I can see the waiters, customers and
occasional passers-by gathering around a TV. I join them to watch a
worried Mr Blair speaking to the nation. The message is clear: we are
under attack, and although everything is under control, we have to stay
where we are. Walking along the street, I see tourists still unaware of the
attack, children playing, old ladies waiting for improbable buses. This time
no life has been shattered, no other blood added to the 7/7 carnage. ‘Life
has to go on,’ said the Prime Minister; ‘life has to go on,’ say the people I
meet, yet the sirens of the emergency services remind me that life will not
be the same. Many questions cross my mind, the most persistent of which
is ‘Why?’ Why are these people taking their lives and killing innocent
people in the name of Islam? Why are they conducting their jihad? What
does jihad mean today?
To answer these questions, the mass media, politicians and often aca-
demics (see for instance Hoffman 1995; Hunter 1988; Huntington 1996;
Kramer 1996; Lewis 2003; Pipes 1983; Roy 1994) have focused, among
other things, on the political issues, on the alleged ‘Clash of Civilizations’,1
on the failure of multiculturalism, the invasion of Iraq, the alienation of
Muslims, the social ghettoization of young South Asians, and the radical
preachers and imams. All these factors might be the tiles of a complex
mosaic, but still do not explain why the mosaic itself exists; why certain indi-
viduals, who profess themselves to be Muslim, have decided to kill them-
selves and innocent people in the name of jihad. In this book, I am not
interested in discussing the ‘tiles’, although I shall consider them, but ‘the
mosaic’. This means shifting our analysis from interpreting the ‘aims’ of ter-
rorists’ actions to the dynamics of radicalization. Why do some Muslims
understand jihad as murder while the majority reject such a view? 
1
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Before discussing this issue, let me emphasize a fundamental premise,
without which any anthropological analysis produces flawed results: no text,
even the most holy, could speak without the human mind reading, under-
standing and interpreting it.2 This simple, self-evident (but in the case of
religion often undermined) observation has an important consequence,
which other anthropologists working on Islam have emphasized. For
instance, Donnan (2002: 1) has observed ‘what one knows about Islam, one
knows, inevitably and inescapably, with reference to the ways in which the
other people come to know about Islam.’ The attempts to scrutinize the
Qur’an to find the Holy Grail of extremism or to describe violent and radical
Muslim worshippers as ‘traitors’ of a ‘real’ Islam might be useful for polit-
ical diatribes, but certainly not for understanding why so-called Islamic ter-
rorists exist.3 The available studies on jihad tend to undermine the role that
personal identities have on it, and rather focus on the historical and polit-
ical elements of jihad. This has facilitated antithetical forms of essentialism.4
Something which is not new in the study of Islam. 
Said’s book Orientalism (1978) has played an involuntary role in this essen-
tialization process. Said’s complex critique of Western scholarship on the
‘Orient’ and Islam, in particular when focusing on literature and art, has too
often been reduced to a Manichaean division. On the one hand, there are the
Orientalists, the scholars who being in love with colonialism would retain a bias
against Islam, on the other the anti-Orientalists, who would claim to represent
Islam by respecting the real meaning (Milton-Edwards 2002). If we observe
the social and political discussion available on contemporary jihad, we can see
that this has produced two ‘schools of thought’, whose members, through
their reciprocal denigrating cliché, have been termed neo-Orientalists and
Apologists. So, following such a Manichaean division (cf. Sadowski 1993;
Tuastad 2003), those suggesting that Islam leads to extremism have been clas-
sified as neo-Orientalists by those who deny that extremists are real Muslims;
the neo-Orientalist has claimed that this latter position was nothing other than
apologetic.5 Notwithstanding their irreconcilable positions and arguments,
both the ‘neo-Orientalist’ and ‘apologist’ share an essentialistic view of Islam.
Let me say that I reject this distinction as useless for social scientific research
for it is produced by political interests dealing with the Middle East crisis and,
in particular, the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. 
An example of what neo-Orientalists would call an apologetic approach
to jihad is Noorani’s book Islam and Jihad: Prejudice Versus Reality (2002).
Noorani has argued, ‘the so-called Islamic fundamentalist is an impostor. He
has misused a noble faith as a political weapon. Of course, Islam does have
a political vision; but it is far removed from the Islam which very many
Muslims and most non-Muslims imagine it to be’ (Noorani 2002: ix,
2 Contemporary Asian Cinema
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emphasis added). Noorani speaks of Islam as a physical entity possessing
consciousness and an authoritative voice, against which the Islamic tone-
deaf Muslim (the impostor) may be easily spotted. In other words, Noorani
has not suggested that extremists are a minority among the Muslims with
unorthodox interpretations of jihad, but rather that they are Muslims without
Islam. The issue is that the impostors consider themselves the best Muslims.
The impasse is created by the fact that both Noorani and his ‘impostors’
share the idea that Islam is one. So that only one interpretation is accept-
able. Noorani’s argument on jihad is theological. Indeed, his argument
reminds us that the majority of Muslims love peace and that terrorist actions
shock them no less than us, but Noorani in his discussion does not tell us
why a minority of these Muslims wish to immolate themselves by their idea
of jihad. 
Noorani is not the only scholar who has tried to suggest a distinction
between Muslims and Islam. For instance, Esposito (1992; 2002) has
argued, ‘[Islam], like Judaism and Christianity, rejects terrorism’ (2002: ix),
and has suggested that some people manipulate Islam as a political tool in
order to change their societies or oppose ‘imperialism’. Esposito has
observed, ‘many in the Muslim world, like their counterparts in the West, opt
for easy anti-imperialist slogans and demonization. At its worst, both sides
have engaged in a process of “mutual satanization”’ (1992: 172). In his
books, Esposito has introduced short histories of Islam (see also Akbar 2002
and Piscatori 1983 and 1991), which, however, have remained rather
detached from the rest of his argument. So, the impression is that he is
arguing something very similar to Noorani, that Muslim extremists are
unable to understand the real history of Islam as other religious extremists
cannot understand theirs: ‘Although the communities in these areas [Sudan,
Lebanon, Kosovo, Yugoslavia, and Azerbaijan] may be broadly identified as
Christian and Muslim, it is nonetheless true, as with Northern Ireland’s
Catholic and Protestant communities, that local disputes and civil wars have
more to do with political issues … and socio-economic issues than with reli-
gion’ (Esposito 1999: 181). Esposito has not emphasized the theological mis-
understanding of the extremists, as Noorani has done, but rather the general
irresistible temptation that human beings have to manipulate their religion
for the sake of political and nationalistic goals. While for Noorani radical
interpretations of jihad are treason against Islam, for Esposito they represent
the supremacy of political over religious values. Taken to its extreme, this
interpretation of extremism leads to Hafez’s argument.
In Why Muslims rebel (2003), Hafez has suggested that the poli-
tical oppression of Muslims has caused their rebellions. After rejecting
socio-economic and psychological explanations, Hafez has argued: 
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Muslims rebel because of an ill-fated combination of institutional exclusion, on
the one hand, and on the other, reactive and indiscriminate repression that
threatens the organizational resources and personal lives of Islamists.
Exclusionary and repressive political environments force Islamists to undergo a
near universal process of radicalization, which has been witnessed by so many
rebellious movements. This process involves the rise of exclusive mobilization
structures to ensure against internal defections and external repression, and the
diffusion of antisystem ideological frames to justify radical change and motivate
collective violence. (2003: 22)
His analysis ends in blaming external repressive and exclusionist factors, but
the reader who may wish to understand why these ‘rebels’ transform Islam
into a political ideology of rebellion would again be left without an answer.
Hafez has left unwritten any discussion about Islam or Muslims. Yet we
know that the suicide bombers who are striking in our Western and non-
Western cities use a religious language, affirm religious identities, and see
the world through specific religious interpretations. Could we, as Hafez has
brilliantly done, leave religion aside? 
The scholars who have been nicknamed neo-Orientalists6 have strongly
argued against this possibility. Islam, according to them, is the reason why
we have suicide bombers. As Noorani, so authors such as Pipes, Hunter
Lewis and Kramer have based their arguments on a monolithic under-
standing of Islam. Islam, according to these authors, has prevented Muslims
enjoying modernization and left Muslims in the dark times of Middle Age.
So Pipes, Lewis and Kramer have suggested that to understand tragic events
such as 9/11, March 11 and the recent 7/7 attacks we need to go back to
medieval interpretations and to thinkers such as Ibn Taymiyya.7 These
extreme essentialistic viewpoints have facilitated odd arguments, such as the
claim that Muslims are conducting jihad because they wish to transform
non-Muslims into Dhimmi.8 Although certain extremist leaders, such as
Osama bin Laden, have used expressions which came from the ‘dark age’ of
the Crusaders and Islamic chevaliers, it would be extremely naïve to believe
that behind such Islamic retro-chic styles there could exist medieval minds.
We know very well that the context enforces new meanings on ancient
expressions. Bin Laden and his acolytes adorn themselves with a mystic aura
of the past, but they speak to the present, to contemporary Muslims, not to
Ottoman ghosts. In Chapter 8 of this book, we shall discuss the reasons why
scholars such as Bat Ye‘or, Pipes, Lewis, Kramer and Huntington prefer to
believe in the extremists’ masquerade rather than trying to get behind it. 
Halliday, while reviewing Pipes’s book In the Path of God: Islam and
Political Power, has argued:
4 Jihad Beyond Islam
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this book, for all its range, is deeply flawed because it overstates its case, ending
up with that fallacy that besets so many writers about Islam, not least of all the
faithful themselves. This fallacy is essentialism – the idea, for which the evidence
is rare indeed, that the behaviour of Muslims through all centuries and countries
can be explained primarily by reference uniquely to their belief system. (1984:
583)
In another article, Halliday has strongly criticized the ‘neo-Orientalist’ and
‘apologetic’ positions, because these debates have only ‘generated much hot
air’ (1997: 401). Halliday, rejecting the use of the traditional polemic labels,
has suggested a more accurate description of these opposing academic view-
points as ‘essentialists’ versus ‘contingencists’. So, essentialists are ‘those
who argued that the Islamic world was dominated by a set of relatively
enduring and unchanging processes and meaning, to be understood through
the texts of Islam and the language it generated’ (1997: 400–1). By contrast,
Halliday has defined the ‘contingencists’ as those who reject any universal-
istic framework and prefer to focus on the ‘contingent’ realities that exist in
each Islamic country or socio-political situation (as Esposito). 
Of course, the dichotomy between these two approaches exists because of
the methodology each side has employed. Hodgson (1993) has suggested
that a third way may be developed, combining the essentialists’ and the con-
tingencists’ paradigms and concluded that the main feature of any Muslim
philosophy is to achieve the Islamic ideal. By contrast, Halliday has argued
that the study of Islamic societies involves observing Muslims’ peculiarities
and differences so that the student can develop different representations of
the Muslim world. Nevertheless, both these ‘third ways’ have not convinced
the scholarly community. Salla, among others, has argued,
I think that both Hodgson’s and Halliday’s attempts to find the ‘middle ground’
or ‘a third position’ are unconvincing. As far as Hodgson is concerned, his
notion of the ‘cultural unit of Islam’, is not, as Leonard Binder [1988] the
middle ground position of ‘pragmatic orientalism’, but a notion that is firmly
located in the essentialist-contingencist debate in terms of an essentialist cate-
gorisation that is sensitive to cultural variation. It is therefore a variant of schol-
arly approaches that Said recommends in Orientalism – what Binder suggests are
instances of ‘good orientalism’. On the other hand, Halliday dichotomies about
reality and what is actually out there – the real (Muslim) world. Such a
dichotomy is a critical part of the methodological debate and therefore fails to
produce a distinctive third position. (1997: 731)
Unfortunately, Salla has not provided any new methodological frameworks,
but suggested a pragmatic (yet analytically useless) political programme.
Introduction 5
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The search for a middle ground thesis has never been very successful, but
the events of 9/11, exacerbating the political and ideological arguments,
have definitely marginalized future attempts to escape the vicious circle
started by the ‘essentialists’ versus ‘contingencists’ diatribe. 
Essentialism has not spared some past or recent anthropological studies
of Islam (for an interesting critique of anthropology of Islam, see Varisco
2005). Geertz’s Islam Observed (1968) is surely one of the most quoted and
influential studies of Islam. Although Geertz knew that essentialist
approaches were not without risks (Geertz 1973), he ended in presenting an
analysis of Islam (observed in Indonesia and Morocco) in which texts and
myths explain Muslims’ behaviour,
If they are religious men, those everyday terms will in some way be influenced
by their religious convictions, for it is in the nature of faith, even the most
unworldly and least ethical, to claim effective sovereignty over human behav-
iour. The internal fusion of world view and ethos is, or so I am arguing, the heart
of the religious perspective, and the job of the sacred symbol is to bring about
that fusion. (1968: 110)
Geertz has argued that the actions of scripturalists (i.e. fundamentalists) derive
from ‘the Koran, the Hadith, and the Sharia, together with the standard com-
mentaries upon them as the only acceptable bases of religious authority’
(Geertz 1968: 65). At the centre of his study is neither Islam as a religion nor
Muslims as believers, rather the system of symbols which, according to him,
shapes human behaviour. There are many flawed and weak points in Geertz’s
study of Islam which other scholars have noticed and discussed (el-Zein 1977,
Varisco 2005), but the most evident is the lack of real Muslim voices, his
informants are never mentioned, their words never reported. 
Notwithstanding the essentialist approach that he has employed, the
author of Islam Observed has at least admitted that his interpretation was
only one among the many possible (see also Geertz 1973). Yet another influ-
ential anthropologist, Gellner, was not so ready to admit the same, and even
less that Islam could have more than one interpretation. Gellner’s theory
has been very influential within British social anthropology until today (see
Shankland 2003).9 In a few words, Gellner has reduced Muslims to being
products of their religion, and since he has argued, ‘fundamentalism is at its
strongest in Islam’ (1992: 4), he concluded that real Muslims could not be
other than Muslim extremists. The reasons for Gellner’s argument can be
found in his most celebrated book, Muslim Society,
What are the ideological cards which are dealt by Islam? The crucial ones are: a
scriptural faith, a completed one (the final edition, so to speak) is available, and
6 Jihad Beyond Islam
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there is no room for further accretion or for new prophets; also, there is no
warrant for clergy, and hence for religious differentiation; and, third, there is no
need to differentiate between Church and State, between what is God’s and
what is Caesar’s, since it began as a religion of rapidly successful conquerors
who soon were the state … The consequences of all this is that the trans-social
standard which judges the social is a Book, and not a Church. (1981: 100–1)
Gellner has presented Islam as something historically unique, though the
characteristics he has described are certainly not unique to Islam; further-
more, he has overlooked the role that Muslim clergy play within the dis-
parate Muslim traditions. It is true that Muslims do not have a centralized
and hierarchical church, but it is equally true that the Qur’an cannot inter-
pret itself. Socio-political and cultural dynamics mark the relationships
between single Muslim believers and ‘the Book’. 
According to Fuss, essentialism is ‘an ontology which stands outside the
sphere of cultural influence and historical changes’ (1989: 3). A clear
example of Fuss’s definition can be found in Shankland’s work (2003),
which ideologically compares Sunni and Alevi traditions in Turkey. His
essentialism becomes particularly visible when he has discussed gender and
Islam, ‘My explanation assumes that there is something within Islamic faith
which assumes the axiomatic inferiority, or at least separation, of women
from men (and therefore the power to run society)’ (2003: 316, emphasis
added). While Gellner has at least developed sophisticated socio-philosoph-
ical essentialism, which, however, condemned his study to a frantic
Eurocentrism, Shankland has presented an essentialist account that even
lacks the sophistication of his mentor. It would be easy to reject Shankland’s
work as polemic, ideological and irrelevant; yet my criticism does not deal
with his representation of Muslim worshippers as an oppressive, barbaric
and fanatical force (maybe his respondents were), rather I reject his assump-
tion that the ‘Islamic faith’ in itself may cause misogynist behaviour beyond
the mind interpreting the text. Paradoxically, Shankland’s representation of
Islam as an ontological essence perfectly fits the ideology of those ‘strong
Muslim believers’ he was condemning. Essentialist positions have discussed
Islam but ignored Muslims, and in particular their identities. Identity, I shall
suggest, is an emotional commitment through which people experience
their autobiographical selves. This could explain why those Muslims who do
not practise, or even respect the basic rules of Islam (such as drinking
alcohol) still define themselves as Muslim. Simply, because they feel to be
Muslim. 
To observe how Muslims form their identities is very important if we want
to understand the current uneasiness within Western Muslim communities.
Tensions between Muslims and their Western governments and societies are
Introduction 7
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certainly not a novelty. The so-called Rushdie affair perhaps represents the
first event that attracted considerable scholarly attention to the European
Muslims’ mood. The Rushdie affair also represented the first visible turning
point in the relationship between Muslims and the majority of the non-
Muslim population. It is certain that the affair became the symbol of the long-
standing concerns that Muslims and non-Muslims had about each other’s
cultures and lifestyles. Some of my Muslim respondents considered that the
affair was the first evidence of that ‘attack against Islam’ they still perceive
today. By contrast, the famous book-burning demonstration (organized in
Bradford on 14 January 1989) convinced many non-Muslims that Islam
could be a threat to Western democracies and lifestyles. I am aware that the
majority of Muslims who performed that burning ritual could not foresee
the consequences of their actions, and their lack of knowledge regarding
European history left them surprised when journalists compared their
actions to Nazi behaviour (Werbner 2002).10
Kepel (1997), in his book Muslims in the West, has devoted an entire chapter
to this ‘affair,’ describing in detail the different phases. What the reader can
grasp from this account is that, apart from its international political implica-
tions, the affair became a catalyst for Muslims’ deep frustrations. As Lewis
and Schnapper (1994) have emphasized, the image of the Prophet (which,
according to some Muslims, Rushdie’s book would have denigrated) has a
particular emotional value for Muslims, in particular when they are of South
Asian origin. Asad has suggested that The Satanic Verses has followed the ‘long
tradition of Christian anti-Muslim polemics’ (1990: 252). However, my
Muslim respondents seemed to react not against the ‘Christian anti-Muslim
polemic’, but rather against the different treatment of the three monotheistic
religions: European anti-blasphemy laws protect Christians and Jews but not
Muslims. They felt themselves to be the children of a lesser God. 
Many political discussions have focused on the Rushdie affair, yet in
which way did anthropologists interpret the first noticeable Western Muslim
‘rebellion’? Werbner has argued that a ‘clash of aesthetics’ caused Muslims
to protest. She has argued that Muslims and non-Muslims have ‘two dis-
tinct aesthetics, and two distinct moralities or world views. So, the con-
frontation was between equal aesthetic communities, each defending its own
high culture’ (2002: 110). Werbner’s interpretation, which is based on a cul-
turalist post-modern viewpoint, has highlighted the degree of mutual
incomprehension between contemporary Western Muslims and non-
Muslims. On the one hand, the events of 9/11 have increasingly convinced
some non-Muslims that Islam, as a faith, is incompatible with ‘democracy’
and ‘civilization’, on the other, some Muslims strongly believe that the West
has rejected and attacked Islam, not only as religion but also as an identity.
8 Jihad Beyond Islam
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The fact that the majority of contacts between Muslims and non-Muslims
tend to be mediated by stereotypes does not help reciprocal understanding,
rather it facilitates reciprocal mistrust. This has recently caused a growing
number of Muslims to experience imposed or self-imposed ghettoization.
In the majority of European cities I have visited, in some neighbourhoods
the Muslim population tended to outnumber the non-Muslims. There are
many studies and ethnographies available on Muslim migrants in the West,11
and in different ways, they agree that ghettoization is taking place and that
the effect on the communities is negative. Students of Islam in the West12
have tried to analyse this trend and have suggested three different reasons.
The first argues that some Muslim communities segregate from the main-
stream society because it simplifies the process of providing Islamic facilities,
such as school and shops, and provides a sense of security against racial or
Islamophobic attacks (see Nielsen 1992 and Rex 1998). By contrast, other
scholars (Roald 2002) have suggested that many Muslims suffer economi-
cally because of the diffidence towards them that Western societies display,
and this process ends in the cultural as well as geographical ghettoization of
Muslims. Vertovec (2002) has agreed with Roald, and argued that when
Muslims are not rejected completely, they are still perceived as ‘aliens’, ‘dif-
ferent’ and ‘not ordinary’ citizens, while, according to Moore, although
Muslims are not completely rejected, ‘the Western institutions’ still perceive
them as a peculiar population that needs to be ‘placed in the new world
order’ (2002: 173). Finally, some authors (for instance Amersfoort 1998)
combine these factors, concluding that such a synergy isolates Muslim
migrants and their children. 
Some academics have suggested that since Muslims are exposed to
secular cultures, they would become secularized and become not so dif-
ferent from the average Christian walking in our streets; integration, at this
point would be achieved. So Nielsen observed, ‘Muslims would become, if
not secularised, at least like most northern European Christians in confining
their religious life to a small private niche’ (Nielsen 1992: 155). Today we
have to question both these axioms. Kepel, writing twelve years later, has to
admit, ‘Instead of pushing young people away from Islamist organisations,
the explosions of 9/11 created a vortex into which some young European
Muslims were drawn.’ (2004: 271) During my researches, I was able to
appreciate Kepel’s observation. Some Muslims living in Western countries
have developed a monolithic and ideological representation of ‘the West’
and, by contrast, a self-representation of their identity as monolithically
Muslim. Therefore it is not surprising that the concept of jihad has devel-
oped an independent life beyond the classical theological Islamic under-
standing of it (see Chapter 2). 
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As we have seen, there have been several attempts to develop different
anthropological approaches to Islam.13 Yet in the case of studies focusing on
jihad, political analyses have been prominent.14 In Jihad beyond Islam, I shall
start from a very different position. Emotions have been overlooked in
studies concerning Muslims and jihad and I have observed the impact that
emotions have on the formation of identity and would therefore start to
discuss jihad from the basic, but relevant, observation that Muslims feel to
be Muslim despite how people may see them. The study of emotions and
identity in the field of anthropology is not new, many anthropologists have
discussed concepts such as self, identity, emotions and feelings from cultur-
alist, psychological and psychoanalytic viewpoints.15 The culturalist tradi-
tion is the most prominent, and Rosaldo has argued,
Society … shapes the self through the medium of cultural terms, which shape
the understanding of reflective actors … Previous attempts to show the cultural
specificity of such things as personality and effective life have suffered from
failure to comprehend that culture, far more than a mere catalogue of rituals and
beliefs, it is instead the very stuff of which our subjectivities are created. (1984:
150)
Recently, anthropologists such as Kay Milton (2002; Milton and Suasek
2005) have demonstrated that emotions could be interpreted while avoiding
the nature/nurture debate. Milton has suggested that emotions could be
‘ecological mechanisms’ that enable us to learn from our environments,
despite them being natural, cultural and social. 
Emotions are a key element in my interpretation of why today some
Muslims have associated jihad with violence, while the great majority reject
this interpretation. People act because they have consciousness, self and
identity, which allow them to interact with their environment. Although
acting in the most repulsive way, the suicide bombers are not less human
than we are; as biologically human, they are equipped with emotions and
feelings just as we are. Emotion is the key word of this study of jihad among
ordinary Muslims. Starting from Damasio’s theory of emotions and self and
Milton’s idea of emotions as ‘ecological mechanisms’ (see Chapter 3), I will
argue that people’s understanding of themselves derives from their primary
emotional commitments. In other words it is what I feel I am that determines
my identity for me, regardless of how others, engaged in countless public dis-
courses around the use of cultural markers, might perceive me. Now, an
increasing number of Western Muslims are becoming trapped in what
Bhabha (1994) has defined as the ‘circle of panic’. A ‘circle of panic’,
according to Bhabha, develops when within a community an undefined and
a-testable rumour is spread. In this case, the rumour spreading among
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Muslims says that an imagined monolithic ‘West’ wishes to wipe out Islam,
and consequently, Muslim identities. I shall suggest that a ‘circle of panic’
is what Bateson has defined as schismogenesis: the tendency for individuals to
move apart through a systematic and divergent interaction produced by
negative feedback. Schismogenetic processes may affect the emotions of
certain Muslims to the degree that they feel an act of identity to be required
in order to maintain a stable experience of their self. Because of the ‘circle
of panic’, a certain rhetoric of jihad could easily become the preferred ‘act
of identity’.
Jihad beyond Islam provides a new interpretation of the concept of jihad
provided by ordinary Muslim men and women. The Muslims with whom I
have conducted research from 1998 to 2004 were living in different
European countries (i.e. Italy, France, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Scotland
and some parts of England). So, my respondents came from different ethnic
origins, nations and status; in Continental Europe North Africans formed
the majority of my respondents while in the UK I met mainly South Asians. 
Indeed the reader may well understand the ethical issues that the topic of
this book raises. Today, the increasingly draconian anti-terrorism legislation
is affecting our freedom of speech and any controversial opinion on jihad or
Islam may become the evidence to accuse non-violent people of terrorism.
Some of the opinions I have collected could end in jeopardizing the people
who expressed them. After 9/11, breaching basic human rights, for security
reasons, has not just been a disagreeable exception but rather an established
rule. The mass media has recently reported the ‘special rendition’ of
Muslim suspects to the CIA who often pass them on to dictatorial pro-
Western Muslim countries to be interrogated or tortured. None of the
people I met were involved in terrorist activities, none of them has shown
any intention to use violence. My respondents have only freely expressed
their feelings and thoughts knowing that anthropologists are ethically com-
pelled to pledge the anonymity of their informants. A sense of moral respon-
sibility has forced anthropologists to use the fictionalized ‘I’ (for a decision
on the topic see Benedict 2002; Geest 2003) or even compress several
people in one ‘I’ in much less serious situations. Without affecting the
overall argument, I have used different techniques to carefully disguise the
identity of my respondents and, when I believed it to be appropriate, the
locations where I met them. 
Plan of the book 
In Chapter 2, I explain that the Qur’an devotes very few words to jihad. I
observe how the concept of jihad has changed during its historical develop-
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ment and how the not-so-straightforward Qur’anic and Sunna definitions
have been adapted to the temporal exigencies of the Islamic states. Islam is
a universalistic religion, and in the Qur’an we find that the other monothe-
istic religions receive a particular status in the theological and political
dimensions of Islam. Yet we shall observe how the Islamic juridical tradi-
tions have developed a dualistic vision of the world. Muslim theologians
developed the concepts of dar al-Islam (the house of Islam) and dar al-harb
(the house of war) in order to facilitate the military expansion of Islamic
states. The different juridical schools, which developed after the death of
Muhammad, have increasingly transformed jihad into an open concept flex-
ible enough to adapt to different political contexts. Of course, the main dif-
ferences among the schools has been epitomized in the difference between
Sunni and Shi‘a interpretations. This historical development of the concept
of jihad has facilitated its ubiquity, so that even from a historical and theo-
logical perspective we may say that jihad is what Muslims, in different times
and places, have said that it was. 
For this reason, I suggest that we need to understand how human beings
form their identities, since a ‘Muslim identity’ is no more than one of the
many expressions of human identity. Therefore, in Chapter 3, after pre-
senting and discussing the relevant sociological and anthropological theories
of identity, I suggest a different interpretation of self and identity. Starting
from Damasio’s theory (2000), which demonstrates that what he calls the
self and autobiographic memory have their origins in complex neurological
mechanisms, I suggest that identity is a homeostatic process controlled by
emotions which enable human beings to understand their self and express it
in relation to their environments (seen as natural, social and cultural cate-
gories). Therefore, the stability of the self is derived from a successful, emo-
tionally driven relationship between the sense of ‘I’ and the environment in
which the individual lives. This means that human beings experience con-
stant tensions between the self and the ‘I’. Damasio, as we shall see in
Chapter 3, suggests that emotions and feelings are not the same thing. I
suggest that what I call ‘acts of identities’ are mechanisms to generate par-
ticular feelings which, in case of a crisis of the ‘I’, maintain the self safely
coherent avoiding dissociation (which would lead to schizophrenia). It is by
starting from this understanding of identity that we can observe the role that
the concept of jihad has acquired today for some Muslims. So, by
employing Bateson’s (2000) concept of schismogenesis, I argue that the idea
that Islam is under attack creates ‘circles of panic’ affecting the identities of
some Muslims and consequently shaping their rhetorics of jihad.
In Chapter 4, after discussing the impact that colonialism and post-
colonialism have had on Muslim migrant men, I deconstruct the stereotype
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that represents mosques as the ‘lions’ den’ in which Muslims plan their
jihads. After presenting the everyday life of an ordinary mosque, we follow
the experience of a migrant Muslim man when a suspicious itinerant imam
tries to manipulate the emotional context of migration so as to result in my
respondent’s emotional reaction. Then I present the different discourses of
jihad I encountered among migrant Muslims; from the idea of jihad as a spir-
itual struggle, to controversial, often unorthodox understandings of it. I show
how these different ‘interpretations’ are in reality caused by the rumour,
increasingly spreading among Muslims, that Islam is currently under attack. 
In Chapter 5, after a short summary of the most important events and
tragedies in the Muslim world that have facilitated the development of this
rumour, I observe the role that the mass media, in particular Arab satellite
TV, have in this process. We observe two Muslim migrant families watching
television news concerning the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. By contrast,
Chapter 6 observes how Western-born Muslims discuss jihad. After dis-
cussing and criticizing the approaches that describe Western-born Muslims
as possessing ‘in-between’ identities, I observe how their societies (which
are the host societies of their parents) constantly affirm their loyalty
(Haddad 2004). This is often expressed through the recurrent question ‘are
you British (Italian, French, American and so on) or Muslims?’ 
In Chapter 7, we see that migrant Muslim women and their daughters are
not passive subjects, as some scholars still argue, but active members not
only within their families but also among their extended female networks.
Their experience of migration is shown to be different from that of their
male relatives. Muslim women use their memories and Islamic myths to
adapt to the new, often not very welcoming, Western environments. Among
the most popular Islamic stories and myths are those of the Muslim women
martyrs, who offered their lives to defend Islam and the Prophets but also
exhorted their male relatives to show their Islamic honour by performing
jihad. Western-born Muslim girls know the traditional stories, but also have
new models: the Palestinian Muslim women martyrs. 
Muslim women are increasingly attending Islamic circles provided for
them by Muslim associations and mosques. They are becoming the ‘strong
believers’ among the members of their families. We observe how some
Muslim women tend to compare ‘real’ Muslim men with their sons, hus-
bands, brothers and fathers. Of course, because of the difficulties Muslim
migrant men face, their masculinity is often a shadow of the Islamic arche-
type. In this chapter, I suggest that if some Muslim men show the charac-
teristics of an honour and shame syndrome, some Muslim women also
develop similar dynamics, which can facilitate the rhetoric of jihad within
their families. 
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Today, many commentators link jihad and Muslim extremism to Muslim
anti-Semitism. In Chapter 8, I discuss the issue of defining anti-Semitism
and whether Muslim anti-Semitism might be similar, as some scholars have
suggested, to the Nazi ideal. Throughout the chapter, it will become clear
that, although Muslim communities in the West show a strong resentment
against Israel and Jewish people, there are ideological and political reasons
behind the allegations that Muslim anti-Semitism is similar to that of the
Nazis. I suggest that to understand the rise of anti-Semitism among some
young Muslims we need to understand a different concept: Westernophobia. 
Notes 
1. For my criticism of this concept, see Marranci 2004a. 
2. Although some of my Muslim respondents have found this argument theo-
logically wrong, the first word that Muhammad received from Allah was iqra,
‘read!’, which also means ‘understand’ ‘discern’, which, of course, implies a mind. 
3. See Arjomand 1984; Bruce 2000; Choueiri 1997; Cooley 2000; Esposito
1999, 2002; Hafez 2003; Hoffman 1995; Hunter 1988; Huntington 1996; Kepel
2004; Noorani 2002; Pipes 1983; Piscatori 1983; Roy 1994.
4. It is important to remember that the main victims of the so-called Islamic ter-
rorism have been Muslims.
5. Even when the allegation does not survive the burden of proof, as in the case
of scholars such as Esposito or Piscatori. 
6. Just to mention the most quoted: Bat Ye‘or 1978, 1984, 1991, 2002; Bruce
2000; Hall 1985; Hoffman 1995; Hunter 1988; Huntington 1996; Kramer 1996;
Lewis 1993, 2000, 2003; Patai 1973; Pipes 1983; Roy 1994. 
7. Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) was the most important figure in the future
Hanbali School of Islamic thought. His texts and conservative religious philosophy
is at the centre of the Wahhab school which is the official school of Islamic thought
in Saudi Arabia. I suggest the reader who is interested in more details concerning
the relationship between the Saudi family and Wahhabism read Chapter 5 in Kepel
2004. 
8. This is a medieval legal concept applicable to non-Muslims who lived under
Islamic rule. Bat Ye‘or (1978, 1984, 1991, 2002) has revitalized this classic Islamic
concept by applying it to our contemporary problems with radical Muslims.
9. For an exhaustive criticism of Gellner’s thought, Hall and Jarvie 1996,
Mabry 1998 and recently Varisco 2005. For an attempt to reply to such critiques,
see Shankland 2003, Chapter 8.
10. It is interesting to note that the people comparing this book-burning activity
to the Nazi event have failed to observe that the Muslim demonstration might
better resemble the traditional ritual burning of heretical books by the Inquisition.
11. See for instance, Alsayyad and Castells 2002; Gerholm and Lithman 1988;
Haddad 2002; Kepel 1997; Khan 2000; Lewis and Schnapper 1994; Nielsen
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1992; Nonneman, Niblock and Szajkowski 1997; and Werbner 2002.
12. See for instance, Amersfoort 1998; Mandel 1996; Metcalf 1996; Nielsen
1992; Rex 1998; and Roald 2002.
13. See for instance, the five volumes edited by Martin E. Marty and Scott
Appleby (1991, 1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1995). 
14. Just to mention some studies among many: Duquin 2000; Erikson 1968;
Kitayama, Markus and Liberman 1995; Markus and Kitayama 1991; Rosaldo
1984. Yet it is interesting to note that in Rapport and Overing’s Social and Cultural
Anthropology: The Key Concepts (2000) among the key concepts discussed, emotions,
identity and self are missing. 
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CHAPTER 2
Jihad: From the Qur’an to the Islamic State
Other authors have devoted time and ink trying to explain the meaning and
historical developments of this Islamic concept (cf. Kolocotronis 1990;
Manirujjamana 1999; Noorani 2002; Peters 1985; Pruthi 2002 and, in par-
ticular, Heck 2004). Yet my respondents referred to historical events, and I
think that a brief discussion of jihad in the Qur’an, the Sunna and Islamic
scholarly texts would help the reader to follow my respondents’ discussions.
Let me start from an ancient, but still relevant, diatribe which, although
expressed in different terms, still animates the Muslim as well as non-
Muslim debate: is jihad a holy war? Although the majority of Muslims
emphatically reject such an axiom, we must recognize that historically a
straightforward answer does not exist. During their histories, the Islamic
states had to face a difficult decision: to interpret the Qur’anic teaching so
that any imperialistic aspirations had to be renounced, or to venture into
philosophical and theological sophisms and combine their earthly desires
with Allah’s injunctions. Since power and territorial control are difficult to
renounce, Islamic leaders have a privileged political interpretation of jihad
over the spiritual elements of Islam. Jihad cannot be understood outside the
historical contexts and events. Nevertheless, it is important to explain where
jihad is discussed in the recognized spiritual texts of Islam. 
Muslims have two main sources of religious knowledge: the Qur’an
(recitation), which is considered to be Allah’s1 revelation to his Prophet
Muhammad, and the hadiths (reports or narratives), the record of
Muhammad’s sayings and actions. Both these sources mention jihad. The
Qur’an has 114 suras (chapters) formed by 6,234 ayas (verses).2 Of all these
suras, only twenty-eight have some reference to jihad (the word jihad is
mentioned about forty-one times). The term jihad is derived from the
Arabic root jhd, ‘to strive’. The same jhd serves as the root for other verbs
emphasizing effort and struggle to achieve perfection in difficult tasks.
Unsurprisingly, ijtihad, meaning ‘to strive for understanding and inter-
preting the Qur’anic law’, has the same jhd root as jihad. Today, an
increasing number of people are aware of the correct Arab meaning through
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newspapers and non-academic sources, but unfortunately an increasing
number of scholarly publications prefer the traditional medieval translation
‘holy war’. Whether or not jihad is a holy war depends, as I have empha-
sized in the Introduction, on the person interpreting the concept. At a
purely linguistic level we should recognize that holy war in Arabic would
sound like harb-al muqaddasah rather than jihad. Neither in the Qur’an nor
in the hadiths can we find such an expression. This does not mean that in
the Qur’an a discussion of war is absent. 
The Qur’an is a spiritual book but it is also a practical one. Muslims see
it as a personal guide to Allah’s path as well as a guide to establishing the
Islamic ummah (community of believers). As a know-how guide to life, we
can find different topics discussed in the Qur’an, and among them, indeed,
is war. Pre-Islamic Arabic societies had developed a sophisticated martial
terminology, such as sira’at (combat), ma’arakat (battle), harb (war) and
qital (killing) which the Qur’an has inherited. For a society such as the pre-
Islamic Arabian, war was part of everyday life; but in the Qur’an the specific
term harb is rarely used and qital is used only thirty-four times but not
always with reference in killing one’s enemies. For instance, qital is often
found in verses that impose on human beings a respect for life in general.
So, in Sura 4:29 we can read ‘Nor kill (or destroy) yourselves: for verily
Allah hath been to you most Merciful!’,3 in Sura 5:32 ‘If any one slew a
person - unless it be for murder or spreading mischief in the land – it would
be as if he slew the whole people’, and again in Sura. 6:151 ‘Take not life,
which Allah hath made sacred, except by way of justice and law’. Therefore,
qital seems to be used in a way that rejects arbitrary killing. 
All Muslims agree that the Qur’an allows Muslims to fight in two main
circumstances: self-defence and to maintain their right to worship. Yet
each Muslim can decide when self-defence is needed or when the worship
of Allah is jeopardized. Again, personal interpretation is far more relevant
in understanding jihad than the literal text. Indeed, when we approach the
Arabic version of the Qur’an it is not difficult to recognize, as far as war is
concerned, a chivalrous attitude: forbidding useless violence, preserving
civilians, and expressly dictating strict codes of conduct and engagement.
I am not surprised that the majority of Muslims say that Islam is peace
loving, since the Qur’an gives them supportive evidence on preserving
civilians. One of my respondents told me that even in the case of war,
Muslims have to restrict their aim to ‘justice’ because ‘Those who believe
fight in the cause of Allah, and those who reject Faith, fight in the cause
of the Evil’ (Sura 4:76). Yet we must observe again that concepts such as
‘justice’ are open not only to interpretation but also to personal emotional
values. 
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Jihad, despite the variegated meaning it may acquire among Muslims,
certainly represents a sense of totalizing effort. In the Qur’an there are many
examples in which such effort (e.g. economic, psychological and physical)
has been required by the new-born Muslim community (see Sura 2:218,
4:95, 22:78, 25:53). So, jihad has a different meaning from qital or harb. Yet
in much popular literature as well as in some academic studies, I have
noticed that many Qur’anic verses allegedly reporting good examples of the
violent meaning of jihad are in reality mentioning qital. For instance, one of
the most worn Qur’anic verses quoted to support the violent concept of
jihad is Sura 2:191 ‘And slay [qtulu] them wherever ye catch them’. Often
the second part of the verse and its historical context is omitted by both
Islamic extremists and anti-Islamic rhetoricians: ‘and turn them out from
where they have turned you out; for tumult and oppression are worse than
slaughter’. The Qur’an is a text and like any other text entitles Muslims and
non-Muslims to interpret it. But to confuse qtulu with jihad (see Kelsay and
Johnson 1991: 50 and Johnson 1997: 61) has nothing to do with interpre-
tation and everything to do with ignorance or misreading. 
Since, according to Muslims, the Qur’an is Allah’s direct words, they rec-
ognize it as the most holy and unchangeable Islamic source. Indeed,
Muslims believe that the Qur’an has been preserved from being mixed with
the Prophet’s sayings. Yet Muhammad was the Prophet of Islam, guided
directly by Allah, and leader of the ummah; his actions, juridical decisions
and explanations could decrypt some of the difficult passages Muslims find
in the Qur’an. Muhammad’s followers started to memorize and report the
Prophet’s actions and sayings. At his death, in June 632, the ummah was left
without the earthly presence of the Prophet, without its ruler, its supreme
judge, its Qur’anic interpreter and, most visibly, its source of unity.
Although Muhammad had prepared his community for his death, and the
Qur’an itself had emphasized ‘Muhammad is no more than a messenger:
many were the messengers that passed away before him. If he died or were
slain, will ye then turn back on your heels?’ (Sura 3:144), the ummah felt
disoriented and tribal interests started to prevail. Although no Muslim
would openly have tried to manipulate or change the Qur’an (something
that indeed would have been harshly punished), the oral tradition of
hadiths, which had replaced the physical presence of the Prophet, became
the battlefield in which to affirm one’s own version of Islam. Hadiths started
multiplying uncontrollably: the first Muslims were tempted to resolve their
disputes by proudly saying ‘I saw the Prophet doing such and such,’ or ‘I
heard the Prophet saying such and such,’ as well as ‘somebody told me that
the Prophet said …’ Twenty years after the death of Muhammad, Muslims
had succeeded in publishing an organized and agreed official copy of the
Jihad: From the Qur’an to the Islamic State 19
01Jihad  30/3/06  4:31 pm  Page 19
Qur’an, but seemed completely incapable of preventing the creation of
hadiths. Soon it became clear that a reliability system to test the hadiths was
urgently required. 
Muslim scholars turned toward the Qur’an to find the best system to cat-
egorize the hadiths, and they found their solution in the Qur’anic require-
ment that Muslims must look for knowledge and ask the people who may
know best (Sura 29:20). Therefore, isnad (the chain of authorities) appeared
to be a suitable system for disentangling trustworthy hadiths from fake ones.
This system had another, less ‘divine’, advantage: it had been used among
the Arab tribes for centuries to validate their tribal traditions (sunna). Al-
Bukhari 4 and Muslim al-Hajjaj5 compiled the two most famous collections
of trustworthy hadiths, traditionally called sahih (literally, it means sound).
The hadiths that could not be considered as sahih, but were still considered
trustworthy, became known as hasan (good). On a decreasing scale, we can
find the da‘if (weak) and finally the saqim (meaning infirm or sick) hadiths. 
Goldziher (1971) was one of the first (non-Muslim) European scholars to
study the hadiths. Said’s suggestion (1978) that Orientalism may have
affected Goldziher’s views on Islam has irremediably overshadowed
Goldziher’s work. Nevertheless, I think that some of the findings of
Goldziher’s study should be reconsidered. He has argued that, after the
death of Muhammad, the several Muslim factions, struggling for religious
and political control of the ummah, fabricated some hadiths and imposed
their own Islamic views. Certainly, many hadiths, as Muslims recognize,
have been fabricated or substantially modified; but, as Burton (1994: xii)
has observed, ‘If hypocrisy lies precisely in the adoption of the external
demeanour of the pious and the counterfeit testifies to the existence of the
genuine coin, pseudo-hadiths imitate real hadiths, otherwise the exercise is
pointless.’ In other words, even the ‘pseudo-hadiths’ followed the model of
the real ones and became part of the Islamic tradition. 
Muslims perceived al-Bukhari’s and al-Hjjaj’s impeccable religious life
and faith as a warranty of their genuine commitment to report
Muhammad’s exact words and actions. If today we might have some scep-
ticism about the scientific efficacy of isnad, Burton (1994: xvii) has been
right in arguing that for a Muslim the respect of ‘every detail, however
minute, might literally make the difference between eternal life or death’. I
think that some of Goldziher’s criticism should be taken into consideration,
yet we must remember that Muslims consider the hadiths to be a vital
source of religious knowledge, second only to the Qur’an. 
The hadiths, however, have an advantage over the Qur’an. They are easily
understandable, anecdotal and are considered to be the product of human
beings reporting the actions of another (although respected and honoured)
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human being. This has some important implications. For instance, while
Muslims avoid misquoting the Qur’an, this is not the case with the hadiths. It
is the story, the anecdote that really matters. So, hadiths are still easily created,
modified and forged even today. Attending Friday khutbas (sermons) in dif-
ferent mosques, I have observed imams who have modified al-Bukhari’s
hadiths or even transformed Zen and Hassidic stories into new ‘hadiths’. 
Although Jihad constitutes only 0.4 per cent of the whole Qur’an, we may
find many hadiths (sahih, hasan, but in particular da‘if and saqim) which
mention it. In contrast to what we have discussed about the Qur’an, in some
of these hadiths jihad, harb and qital can be found together in the text. In
al-Bukhari’s and in al-Muslim’s collections, jihad never seems to justify
aggression. Nevertheless, a famous, but according to some Muslim scholars
controversial, hadith seems to suggest two contradictory aspects of jihad:
one spiritual (striving) and the other overtly military (fighting). Al-Qari,
who defined the hadith as saqim, reported it,
al-Khatib al-Baghdadi relates in his ‘History’ on the authority of Jabir: The
Prophet came back from one of his campaigns saying: ‘You have come forth in
the best way of coming forth: you have come from the smaller jihad to the
greater jihad.’ They said: ‘And what is the greater jihad?’ He replied: ‘The
striving (mujahadat) of Allah’s servants against their idle desires.’ (1986 [1406]:
127)
Although in the Arabic text we cannot be sure that the word ‘jihad’ refers
back to ‘campaign’, the majority of Muslim scholars accept such a correla-
tion and recognise two jihads: the striving and the fighting for Islam (Cook
2005). From different perspectives in the following chapters many of my
respondents will refer to the ‘doctrine of jihad’. 
Therefore al-Bukhari and al-Muslim’s collections are not able to clarify,
once and for all, the meaning of jihad. In al-Bukhari the concept of jihad is
surely open ended, yet his fifty-second book (i.e. chapter) simply titled
‘Jihad’, has been constantly translated as ‘Fighting for the cause of Allah’.6
Below, I shall report three of the most quoted al-Bukhari’ hadiths, 
Narrated Abu Huraira: A man came to Allah’s Apostle and said, ‘Instruct me as
to such a deed as equals Jihad (in reward)’. He replied, ‘I do not find such a
deed’. Then he added, ‘Can you, while the Muslim fighter is in the battle-field,
enter your mosque to perform prayers without cease and fast and never break
your fast?’ The man said, ‘But who can do that?’ Abu-Huraira added, ‘The
Mujahid (i.e. Muslim fighter) is rewarded even for the footsteps of his horse
while it wanders bout (for grazing) tied in a long rope’. (al-Bukhari, Vol. 4, Book
52, hadith N 44 in Khan 1995)
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Narrated ‘Abdullah bin Abi Aufa: Allah’s Apostle said, ‘Know that Paradise is
under the shades of swords’. (al-Bukhari Vol. 4, Book 52, hadith N 73 in Khan
1995)
Narrated ‘A’isha: the mother of the faithful believers: The Prophet was asked by
his wives about the Jihad and he replied, ‘The best Jihad (for you) is (the per-
formance of) Hajj’. (al-Bukhari , Vol. 4, Book 52, hadith N 128 in Khan 1995)
As an imam whom I have interviewed on this topic observed, these hadiths,
as the others concerning jihad in al-Bukhari’s book, emphasize istidsha (mar-
tyrdom) rather than murder. The imam observed ‘According to Muslim
theology, the highest act of love that a person could offer to Allah is his or
her own martyrdom’.7 The imam emphasized that Allah would reward the
brave believer with an immediate access to al-janna (The Garden, i.e. the
Paradise) and its mental and spiritual bodily pleasures. The term martyr,
shahid (from the Arabic root shd meaning ‘testify’), shares its root with
shahada,8 the Muslim profession of faith. By pronouncing it, Muslims
testify their submission to Allah, by dying for it, Muslims fulfil their testi-
mony. Indeed, which action might better testify a complete submission to
Allah’s will than martyrdom? Which action could ever require stronger jihad
than one’s own death for a spiritual ideal? The imam’s interpretation of
jihad (and probably the most common among the great majority of
Muslims) means to offer one’s own Muslim life to Islam rather than immo-
lating non-Muslims by it. 
However, Muslims have not shaped their contemporary idea of jihad only
through the Qur’an and the Prophet’s Sunna. The Islamic juridical tradi-
tions (fiqh), the history of the ummah (community of believers) and the for-
mation of the Ottoman Empire have played a fundamental role in shifting
the meaning of jihad towards holy war (Heck 2004). Increasingly divided,
the Muslim jurists have been unable to develop a unitary Islamic juridical
tradition. The same internal disagreements that had created a plethora of
questionable hadiths, produced contrasting schools of Islamic thought and
philosophy. Of course, each of these juridical schools presented their inter-
pretation of shari‘a (from the root sh‘ meaning ‘marking out’ and often
translated as ‘Divine Law’) as the most Islamic. Known as madhhabs (move-
ments or ideologies) they were named after their founders. Only four of
them have survived: the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi and Hanbali schools. The
Shi‘a Muslims developed a distinct school which I shall discuss latter. 
As we have seen, the hadith criticized by Ali al-Qari, but accepted by the
majority of Muslims, argues that there are two kinds of jihad. Later, the
Islamic scholars named them as al-jihad al-akbar (the greater jihad) and al-
jihad al-asghar (the lesser jihad). Then another sub-categorization took place
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and al-jihad al-akbar was divided into jihad al-qalb (jihad of the heart), jihad
al-kalima (jihad of the tongue) and jihad bi-al-yad (jihad of the hand). Al-
jihad al-asghar maintained its military connotation and was categorized as
jihad bi-al-saif (jihad of the sword). Islamic scholars have described jihad as
progressive achievement. So, the ‘jihad of the heart’ represents the struggle
of the personal naf (soul) against worldly temptations in order to achieve
spiritual purity. When Muslims reach this level, they may conduct ‘the jihad
of the tongue’ by preaching Islam. Yet preaching is not enough, and good
Muslims should perform the ‘jihad of the hand’ by showing the power of
Islam through good deeds. Only when Islam is threatened and as a last
resort, may Muslims conduct the jihad of the sword. It is important to be
reminded that the Qur’an does not mention any of these categories. They
are philosophical and theological products that tried to combine different
scholarly opinions on jihad in a unified system acceptable among the
increasingly divided Muslim communities. 
Yet war limited to self-defence was hardly the dream of any medieval king.
So, the contradiction between the eighth-century military expansion of
Islam and the Islamic injunctions against unjust, unprovoked wars became
visible (Heck 2004). Muslim scholars were required by their rulers to
resolve such a contradiction to allow expansionistic wars. Despite a famous
hadith narrating how the Prophet had emphasized ‘The best jihad is to
speak a word of truth to a tyrant’,9 we can easily understand how many
Muslim scholars preferred to favour their rulers’ earthly desires rather than
their theological beliefs. I agree with Heck when he observes ‘The umayyad
logic of state had profound and lasting effects on the Islamic conception of
jihad: jihad as the tool of a state oriented towards expansion and became
itself conceived as a tool in the service of territorial expansion, rather than a
religious struggle at the level of devotion to God’s cause’ (2004: 108).
Hence, Muslim scholars observed that Allah had revealed the Qur’an at
different stages of Muhammad’s life, and subsequently at different stages of
the history of the Islamic ummah. Two verses (Sura 2:106 and Sura 16:101)
seem to suggest that Allah might have replaced and modified some previous
Qur’anic revelations specifically revealed to address the particular needs of
the newly formed Muslim community. So some revelations written in the
Qur’an may refer only to unique historical events. Based on the authority of
these two verses, Muslim jurists and theologians developed what was known
as al-nasikh-ua-al-mansukh (literally ‘the abrogating and the abrogated’) or
simply the ‘doctrine of abrogation’. Nasikh indicates the verse which, abro-
gating, replaced the mansukh, the abrogated. However, the Qur’an does not
indicate which verses Allah might have replaced or changed. Since there is
no divine indication of which verses Muslims need to abrogate and replace,
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al-nasikh-ua-al-mansukh became another fertile ground for disagreement
among Muslims. Many verses in the Qur’an forbid aggression, a few others
if isolated from their context, sound aggressive against non-Muslims. A
selective use of al-nasikh-ua-al-mansukh could provide the moral shield that
Muslim leaders (and today’s extremists) need to religiously justify their
warlike goals.
Therefore, Ibn Hazm al-Andalusi (1986) could argue that the ‘peaceful’
verses of the Qur’an had to be considered as abrogated and replaced by the
‘verses of the sword’. In contrast, Imam Sobhy as-Saleh (1983) had refused
such a radical theory. Evidently, discussion about jihad moved from the
Qur’an and the hadiths to scholarly diatribes. One of the arguments used by
contemporary radical Muslims says that the ‘peaceful’ verses of the Qur’an
have been replaced by the ‘verses of the sword’ because the Muslim com-
munity had succeeded in overcoming its weakness and had won its impor-
tant battles against polytheistic Arab tribes. The community, now strong, no
longer needed the protection of the Jewish or Christian tribes it had enjoyed.
Muslims had achieved enough economic, political and, most importantly,
military power to commence their real divine task: Islamicize the entire
world. Of course, many Muslims reject this opportunistic understanding of
al-nasikh-ua-al-mansukh. For instance, an imam in Scotland observed, ‘if
we have to agree with this extremist argument we would have to accept the
paradox of a hypocritical God’. Yet we know that what might sound hypo-
critical to the imam in Scotland could make perfect sense to somebody in
London.
The Islamic state was becoming a superpower and needed to expand.
Before developing organized military campaigns on a large scale, Muslim
Arabs had conducted razzia. A pre-Islamic term, razzia indicated a quick raid
against non-Muslim territories aimed not at conquering lands, but rather to
provide essential resources (Lewis 1988). The practice of razzia had, however,
another advantage that was more political and less economic. Although
through razzia Muslims did not take direct control of the plundered non-
Muslim territories, indubitably these rapid and persistent incursions facili-
tated the decision of the constantly plundered tribes to join the growing
Muslim community. Indeed, Muslim tribes were not only spared from razzia
but could enjoy the resources derived from this traditional practice. 
Centuries later, a newly formed Islamic state, which economically and
politically was increasingly mimicking the Byzantine Empire, the super-
power of those times, could not rely upon razzia (Lewis 1993). The practice
of al-nasikh-ua-al-mansukh allowed the newborn Muslim states, and then
the Ottoman Empire, to achieve their imperialistic goals without abjuring
their Islamic commitments. The extensive use of al-nasikh-ua-al-mansukh,
24 Jihad Beyond Islam
01Jihad  30/3/06  4:31 pm  Page 24
in particular during the eighth century and the first part of the Middle Ages,
is indeed undeniable (Heck 2004; Watt 1968), although philosophers, such
as al-Ghazali,10 openly criticized it and rejected its use. Yet to transform the
concept of jihad as a productive expansionistic tool, another element was
needed, a new geopolitical vision of the world. 
The Qur’an emphasizes a universalistic and all-encompassing revelation
with a holistic vision of the world.11 Instead of highlighting divisions, the
Qur’an tends to emphasize similarities. But Muslim scholars started to
develop a dualistic representation of the world. If Islam was the most per-
fectly revealed religion, the Islamic state had to be the most civilized of all.
As in any imperialistic and colonialist design, civilising the uncivilized was
seen as a religious duty. Therefore, the world was divided into two geopo-
litical entities dar al-islam (the abode of Islam) and the dar al-harb (the
abode of war). If the former represented all the lands in which the shari‘a
had been implemented (i.e. a territory under an Islamic ruler, thus civi-
lized), the latter indicated all the lands in which non-Muslim law ruled (i.e.
the uncivilized). Of course, jahiliyya, the pre-Islamic ignorance character-
ized the lands of dar al-harb. 
Why did the Islamic scholars select the term harb (war) to geopolitically
identify non-Muslim lands? To understand the reason, we should follow the
rationale they employed. In the Qur’an Allah ordered humankind to allow
what is good and forbid what is wrong (Sura 3:104). This led the scholars
to argue that, since the non-Muslim lands, which at that time were almost
synonymous with Christendom, lived in a jahiliyya state (i.e. did not recog-
nize Islam), it was the duty of Muslims to invite citizens living under
jahiliyya to follow Islam. If they refused the first (kind) invitation, Muslim
states were religiously required to impose what was good (Islam) and forbid
what was wrong (jahiliyya lifestyles). 
Certainly, there were many similarities with the medieval Christian ide-
ology of the Crusades. Yet Islamic scholars had to face another challenge. In
the Qur’an we can find evidence that Muslims should not practise forced
conversions: ‘Let there be no compulsion in religion’ (Sura 2:256).
Historically, this modern and liberal idea was the one most betrayed by
Muslim rulers around the world. Indeed, the Islamic jurists interpreted this
verse as if it was referring to a single non-Muslim rather than to an entire
non-Muslim state. Consequently, they suggested that Islamic rulers could
grant a special status to single non-Muslims living under dar al-islam. This
special status was defined by a legal contract (dhimma), which allowed non-
Muslims the right of residence and economic transactions within the Islamic
state. The dhimma recognized, among other things, the right for the dhimmi
to practise their religion when it was not overtly polytheistic (Lewis 1988).
Jihad: From the Qur’an to the Islamic State 25
01Jihad  30/3/06  4:31 pm  Page 25
Extending its domain, the Islamic world increased not only in the number
of dhimmi, but also in the number of non-Muslim countries sharing its
borders. 
Unsurprisingly, in a state in which a diffuse level of education was
achieved and at least rulers could read and write, political literature was a
very popular genre. The most highly rated topic was foreign policy and
works theorizing the perfect Islamic state. Among the most successful and
influential books that can be mentioned is Shaybani’s kitab al-siyar al-kabir
(Khadduri 2002). The title has been translated into English as a politically
correct The Islamic Law of Nations. Yet the literal Arabic version sounds less
technical and certainly more warlike: The Book of the Great Campaigns.
Shaybani, however, argued that Muslims could not start war, they had to be
attacked first. Johnson has also noticed this ‘Shaybani’s concept of jihad is
thus fundamentally one of defensive war for faith, though his concept of
defence is a broad one due to the conceptions of the dar al-harb as a source
of perennial enmity and danger’ (1997: 72). The political and juridical dis-
tinctions between defensive and offensive jihads raised another question:
who was required to fight in each of them? The Islamic jurists decided that
offensive jihads should be a duty shared by the community, kifaya (i.e. the
state) and the khalifa was the authority that, consulting the ulemas, could
call a jihad. Being the entire community, and not a single Muslim, that had
to share the burden of the war, this jihad was called jihad fard kifaya. Yet in
the case of self-defence each Muslim conducted jihad without the ruler’s
permission, and in this case scholars spoke of jihad fard ‘ayn. The distinc-
tion is not just theoretical but has a practical aspect. When jihad fard kifaya
was called, the Muslims who did not possess weaponry or horses were
exempt from the battles (and of course from the consequent booty). The
Islamic state did not provide equipment for its soldiers and poor Muslim
families could certainly not afford the high costs of war campaigns. In other
words, jihad fard kifaya remained in the hands of the Islamic middle class
and the nobility. By contrast, each Muslim had to fight jihad fard ‘ayn since
in this case their personal lives and Islam were under threat. 
According to a hadith, the Prophet said ‘After me, there will be caliphs;
and after the caliphs, amirs; and after amirs, kings; and after the kings,
tyrants’ (quoted in Lewis 1988: 43). The Sunni jurists argued that the
khalifa (successor), as vicar of Muhammad, had the political and religious
power to call for jihad fard kifaya. This, however, does not represent the
opinion of all the Islamic schools. The Shi‘a scholars disagreed with the
Sunni on this point (and on many others, of course). To understand the
Shi‘a disagreement we need to understand how Shi‘a Islam (Shi‘a simply
means party) developed and became different from Sunni Islam. 
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In this case, to acknowledge the chronological order of these events
becomes very relevant. The division in the Muslim world started from a
dispute over the first khalifa succession. Muhammad died on 8 June 632,
leaving no indication of who would succeed him as leader of the ummah.
Some people saw in ‘Ali ibn-abi-Talib, who was Muhammad’s cousin and
son-in-law, a suitable candidate. Others argued that the Prophet himself had
not named a successor from the line of his family because he had rejected
the idea of an Islamic ruling dynasty. The Muslim community after the
death of Muhammad started to crumble and tribal interests started to
prevail. The Sunni became convinced that only a man respected by the Arab
tribes could maintain a united ummah. Abu Bakr, one of the most loved and
respected sahaba (companions) of the Prophet was recognized as such a
man. He became the first khalifa, so that the practice that the khalifa suc-
cession had to be guided by political interests rather than by kinship was
established among the Sunni. 
According to the Sunni tradition, Abu Bakr was a great, just and true
khalifa. When approaching his death, Abu Bakr consulted the other influen-
tial members of the ummah and then wrote down the name of his successor,
‘Umar ibn-al-Khattab (also known as ‘Umar I). After Abu Bakr, no other
khalifa had the privilege of dying in his bed from natural causes. ‘Umar I was
a great commander and started the military expansion of the Islamic world;
for this reason, he received the honorific title of amir al-mu’minin (the
Commander of the faithful). But his military skills did not spare him from
the anger of a woman who, having some unresolved disputes with him, killed
him in 644 CE. Although ‘Umar ibn-al-Khattab had no time to name his suc-
cessor, he had organized a committee, which, in the event of his unexpected
death, had to appoint the next khalifa. The committee elected Uthman ibn
Afan, a member of the Umayyad dynasty. As khalifa, Uthman was not as suc-
cessful as his predecessors had been. Tensions, divisions and disaffection
spread rapidly among the Muslims, so that some organized an insurgent
force and killed him. Finally, in 665 CE, the Muslims of Medina acclaimed
the cousin of the Prophet, ‘Ali ibn-abi-Talib, as the new khalifa. For the first
time a member of the Prophet’s family came into power. 
‘Ali’s supporters (Shi‘a) believed that the political power of the Islamic
state should remain within the ranks of the Prophet’s family. Another
faction (Sunni) argued that Islam rejected any hereditary power, and they
refused to recognize ‘Ali as the khalifat rasul allah. Consequently, Muslims
experienced what Islam had clearly forbidden: civil wars. ‘A’isha, the
Prophet’s widow and daughter of Abu Bakr, led the army to the ‘Battle of
the Camel’, so called because she stirred on her fighters from her camel. ‘Ali
won the battle but had to face another challenge, this time led by
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Muawiyah, the nephew of Uthman. Not only had Muawiyah refused to rec-
ognize ‘Ali as khalifa, but he also accused him of failing to punish the killers
of Uthman (his uncle). In other words, Muawiyah was suggesting that ‘Ali
himself might have been involved in Uthman’s assassination. Muawiyah was
a powerful man and controlled what today we call Syria. In 657, ‘Ali
decided to take back the region under his control; at Siffin ‘Ali’s army and
Muawiyah’s clashed. The battle was visibly favourable to ‘Ali when
Muawiyah played his last card: the Qur’an. Muawiyah’s army raised the
Qur’an and Muawiyah officially asked for guidance on its precepts. The
arbitration proved to be inconclusive, but had an unexpected effect on ‘Ali:
it challenged his leadership and power. Since Muawiyah succeeded in main-
taining his control over Syria, some of ‘Ali’s supporters remained unsatisfied
and accused ‘Ali of being unable to fulfil the duties as a khalifa, and they
organized a new party that spilt from ‘Ali’s faction. The new party was
known as the Kharijites (from kharaja, exit) and was a particularly extreme
and violent Shi‘a faction (Esposito 2002). In 661 CE, one of the Kharijites
ended ‘Ali’s reign by killing him five years after ‘Ali had been acclaimed
khalifa in Medina. 
This assassination became a central part of the Sh‘ia theological interpre-
tation of Islam. Shi‘a Muslims interpreted the martyrdom of their leaders as
evidence that the world was, and would remain until the Day of Judgement,
intrinsically unjust. The subsequent martyrdom of Hussein (‘Ali’s son)
during the battle of Karbala against the Umayyad forces seemed to confirm
Shi‘a eschatology. Shi‘a and Sunni developed different cultural and theo-
logical aspects. Among these there is the Shi‘a concept of the imamate
which substituted the figure of the elected Sunni khalifa. The Shi‘a imam
should be a member of Muhammad’s family although he does not retain
political power, as the khalifa does, he is the simply the highest spiritual
leader, the most faithful and (though he is not a prophet himself) infallible.
In 687 CE, a new theological idea developed among Shi‘a Muslims, the so-
called ‘hidden imam’. According to this belief, the imam Muhammad ibn-
al-Hanafiyya had not died but concealed his physical presence from human
beings. Before the Day of Judgement, he would leave his hidden place to
become the mahadi, the Messiah,12 establishing Allah’s justice on Earth.
According to the Shi‘a school, nobody could become a rightful leader other
than the hidden imam. Yet Shi‘a Muslims still needed rulers. To avoid
anarchy, they acknowledged that certain imams could act as agents of the
hidden imam and be under his guidance. Nonetheless, the vicars’ actions
would be ‘unjust’ by definition. For this reason, according to Shi‘a
Muslims, the only jihad that their leaders may invoke is a defensive jihad.
The exaltation of martyrdom among the Shi‘a facilitated the odd tradition
28 Jihad Beyond Islam
01Jihad  30/3/06  4:31 pm  Page 28
of the so-called suicide bombers, who first acted in Lebanon under the
banner of Hezbollah. Yet Hezbollah’s activity was understood as a fight
against the occupation and was never aimed at civilians, but rather targeted
military installations (see the 1983 attack on the US Marines in Lebanon). 
In other words, any concept of jihad could not exist outside six different
variables: time, space, social context, interpretation and, last but not least,
personal identity. 
Conclusion 
Jihad, even from a historical viewpoint, shows a complex relationship
between personal faith and political vision. The jihad that we have discussed
here is derived from our idea of history as formed by ‘bookmarks’ along
space-time dimensions. This represents the intellectual phylogenies of jihad
in the Islamic world. Although historical accounts are relevant to the under-
standing of how concepts develop and propagate, we have to recognize that
no concept could maintain exactly the same meaning in different historical
times, nor are they employed in the same way as they were. Yes, it is true
that people like bin Laden may use the medieval rhetoric of jihad, but this
rhetoric has more to do with Hollywood than the language of Shaybani.
History deals with macro levels, we can only observe history from the view-
point of the political elite. We can only speculate from documents, poems,
novels and other written sources what ordinary Muslims during those times
thought about jihad, since history tends to silence the individual in favour
of the state and its leaders.
The concept of jihad and the idea of suicide bombers are today becoming
entangled in the imagination of both Muslims and non-Muslims. As we
have seen in this historical excursus, they are an absolute novelty in any
Islamic traditions. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the end of the
caliphate also signalled the collapse of unified political Islamic doctrine and
the fragmentation of the former centralized power. In such a political-reli-
gious vacuum, who would become responsible to call for a jihad fard kifaya
or decide that Islam might be under threat? If emotions and personal iden-
tities have played a relevant role during the classical history of Islam, today
they have even a greater relevance in Muslims’ understanding of contem-
porary jihad. In other words, jihad is what Muslims (or non-Muslims) say it
is. There is no solution or escape from this tautology. The other way out
would be to affirm that jihad is what God says it is. Yet, even by accepting
Muslim theology, we have to observe that Allah revealed the Qur’an in the
form of a book. Books exist because people can read them and the very act
of reading is just the first step of interpretation. But here we have another
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tautology, interpretation is only possible through identity and we interpret
texts (as well as the world in general) starting from our identities. Therefore,
to avoid surfing from tautology to tautology, we need to address the key
issue: the mother of all interpretations of jihad – whether political, theolog-
ical, opportunistic, esoteric or materialistic – is personal identity. 
Notes 
1. Is Allah the God of both Christians and Jews? Muslims as well as non-
Muslims have answered in two different ways. One position, which is the most
widely shared among liberal Muslims, Christians and Jews, suggests that Allah is
exactly the same God that Christians and Jews worship. A second position, advo-
cated by some Muslim as well as Christian extremists, argues that Allah, although
being the same God worshipped by the Jews, is not the same God of Christians
since Christians believe in the Trinity (this is, for instance, bin Laden’s argument). 
2. The number reported here does not include the 112 unnumbered bismilla (in
the name of Allah) occurring at the beginning of each sura. 
3. Throughout this book, all the quotations from the Qur’an are from Yusuf Ali
(1983). 
4. Al-Bukhari (810–70 CE) purposely travelled through the Islamic state in
search of hadiths to collect. After a careful critical analysis, he organized them
thematically. For Sunni Muslims, the importance of his hadith collection is second
only to the importance of the Qur’an.
5. Muslim B. al-Hjjaj (817–75 CE) has also compiled a book of hadiths which
is as respected as al-Bukhari’s. 
6. I refer here to the translation by Muhammad M. Khan, which is also avail-
able on line, http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/fundamentals/hadithsunnah/bukhari.
7. The imam also referred to Sura 22:58, 47:4, 2:154. 
8. The shahada, which phonetically sounds ashhada an la-illa-llah,wa ashhadu
anna muhammadar-rasulillah, and means ‘I testify that there is no God but God
and Muhammad is the Prophet of God’.
9. It is interesting to note that even in this hadith jihad is linked to martyrdom.
Indeed, opposing tyrants could easily lead to death.
10. Al-Ghazali was one of the greatest Islamic jurists, theologians and mystical
thinkers. He lived in the northern part of Iran and studied Islamic theology and
philosophy in different schools of thought. He was also involved in Sufi practices
from an early age. His ideas and writings became so successful that he was
appointed head of the Nizamiyyah College at Baghdad in AH 484/109 CE.
11. Maybe I should say ‘of the universe’ since in several suras the Qur’an speaks
of ‘worlds’ instead of one world and Muslims believe that other planets could
indeed have intelligent forms of life.
12. For many Sunni Muslims the Messiah is Jesus, who Muslims recognize as
a prophet but not as God’s son.
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CHAPTER 3
I am What I Feel to Be
September 11: A day like many others until two planes crashed into New
York’s Twin Towers killing thousands of innocent people. The suicide
bombers saw themselves as mujahidin. We may try to explain this tragic event
either with rational or irrational theories. Yet the keyword that can help us to
make sense of an unthinkable and inhuman action is a simple one: emotion.
The hijackers, despite all the pathological or eschatological, theological or
political, rational or irrational, philosophical or practical reasons they might
have had for their actions, wanted only one thing, to induce emotions.1 To
do so, they did not just use a knife, a plane or their own lives, but a concept
and word that has ‘emotional’ implications for Muslims and non-Muslims:
jihad. They killed themselves, and thousands of others, while exclaiming
‘Allah Akbar’. They martyred themselves and murdered innocent people
because they felt they were Muslim. They destroyed two American symbols
because they felt they were Muslim. That feeling of being Muslim is what
they would have called their ‘Muslim identity’. My argument is that without
reconsidering what human identity might be, we cannot discuss the meaning
that jihad might have for my respondents. We need to go deep down into the
roots of identity formation to see how the environment in which people live
has the power to shape what they are and how they might think and act. In
the previous chapter I have described the events that have shaped the dif-
ferent historical understandings of jihad. Indeed, some Muslims, as we shall
see, may refer to those ideologies, rhetorical languages and histories. Yet still
a question remains: why? You do something (whatever it might be) because
you feel you are something, your ‘I’. 
I have been fascinated with the idea of identity since the first time I
started to question myself on what this ‘I’ might be. During my last year at
high school in Florence, on sunny spring weekends, I used to visit San
Miniato al Monte, a stunning medieval Dominican monastery. Periodically,
the Dominican monks of this monastery would hold interfaith forums
inviting other religious speakers for public lectures. One Sunday, while I was
admiring from there the beautiful landscape that Florence offers, someone
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came towards me, stopping at my left side: a Buddhist monk. The beautiful
landscape opened the topic of our conversation. Suddenly, in the middle of
it, he asked, ‘What are you?’ I naturally answered, ‘I am a student.’ A few
seconds of silence divided my answer from his next, unexpected, question:
‘do you need the “I”?’ An old friar arrived, asking the young Buddhist to
follow him. The young Buddhist left with a nice smile, his question was
never answered. This chapter deals with that ‘I’, which the Buddhist monk
left me struggling with for a long time; the same ‘I’ that brought the 9/11
hijackers to take their and others’ lives on behalf of a concept of ‘jihad’. In
this chapter, I will discuss what people call ‘identity’. 
To focus on ‘identity’ is certainly not a novelty for a study on Muslims
living in the West. You can rarely read a few lines in a newspaper or an aca-
demic article concerning Muslims in the West without coming across the
word ‘identity’. Yet the meticulous reader may have observed that ‘identity’
is often mentioned but its specific use is seldom explained even in academic
works;2 the impression is that the word ‘identity’ is self-explanatory.
Nevertheless, try to ask yourself what identity might be and your mind will
whirl across abstractions. For this reason somebody with a good sense of
humour has stated ‘trying to define yourself is like trying to bite your own
teeth’.3
In social science, identity has been studied mainly from an ‘outside’ per-
spective. In other words, scholars have mainly analysed what we do every
day when we interact and use each other’s identities in an instrumental way
(i.e. to know how to behave). For instance, when a non-Muslim invites a
Muslim friend to their house for dinner, they need to know in what ways
their guest differs from them (e.g. by not eating pork or drinking alcohol).
Of course, identity in such a context becomes a matter of differentiation and
it has facilitated the interpretation of people’s actions as boundary markers.
But because differentiation marks identity in the social world, should we
assume that the individual experiences his or her identity as social differen-
tiation? It is my contention that this has been, for a long time, a misrepre-
sentation of how personal identity might operate. Unsurprisingly, one of the
most quoted books in reference to what some call ‘cultural identity’ is
Fiederik Barth’s Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (1969). Barth’s intention was
not to develop a theory of identity, but rather to analyse the formation of
ethnic groups. Yet the success of his study ensured that the model has also
been often misused to define Muslim identities per se, particularly in the
case of so-called ‘second generations’. But if personal identity is not defined
by people’s social actions, in what way is identity formed? Why have some
of my respondents, as we shall see in the following chapters, made links
between ‘identity’ and ‘jihad’?
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To explain these points, we need to reconsider the concept of identity,
and to do so we need to observe a very basic reality that often we forget: in
order to feel our identities there is a need to have a conscious brain. For a
long time the relevance of our bodies in the formation of identity has been
neglected because culture and society have been arbitrarily abstracted from
nature.4 It is our brain, or better, its complex neurological system that, as
we shall see, enables us to attain consciousness and consequently achieve a
long-standing sense of selfhood. Yet because this process may be successful,
we need another two elements: the external world and its inputs (be they
natural, social or cultural).5 For this reason, throughout this book I would
summarize such a ‘web of external inputs’ in the simple word environment.
Yet we, as human beings, have continuous input–output relationships with
our surroundings. As we shall see in this chapter, it is what we call emotions
that have the function of interconnecting with the external environment and
with the internal one and vice versa (Milton and Svasek 2005). 
My argument in this chapter will unfold as follows. First, I will describe
how theories of identity have started from within the field of philosophy and
psychology and moved on to sociology and anthropology. Of course, the
discussion does not need to be a comprehensive review of all the available
theories of identity, rather I will focus on those theories that have implicitly
or explicitly been used in the academic discussion of Muslim identities.
Second, I shall discuss Damasio’s theory of emotions (2000) and Milton’s
idea of ‘Emotions as ecological mechanisms’ (Milton and Svasek 2005).
Starting from these two theories, I shall present my understanding of iden-
tity as an emotional commitment through which people experience their
autobiographical selves, so that it is what we feel we are that determines our
identities for us. Finally, I introduce Bateson’s concept of schismogenesis
(2002) and how it can affect personal identity and form what I shall define
as ‘acts of identity’. 
‘I’ and ‘Me’ 
One of the issues we have when we try to discuss ‘identity’ is the excessive
terminology that has proliferated with the growing numbers of studies
devoted to this subject. The frustration here is not with this ‘excessive ter-
minology’ per se, but with the fact that from one study to another, this ter-
minology has become ‘common sense’, and consequently lost its
specification. ‘Identity’, ‘self-identity’, ‘personal identity’, ‘self’, ‘selfhood’,
‘personhood’, ‘I’, ‘me’, ‘Me’ and many other terms6 have become synonyms
referring to that phenomenon which gives human beings their sense of them-
selves throughout their lives. All these terms want to mark one important and
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everyday experience event: we tend to experience ourselves as the same ‘I’
though time elapses and life changes continually. To quote Heraclitus,
although we cannot bathe twice in the same water of a river, the person
bathing in it feels the same both times. Water flows, the ‘I’ remains. 
‘Identity’ derives from the Latin idem, ‘the same’, and the Oxford English
Dictionary defines it as,
the sameness of a person or thing at all times or in all circumstances: the condi-
tion or fact that a person or a thing is itself and not something else; … it under-
lines the continuity of the personality … the quality or condition of being the
same in substance, composition, nature, proprieties, or in particular qualities
under consideration; absolute or essential sameness, oneness …
The philosopher Locke, in the second edition of An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding (1959), tried to answer why we humans feel we are
the very same person every year (I would add, every month, day, hour,
minute and second). Locke deduced that humans have a continuity of con-
sciousness: ‘since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that
which makes everyone to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes
himself from all other thinking beings, in this alone consists personal iden-
tity’ (Locke 1959: 449). As we shall see later, in focusing on consciousness,
Locke had the right intuition.
From this unitary vision of identity, which has endured through different
disciplines and theories, we have reached, in the so-called post-modern era,
the opposite position: a multiple and constantly changing identity. This has
also instigated a proliferation of terms attempting the difficult task of
imposing a meaning on the ‘thing’ that we call ‘self’, and these definitions
have changed according to the writer’s exigencies (Gleason 1982; Henry
2002). During these years, the discussion about identity and self has
become so entangled that somebody has suggested that we might ‘throw this
identity into the junk heap’ (Straub 2002: 59). How did we arrive at an idea
of identity that contradicts the very origin of the term? As some of my
readers may have just noticed, to discuss identity in abstract academic terms
can become difficult and confusing. So let me introduce Mr Hussein, a fic-
tional character on whom, as a guinea pig, the different theories can be
tested. The only thing at this stage that readers need to know is that Mr
Hussein declares himself to be Muslim.
One of the milestones in the study of identity has been James’s analytical
distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’ (1890); in other words the distinc-
tion between the self seen as ‘knower’ and the self seen as ‘known’.7 James
has recognized the ‘I’ as composed of three different, but related, aspects of
the self: the ‘material’ (e.g. body, belongings), the ‘social’ (e.g. social rela-
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tionships) and the ‘spiritual’ (e.g. the feeling of our own subjectivity).
Nonetheless, James, by emphasizing the social construction of the self,
started the tendency to overshadow the individual in favour of the society;
‘a man’, he has stated, ‘has as many social selves as there are individuals
who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind’ (1890: 294).
We can agree with James that our Mr Hussein could have a Muslim social
self, an Algerian social self, a terrorist social self (though he might not be a
terrorist), since some individuals know him as Algerian, Muslim and carry
an image (stereotyped) of him as a terrorist. The problem is that this
overemphasis on Mr Hussein’s social self has become in James the most rel-
evant aspect of Mr Hussein’s identity. The danger is that James’s idea that
Mr Hussein has as ‘many social selves’ as the number of individuals ‘who
recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind’ could end in
denying what Mr Hussein feels himself to be. Nevertheless, James estab-
lished the plurality of the ‘social self’, he cannot be held responsible for the
confusion that his argument would finally bring to the study of identity.
Indeed, he never suggested a dichotomy between the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’, rather
he argued for a certain unity within the self. 
Nonetheless, this Jamesian argument of the ‘unity of the self’ would dis-
appear in the more recent social constructivist theories of identity, in which
identity would be represented as extremely variable, fragmented and
somehow structured only by culture. James was a psychologist with an
interest in sociology and social dynamics. His theory, however, became very
successful among sociologists and later anthropologists. The shift from
physiological to sociological analyses altered the balance between mental
(bodily) and culturally, socially controlled, processes. 
From Psychology to Sociology
James’s argument that people possess different selves in their everyday lives
was further developed, if not radicalized, by Cooley (1992), Mead (1934)
and Goffman (1959) in what became known as ‘symbolic interactionism’.
They started from an issue that James had left unresolved: how could people
move from one identity to another, or even understand the identities of
others. Cooley, Mead and Goffman shared the idea that symbols enable
individuals to modify their personal self in accordance with their social envi-
ronment. In other words, the act of sharing symbols allows people to expe-
rience themselves in the roles of others. This suggests a mutual
interdependence between society and the personal self (Blumer 1969 and
Strauss 1959), which would be systematically theorized in Goffman’s mas-
terpiece The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959). 
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Goffman suggested that interactions among individuals (actors) may be
interpreted as ‘performances’ aimed at providing the others (the audience)
with the right impressions, but inevitably these performances are shaped by
the very same audience the actor is performing for. So, according to him, the
individual, through exchanging and manipulating information, forms his/her
identity as a function of interaction with others. This process is achieved
through what Goffman called the ‘front’, ‘that part of the individual’s per-
formance which regularly functions in a general and fixed fashion to define
the situation for those who observe the performance’ (1959: 22). In other
words, Goffman suggested that the act of representing the persona or self to
the other is what we call identity. Since to maintain their identities people
depend upon others, they need social interaction. Any stigma that may
prevent such social interaction could lead the individual to isolation and
alienation. He defined individuals’ efforts to present themselves to others in
a certain specific way as ‘impression management’. Of course, symbols are at
the very centre of Goffman’s theory since it is through them that people can
impress others and achieve social consideration. In conclusion, culture and
society shape human interaction and consequently human identity. 
Therefore, following (though simplifying for the sake of space) Goffman’s
main idea, Mr Hussein would have formed his Muslim identity as a func-
tion of interacting with both Muslims and non-Muslims. It is this manipu-
lation and exchange of the cultural element (in this case Islam) that defines
Mr Hussein as Muslim and lets others recognize him as Muslim. Of course,
depending on the observers’ viewpoints, Mr Hussein might be a good, bad,
fanatical or moderate Muslim. Now let us say that Hussein is a Muslim
migrant in a predominantly non-Muslim host society. Hussein, as a member
of a minority that is often stigmatized has problems developing social inter-
action and consequently he becomes increasingly alienated. Marginalized
and alienated, Hussein, who wants to maintain his Muslim identity, starts
to radicalize his Islamic views. Following Goffman’s theory, we must say
that the radicalization of Mr Hussein, and for example his extremist idea of
jihad, are the results of his cultural stigmatization. In other words, Mr
Hussein’s radical ideas are the consequence of his incapacity to meet his
audience’s standard sociocultural expectations. Some of you have probably
recognized this argument as one we often read in newspapers or hear on talk
shows. It is a straightforward, convincing argument, which, however, tells us
more about how stereotypes might be formed rather than Mr Hussein’s
identity. Although stigma and stereotype processes have an impact on an
individual, it may be reductive to argue that they shape identity. 
Starting from Goffman, McCall and Simmons (1978) have further dis-
cussed the interdependence between self and society and developed the 
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so-called ‘role-identity theory’. The core of their theory argues that ‘the
character and the role that an individual devises for himself as occupant of a
particular position’ within society forms what we call identity (1978: 65,
emphasis added). Through this definition, McCall and Simmons have
hoped to explain what Goffman had left answered: how individuals may
pass from one identity to another (or, to use Goffman’s terminology, from
one character to another) and remain, at the same time, part of the audi-
ence. Indeed, according to McCall and Simmons, any one person occupies
a range of social positions allowing the individual to have several identities
taking part in more than one social role. Yet McCall and Simmons found
themselves facing the same question that Locke tried to answer; many
people still affirm that they feel the same and have the same identity although
living in different social circumstances. The two authors tried to resolve the
issue by arguing that people constantly try to impose on others the identity
that they are keen to preserve. This is achieved through social interaction
which allows individuals to establish ‘uniqueness’ within their group of ref-
erence. 
McCall and Simmons seem to suggest that Mr Hussein has to struggle in
an endless competition to acquire and maintain the best of his identities (for
instance, Muslim) within his group of reference. Yet since, according to
McCall’s and Simmons theory, Mr Hussein needs to express his role iden-
tity, he finds himself forced to negotiate his role identity with other members
of the group. (Burke and Reitzes 1981). As we can see, this theory tends to
focus primarily on how people select and maintain their roles within society
rather than how people form their personal identities. So, how might role-
identity theory explain an eventual radicalization of Mr Hussein? The
answer is that Mr Hussein’s radical ideas might have derived from his need
to express a strong identity within a certain group; a group of which he needs
to be part in order to express his identity. We can observe that role-identity
theory, indissolubly linking the individual to the social group, tends towards
a certain tautological representation. This issue brought Stryker to develop
his ‘identity theory’. He understood that if scholars did not want going
around biting their own teeth, one question had to be addressed: why it is
so central to people’s actions. 
Although Stryker has focused on the right questions, his theory has ended
up suggesting an even more fragmented and variable idea of identity than
role identity did. Actually, Stryker’s ‘identity theory’ has many points of
contact with McCall and Simmons’ role-identity theory (Thoits and
Virshup 1997). Stryker, as the other student of identity we have mentioned,
has argued that the self is a direct product of the society in which the indi-
vidual lives. Yet the starting point of Stryker’s observations has been that
I am What I Feel to Be 37
01Jihad  30/3/06  4:31 pm  Page 37
since societies are complex and ruled by difference, though organized, in the
same way human self must be equally complex and ruled by differences,
though organized, So, people, according to Stryker have complex and dif-
ferentiated selves that are expressed through different identities according to
the social context in which people find themselves (Stryker and Serpe
1994). Mr Hussein, in this case, has different ‘selves’ (Muslim, father,
imam, mujahidin and so on). One of these ‘selves’ would become his com-
mitted identity because a number of people, who are relevant in his life,
would require him to play that certain role (for instance imam) within a
certain context (the mosque on Friday). This means that in another context,
with another group of people, Mr Hussein might be a mujahid. Yet some-
body might ask why Mr. Hussein should accept an identity that other people
and the social context has ultimately dictated to him? Stryker has answered
that people select their personal identities to satisfy their personal interests.
In other words, the identity that in a certain context fulfils the interest of the
individual would be the most likely to be activated.
‘Interest’ is what prevents people rejecting the identity that the social
context has imposed on their personal self. But at this point, we might ask
who controls whom: is it Mr Hussein who by selecting a certain identity in
order to fulfil his desires, controls the group (i.e. society), or the opposite,
the society which, by imposing a certain identity on Mr Hussein, controls
him and his desires? There is no answer in Stryker’s theory to this issue; if
we accept his theory we must postulate a continuum between self, society
and identity in which one element shapes the other in an endless circle.
Furthermore, we must also understand society as an all-encompassing,
abstract, (and ever existing) force. I have to say that observing Mr Hussein
through Stryker’s lens I reach the conclusion that Mr Hussein is a passive
human being and driven by self-interest. Now, if there might be a Mr
Hussein fitting such a description, it is difficult to agree that all humanity in
any place and culture could be so passive and completely driven by self-
interest. Indeed, there is a certain Pavlovian influence in Stryker’s theory. If
one were to reject Stryker’s Pavlovian vision of personal identity, but still
believe that people have identities because of societies and cultures, one
would need to explain how people might renounce their individuality in
exchange for social acceptance. Two scholars have attempted to resolve this
sphinx-like enigma through two correlated theories: Tajfel’s ‘social-identity
theory’8 and Turner’s ‘self-categorization theory’. 
Tajfel has observed two important facts: first, that self-esteem (as James
had suggested) has a paramount relevance for identity formation; second,
that people categorize social and non-social stimuli in order to self-identify
with others and to form ‘in-groups’, which differentiate themselves from
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‘out-groups’. Differentiation allows groups to form a group identity (i.e. an
in-group A feels itself to be A because it is not part of an out-group B).
Therefore, Tajfel’s social-identity theory (Tajfel 1979), has suggested that
personal self-esteem can only be achieved through in-group membership,
personal identities depend upon the social identity of the in-group and the
self-esteem of each member of the group depends upon the self-esteem of
the others involved within such an in-group. Mr Hussein needs self-esteem
like any other human being, but he can achieve self-esteem only if he
becomes part of a group, namely, his in-group. Mr Hussein’s in-group
(formed by Muslims) provides him with his identity (Muslim) because
through his Muslim in-group he can be differentiated from the ‘others’, or,
the non-Muslim out-group. So, Tajfel can now explain what the other
authors we have discussed could not: how society and culture shape Mr
Hussein’s identity and self. Yet Tajfel’s theory tells us that Mr Hussein (and
the rest of humanity) could not experience their identity as individuals but
only as members of an in-group. Tajfel’s theory has denied the very concept
of the individual. His theory has had an incredible influence on anthropol-
ogists, who in their research have ended up overemphasizing society at the
cost of individuality. Tajfel, however, has not explained how ‘collective iden-
tification’ might be possible. 
One of Tajfel’s students, Turner decided to bring to perfection his
mentor’s theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner 1999). Turner has devel-
oped the so-called ‘self-categorization theory’ to address the issue of ‘col-
lective identification’:
The basic process postulated is self-categorization, leading to self-stereotyping
and the depersonalization of self-perception. It is argued that where people
define themselves in terms of shared social category membership, there is a per-
ceptual accentuation of intergroup similarities and intergroup differences on rel-
evant correlated dimensions … where social identity becomes relatively more
salient than personal identity, people see themselves less as differing individual
persons and more as similar, prototypical representatives of their ingroup cate-
gory. (1999: 11)
So, Turner’s solution is a process called ‘depersonalization’, which is caused
by the natural human attitude of stereotyping others. Yet Turner and Tajfel
have disagreed on whether emotion plays a role in the formation of in-
groups. While the former has strongly argued against the idea that people
might form in-groups through emotional processes, the latter has suggested
that cohesion and identification were the result of a ‘depersonalization’
process controlled by emotions. So, Mr Hussein’s radical ideas would be the
result of the necessary stereotyping process of the out-group (non-Muslims),
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so that being in the in-group enhances self-esteem and, hence, allows Mr
Hussein to enjoy a stable identity. If the self-esteem of the in-group is chal-
lenged or endangered, Mr Hussein would risk losing his identity, which is
only socially determined, and he might turn to extremist acts to preserve the
in-group. In conclusion, according to Tajfel’s ‘social identity’ and Turner’s
‘self-categorization theory’, Mr Hussein’s radicalization and activity would
just be the by-product of in-group versus out-groups dynamics. 
In this section, we have discussed the different theories of identity that
have been widely used in social scientific researches. These theories, though
different in some aspects, have shaped the mainstream idea that identity is
only socially and culturally produced. Yet, though society and culture have
an important role, they cannot constitute the whole truth. According to
these social-centric theories, individuals, who however form their identities
through society itself, themselves form society. This tautology leaves us with
a dilemma: our identity would not be exactly ours; you are not what you feel
to be. According to these theories, Mr Hussein’s ‘I’m Muslim’ would not
represent what Mr Hussein feels to be but what Mr Hussein was told to be
or the context forced him to be. Not only is this deterministic, but it means
that what determines Mr Hussein’s identity is an abstract, imagined, cate-
gory called group or ‘society’. 
During my research, I have not met the fictional character Mr Hussein
but Husseins in the flesh for whom individuality was a reality and society an
abstraction. While living with them, observing them, trying to understand
their understanding of themselves, I have had the strong impression that
their identities did not derive from passive cultural processes, that the rela-
tionship between individual and society was much more complex than these
theories have suggested. Trying to understand this ‘plus’, we need to
approach the nurture–nature discussion from a new viewpoint. 
The Self and the Anthropologist 
During the 1970s, a long debate started: are we products of nurture or
nature? Holland (1997) has presented the discussion in terms of universal-
ists (those who maintain the prominence of nature) versus culturalists
(those who maintain the prominence of culture). The ‘universalists’ argued
that, although in the formation of self/identity, culture might have some
role, it is subordinated to universal biological and natural psychological
structures. The ‘culturalists’ argued the opposite, making self/identity an
excusive domain of culture. Culture, according to the former, shapes a
person’s identity as a bottle shapes the water it contains. This conceptual-
ization of identity has received support from cultural psychologists who have
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tried to prove scientifically a deep correlation between culture and identity.9
Although the main anthropological focus in studying identity has been on
culture, the majority of anthropologists have avoided universalists’ and cul-
turalists’ extreme viewpoints. 
Anthropologists, however, have shown an interest in studying identity
much later than other social scientists. There has been a certain agreement
among anthropologists (see Whittaker 1992) that Hallowell was one of the
first anthropologists to discuss ‘self’ and ‘identity’ in an ethnographic work
(1955). Indeed, Hallowell attempted to reconcile the universal and cultural
aspects. His study of the Ojibwa,10 which could be considered one of the
first structural-functionalist analyses of identity, has suggested a connection
between self and social institutions. Although he has argued that self-aware-
ness and self-reflexivity are universal features, he has also emphasized that
other aspects of the self are culturally shaped and cannot be interpreted in
terms of a universal perspective. More recently, another anthropologist has
tried to cross the nature–nurture dyad in the study of identity. Obeyesekere
(1981) has suggested that symbols play an important role in solving psy-
chodynamic problems and difficulties that people have to deal with. He has
argued that people use symbols (the cultural side) to manage the psycho-
logical effects (the universal side) they have to face. Nonetheless, the influ-
ence that social constructivism has had on anthropology11 has promoted
anthropological analyses of identity and self (often discussed as if they were
interchangeable terms) as inconsistent entities. So inconsistent, ‘fleeting,
fragmentary, and buffeted’, to use Holland’s words, that ‘from the extreme
ephemeralist position, daily life, especially in the post-modern era, is a
movement from self to self’ (Holland 1997: 170). 
I agree with Holland’s view, since by reading many anthropological
analyses concerning Muslim migrants and their children (see Chapter 6), I
have found myself thinking of Welsch’s words, ‘to be healthy today is truly
only possible in the form of schizophrenia – if not polyphrenia’ (1990: 171).
Yet it is not only the representation of Muslims as ‘polyphrenic’, but also the
fact that, as Sökefeld has critically observed, ‘In anthropological discourse,
the question of identity is almost completely detached from the problem of
the self. In the vast body of literature about ethnic identity the self is rarely
mentioned, and in writings about the self, a relation between the self and
identities is some time noted but remains unexplored’ (1999: 419). Sökefeld
has argued that because of the overemphasis on society we have just dis-
cussed, anthropologists have denied the relevance that individuality and the
personal self have in the study of the ‘others’. He has suggested that social
anthropologists took ‘Durkheim’s concept of “collective representations” …
as justification for the fact that social anthropology gave little attention to
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the individual, regarding the social as its only object’ (1999: 428). This is
not so surprising, if we think that theories of identity, which I have summa-
rized in the previous section, have been widely (though often implicitly)
employed as the theoretical framework for anthropological studies.
We have seen that a major role in the denial of individuality in the for-
mation of identity has been how social scientists during the 1960s under-
stood ‘culture’. So, Sökefeld has observed that in anthropology culture has
been seen ‘not as something ephemeral but … as a “power” constituted by
a system of shared meaning that is effective in shaping social reality’ (1999:
427). This, according to him, has prevented some anthropologists recog-
nizing the existence of a stable and individualistic self. Indeed, many anthro-
pologists have accepted the idea that self and identity are as unstable and
fluid as the cultures that allegedly create them. Sökefeld has suggested that
a solution could be achieved by conceiving ‘the self (used here as generic
term including “individual”, “individuality”, “person”, etc.) as [a] relatively
stable point’ (1999: 427).
Sökefeld’s article has raised a debate in the journal in which it was pub-
lished (Current Anthropology). Almost all the scholars who have commented
on Sökefeld’s article agreed with him in principle (with the unsurprising
exception of Gellner, Mageo and Werbner).12 Rapport was the most sym-
pathetic to Sökefeld’s criticism and has even advocated ‘a human-existen-
tialist anthropology which recognizes the radical freedom of the apartness of
the individual … Individuals carry with them their own experiential con-
texts, in short, and human social life is the story of a diversity of individual
worlds abutting against one another’ (Rapport quoted in Sökefeld 1999:
439). Traditionally, post-modern scholars studying migrants, and in partic-
ular Muslim migrants, seem to be keen to deny what Rapport has rightly
observed. Indeed, to use a vivid comparison that Ingold has made ‘in
anthropology, culture has tended to play the role that the DNA is made to
play in biology’ (Ingold 1996: 114). Notwithstanding the fact that I agree
with almost the whole of Sökefeld’s argument, I still perceive the traditional
division between nature and nurture. This dyad does not help develop a
clear understanding of the self and consequently identify what identity is. 
Geertz has defined culture as a ‘control mechanism – plans, recipes, rules,
instructions (what computer engineers call “programs”) – for governing
behavior’ (1973: 44). In a previous version of the same article, he also
emphasized that such a ‘control mechanism’ is achieved by ‘the imposition
of an arbitrary framework of symbolic meaning upon reality’ (1964: 39). In
other words, humans without culture could not control their behaviour and
would act as ungovernable, chaotic, shapeless, a-meaningful beings (Geertz
1964: 46). Non-humans (animals), though lacking symbols and culture,
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avoid such chaos because they have natural ‘control mechanisms’ (i.e.
instincts) that substitute culture. However, I agree with Ingold when he has
observed that Geertz’s conceptualization of culture tends to represent
humans as ‘suspended in webs of significance [and] puts humans in a kind
of free-floating world in which we are ascribing significance to things “out
there”’ (Ingold 1996: 130). Geertz has presented humans as something dif-
ferent from the rest of nature, as beings resembling mythological fallen
angels now trapped between the two dimensions of nature and nurture. 
Recently, some anthropologists have tried to completely overcome the
nature–nurture dyad and have suggested that we can interpret cultural phe-
nomena as one of the many realities of nature. So, Milton has argued, 
any debate about the naturalness or unnaturalness of cultural phenomena is
most accurately seen as a debate about human nature and human experience
(often expressed as ‘nature and nurture’) rather than nature and culture. What
confuses the issue, apart from a failure to recognise the different meanings of
‘nature’, is that human experience and its products are often described as
‘culture’, while attributes of human nature are often described as ‘non-cultural’.
(2002: 17)
By agreeing with Ingold who has argued, ‘perception involves the whole
person, in an active engagement with his or her environment’ (1996: 115),
Milton has reconsidered the role that emotions have in the way in which we
relate to our environment. Milton’s work on emotions as well as Damasio’s
study of consciousness (2000) are central to my understanding of identity
and will be discussed in the next section. 
From Consciousness to Self
As I have mentioned earlier, Damasio’s book The Feeling of What Happens
(2000) suggests one of the most recent and intriguing theories on human
consciousness. Damasio is M. W. Van Allen Professor and Head of Neuro-
logy at the University of Iowa. As a neuroscientist, he has developed a par-
ticular interest in the study of emotions and consciousness. Damasio has
conducted both laboratory experiments and clinical observation of people
suffering brain damage affecting consciousness and emotional reactions.
This has allowed him to study the relationship between emotions, con-
sciousness and self. His theory has changed the way in which we used to
think about emotions and feelings. 
Damasio (1995) has argued that emotions and feelings are not exactly
what we ordinarily think they might be. Emotions are reactions to external
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environmental stimuli producing bodily changes, such as changes in heart rate,
blood pressure and neurological activities. Although many of these bodily
changes remain undetected by the ordinary external observer, some produce
visible alteration of, for instance, facial expressions, increase in sweating and
alterations in behaviour. By contrast, what Damasio has called feelings are
mental representations of the body-state; they are the private experience of emo-
tions, inaccessible to observation, and consequentially to other fellow
humans. Damasio has observed that emotions pertain to the bodily domain,
while feelings to the mind. Consequently, we first have emotions and then
the feelings caused by them. While emotions do not become part of our
mind, since they are only reactions to external stimuli, feelings become a
consistent part of the mind as the lasting memory of emotions. In other
words, happiness, sadness, joy, love and other more complex ‘sentiments’
are not (as common sense understands them) emotions but rather feelings. 
Starting from Damasio’s observations, Milton has suggested that emo-
tions ‘are an ecological rather than a social phenomenon, that they are a
mechanism through which an individual human being is connected to and
learns from their environment’ (Milton and Svasek 2005: 32). Milton does
not reject the idea that emotions are generated during social interaction, but
rather that they do not have a ‘social ontology’ (2005: 35) and the ‘other’
producing the emotional behaviour ‘does not have to be a social or human
other, it can be anything with which the individual organism engages, for
emotion is part of that engagement’ (2005: 35). This leads to the conclu-
sion that through the engagement with different environments ‘people learn
to love, hate, fear, or be disgusted by different things, so that their body
reacts differently when things are encountered’ (Milton and Svasek 2005:
36). As Damasio has explained, we translate these bodily reactions (i.e.
changes) into feelings. Now, it is my contention that emotions, and the
process of learning through them, have an important role in the formation
of human self and identity. 
Damasio has argued that because emotions could have an impact on
organisms, they started to develop what we shall call ‘self’ so that organisms
could stimulate internal and external changes. According to Damasio, evo-
lutionary processes have originated increasingly complex systems of ‘selfs’,
the simplest of which he has called proto-selves. All living organisms (even a
mono cellular paramecia) have proto-selves, an unconscious system that is ‘a
coherent collection of neural patterns which map, moment by moment, the
state of the physical structure of the organism in its many dimensions’
(2000: 154). Some organisms, however, become more complex than others
and not only have proto-selves but also consciousness. Damasio, reminding
us that consciousness is not monolithic, has suggested the existence of at
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least two kinds of consciousness: core consciousness and extended consciousness,
which then form two parallel kinds of self, the core self and the autobiograph-
ical self. 
Core consciousness, which is less complex than extended consciousness,
occurs when the brain’s representation devices create an image of how the
internal state of the organism is affected by an external object and locate it
in a salient spatial-temporal context. This leads to the core self: ‘the transient
protagonist of consciences, generated for any object that provokes the core-
consciousness mechanism’ (Damasio 2000: 175). The core self, which
depends on the proto-self being modified, is continuously generated and
time related because, of course, we encounter an unending number of
objects in our environment. The result of core consciousness is what
Damasio defines as ‘the feeling of knowing’; yet, although the core self is
formed through a conscious process, we hardly notice it, ‘the images that
dominate the mental display are those of the things of which you are now
conscious’ (2000: 172). It is clear that memory has a fundamental role in
the formation of the sense of ‘self’, which, in Damasio’s terminology, is rep-
resented by the autobiographical self. The autobiographical self is formed by
two elements, the core self and ‘reactivations and display of selected sets of
autobiographical memories’ i.e. what Damasio has defined as the autobio-
graphical memory (Damasio 2000: 196). He, through convincing clinical
examples, has suggested that without autobiographical memories our sense
of self (i.e. our sense of past, future and historical-temporal continuity)
could not be developed. At the same time, however, without the core self,
derived from the core consciousness, ‘we would have no knowledge what-
soever of the moment, of the memorized past, or the anticipated future that
we also have committed to memory’ (2000: 219). So, emotions, and the
consequent feelings they induce, are the ‘engine’ of these complex neuro-
logical processes that we simply call the ‘self’, and we have seen how emo-
tions put us in relationship with our environment. 
It is becoming clear that ‘self’ and ‘identity’ are not the same, as some of
the theories we have discussed seem to imply. The self (but not identity) is
something that exists; it is the product of our complex neurological systems.
Following Damasio’s theory of self and consciousness, we can now resolve
Friese’s dilemma: ‘it is neither clear whether the reflecting subject has self-
consciousness or whether it is self-consciousness, nor is it clear how subjec-
tivity thus understood can be unified, and related to diversity at the same
time’ (2002: 21 emphasis in the original). The ‘reflecting subject’, we can
now affirm, is self-consciousness, since without consciousness we cannot
have a reflecting subject. Damasio’s theory of the self resolves another issue
left open by sociocultural theories of identity, namely, to reconcile the
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Jamesian’s ‘ever-changing self’ with the self seen as the stable element of the
persona. Damasio’s theory of self explains that, although closely related, the
core self and autobiographical self are two different entities. While the core
self represents the Jamesian’s ‘ever-changing self’, the autobiographical self
provides the sense of stability. 
Mr Hussein, before we discussed Damasio’s and Milton’s theories,
formed and maintained his personal self/identity through social interaction,
so culture and society shaped him as a Muslim. Mr Hussein changed his
personal self through negotiations with his group (or society), he could
make sense of himself because an out-group existed, and he was happy to
‘depersonalize’ to the advantage of his in-group. Mr Hussein, like all human
beings, was a product of ‘culture’, which acting as a control mechanism
could govern his behaviour; without it he could have only acted chaotically,
shapelessly and a-meaningfully. (Geertz 1973: 44). From this perspective,
Mr Hussein’s self was ‘suspended in webs of significance’ (Ingold 1996:
130). Mr Hussein is a fictional character, yet starting from these views of
self, we would certainly not be more real. Even before discussing Mr
Hussein’s self and identity, the observer has to acknowledge, and fully
accept the consequences, that he is a human being, that he is made of flesh
and blood, that he has a brain which is conscious, which reacts bodily to
changes in his environment. 
If we take into consideration these points, we can observe the ‘human
being’ Mr Hussein. To do that, we may use Damasio’s and Mitlon’s theo-
ries. Since Mr Hussein is physically and mentally a healthy human being,
he could interact with his environment, he could watch TV by using his
eyes. Mr Hussein was watching the Arabic channel al-Jazeera when he
became aware of the horrible pictures he was watching, children mutilated,
women in despair, blood and death. This ‘stimulus’ activated a bodily
response (emotion) and Mr Hussein’s heart throbbed, his blood pressure
increased, his face became red and his hand formed a fist. Mr Hussein felt
anger (perception of emotion) and shouted ‘we have to conduct jihad and
kill the bloody Americans’ (action). Milton and Svasek (2005) have told us
that Mr Hussein’s emotions are ‘ecological mechanisms’ through which we
learn from the environment and they have a deep impact in the formation
of feelings. We form our consciences only in relation to our environment;
in other words the external objects forming what we call, in general terms,
the environment have an impact on our neurological system and create,
through different neuron maps, what Bateson (2000) has described as the
abstract account of a concrete external world. So, Damasio (2000) has told
us that emotions and feelings influence Mr Hussein’s proto-self and conse-
quently his core self which with Mr Hussein’s autobiographical memory form
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his autobiographical self (what we normally just call the self). The emotions
induced by the pictures that Mr Hussein has watched are, through the feel-
ings of anger, now part of Mr Hussein’s self. So far so good, but we still
have to understand what is that thing called ‘identity’, symbolically repre-
sented by the English pronoun ‘I.’
Rethinking Identity 
As Locke had intuitively suggested about three centuries ago, human beings
have a strong tendency towards a single sense of self. The philosopher Kant
argued, ‘I am … conscious of my identical self, in relation to all the variety
of representations given to me in an intuition, because I call all of them my
representations’ (Kant 1990: 138). Not surprisingly, McAdams has
stressed,
[The ‘I’] puts experience together – synthesizes it, unifies it – to make it ‘mine’.
The fact that it is mine – that when I see the sunset, I am seeing it; that when
you hurt my feelings, those were my feelings, not yours, that were hurt – pro-
vides a unity of selfhood without which human life in society as we know it
would simply not exist. (1997: 57 emphasis in the original)
Damasio, from a neuroscientific rather than a philosophical perspective, has
suggested something very similar: the ‘I’ would be a ‘delicately shaped
machinery of our imagination [which] stakes the probabilities of selection
toward the same, historically continuous self’ (2000: 225). Human beings,
however, need to make sense of their autobiographical self so that they can
express it. Indeed, feelings (i.e. the perception of emotions) are so personal
that other human beings cannot directly experience them. Although I agree
with Damasio’s idea of identity, I suggest that identity is not just a mecha-
nism that ‘stakes the probabilities of selection’ toward the same self, but
rather a process that allows human beings to make sense of their autobio-
graphical self and to express it. 
An act of identity is a symbolic act. Geertz has provided the most suc-
cessful and famous definition of symbols. He has interpreted symbols as an
extrinsic source of information. According to him, symbols lie outside the
individual and provide a way of looking at or understanding the world and
its processes (1973). Unsurprisingly, Geertz has compared symbols to
genes:
this comparison of gene and symbols is more than a strained analogy of the
familiar ‘social heredity’ sort. It is actually a substantial relationship, for it is 
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precisely because of the fact that genetically programmed processes are so highly
generalized in men, as compared with lower animals, that culturally pro-
grammed ones are so important; it is only because human behaviour is so loosely
determined by intrinsic sources of information that extrinsic sources are so vital.
(1973: 92–93)
Geertz has described symbols as extrinsic sources of information that
provide humans with what in non-humans are provided by intrinsic sources
(i.e. instincts). He has added another pre-programmed element, this time
social and cultural, which not only would control human behaviour, as
genes do, but also make the behaviour ‘human’ and ‘normal’, in other
words, non-schizophrenic. 
As I have said in the previous section, I disagree with Geertz, finding
Milton’s argument on ‘ecological emotions’ more convincing and certainly
less dogmatic. I suggest that symbols do not lie outside the individual but are
part of that mechanism that allows us to ‘feel’ the so-deeply personal and
incommunicable human feelings. Turner (1967) has described symbols as
‘storage units’ filled with information that not only carry meaning, but also
transform human attitudes and behaviour. He described symbols as a ‘set of
evocative devices for rousing, channelling, and domesticating powerful
emotions’ (1969: 42–43). Although I agree with Turner’s definition, fol-
lowing Damasio, we have to read ‘feelings’ where Turner speaks of emo-
tions. In other words symbols are a storage unit filled with references to
stimuli capable of provoking emotions which induce certain selected feel-
ings. Damasio has told us that emotions have a direct impact on our minds:
In organisms equipped to sense emotions, that is, to have feelings, emotions
also have an impact on the mind, as they occur, in the here and now. But in
organisms equipped with consciousness, that is, capable of knowing they have
feelings, another level of regulation is reached. Consciousness allows feelings to
be known and thus promotes the impact of emotion internally, allows emotions
to permeate the thought process through the agency of feelings. (Damasio
2000: 56)
So, we can argue that symbols also have a direct impact on minds, and they
are used (not only among human beings but also among non-humans) to
communicate at an inner level feelings which, in other ways, would be, at
the level of direct experience, incommunicable. 
Let us go back to our Mr Hussein. He has an autobiographical self of
which he makes sense through that delicately shaped machinery of his imag-
ination he communicates with the symbolic expression ‘I am Muslim’.
Finally, Mr Hussein is what he feels to be, regardless of how others, engaged
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in countless public discourses around the use of cultural markers, might
perceive him. ‘I am Muslim’ means that Mr Hussein feels himself to be
Muslim. Now we can observe that there exists a sort of circuit; the environ-
ment produces stimuli that produce emotions (the body-reactions), which
are perceived by Mr Hussein as feelings, which affect his autobiographical
self, which is experienced (makes sense) through the delicately shaped
machinery of his imagination he calls his Muslim identity, which, of course,
is now affected by the feelings he perceived. In other words, what I have
described until now is a circuit of causalities based on information both
internal and external to the individual. This system aims at maintaining
equilibrium at different levels. And we know from physiological as well as
psychoanalytic studies that equilibrium between self and identity is essential
for a healthy life.
Human beings are not the only ones who tend to stability. Bateson (2002)
has observed that any circuit tends toward stability and to counterbalance
changes. So, a system, in order to function and survive, should be self-correc-
tive, this is achieved by maximizing certain variables. Indeed, we can see
‘identity’ as exactly a self-corrective mechanism. So, Bateson’s study
becomes very relevant to our attempt to understand it. Bateson has sug-
gested that stability could be maintained through circular causations, in
which small changes are repeated until the status quo ante is re-established
after each disturbance; he exemplified this process in these terms: 
Imagine a machine in which we distinguish say, four parts, which I have loosely
called ‘flywheel’, ‘governor’, ‘fuel’, and ‘cylinder’. In addition, the machine is
connected to the outside world in two ways, ‘energy input’ and ‘load’, which is
to be imagined as variable and perhaps weighing upon the flywheel. The
machine is circular in the sense that flywheel drives governor which alters fuel
supply which feeds cylinder which, in turn, drives flywheel. (2002: 97)
It is easy to see that, in such a circular system, an altering event affecting one
part of the circuit reproduces itself again and again in the other parts, until
it reaches the point of origin so producing a final change. Stability is main-
tained until a new alteration in some part of the system occurs again initi-
ating the same process. In this hypothetical circuit, each part is in
relationship with the preceding and the following, exactly as in our circuit
involving Mr Hussein’s identity. Bateson has observed that the type of effect
which the parts have on each other could be of two orders: positive gain or
no gain. In the case of positive gain, the system would inevitably accelerate,
run away and, finally, break down. In the other case, Mr Hussein would
experience a ‘breakdown’, a crisis of identity, with all the consequences that
I will not discuss here, but which are easily found in psychological studies. 
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Bateson, during his study of the Iatmul tribe (1936) had occasion to
observe cases of ‘positive gain’, ‘various relations among groups and among
various types of kin were characterized by interchanges of behaviour such as
that the more A exhibited a given behaviour, the more B was likely to exhibit
the same behaviour’ (2002: 98). Bateson called these kinds of relationship
symmetrical changes. However, he also noticed another pattern in which the
behaviour of B although being different from that of A was complementary to
it. According to Bateson (2000: 323), examples of simple symmetrical
changes are armament races, athletic emulation, boxing matches; while
examples of complementary behaviours are dominance submission, sadism–
masochism, spectatorship–exhibitionism. Both symmetrical as well as com-
plementary changes are subjected to forms of progressive escalation, which
Bateson has called schismogenesis. By affecting the relationship between the
elements of the circuit, schismogenesis (both symmetrical and complemen-
tary) has the power to break down the circular system. 
Certain circumstances could trap people in schismogenetic processes that
could ‘break down’ the delicately shaped machinery of our imagination
called identity. Schismogenetic processes that affect the relationship
between the autobiographical self and identity are often the result of a ‘circle
of panic’. Bhabha has suggested that circles of panic are caused by ‘the inde-
terminate circulation of meaning as rumour or conspiracy, with its perverse,
physical affects of panic’ (1994: 200). As we have seen, emotions raise feel-
ings that then lead to action; the circle of panic leads to a self-correcting
mechanism, so the person can again experience his or her autobiographical
self as meaningful. This self-correcting mechanism is what I call an act of
identity. Because derived from strong emotional reaction to the schismoge-
netic events, acts of identity tend to be extreme in their essence. Although
they are often expressed through rhetoric, sometimes the rhetoric becomes
desperate action. In some cases, we can read suicides, particularly when
involving young people, as extreme acts of identity. (Dabbagh 2005). A par-
ticular circle of panic is trapping many Muslims, and the ‘rumour’ declares
that Islam, both as religion and source of identity, is under attack. This
‘circle of panic’ leads some of them to develop different degree of ‘rhetoric
of jihad’. 
Conclusion
After a pilgrimage among the different theories of identity and self that
emphasized the unique role of culture in their construction, I have observed
that another interpretation could be brought to the fore. By seeing, as
Milton suggested (2002; Milton and Svasek 2005), culture as an ecological
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part of nature, I have focused on how the environment has an impact on
human beings. Emotions, some recent anthropological studies have argued
(Ingold 1992, 1993 and Milton 2002; Milton and Svasek 2005), are central
to the way in which we perceive our surroundings or environment. Damasio
has challenged the common idea of emotions as subjective feelings and sug-
gested that emotions are bodily responses which are perceived to provoke
the feelings (2000). For these reasons, Milton has proposed that emotions
are an ecological rather than a social phenomenon (Milton and Svasek
2005), though social interaction surely raises emotions. If this is the case, as
I believe, what we call self and identity could not be, as the majority of social
scientific theories claim, the product of social interaction, though social
interaction could provoke changes in them. Damasio has provided us with
a convincing theory of how we form our autobiographical self. I have
accepted Damasio’s viewpoint and agreed with him that identity is a ‘deli-
cately shaped machinery of our imagination [which] stakes the probabilities
of selection toward the same, historically continuous self’ (2000: 225). 
I have explained, however, that identity is a process that allows human
beings to make sense of their autobiographical self and to express it through
symbols, which communicate at an inner level feelings that are in other ways
directly incommunicable. I have suggested that it is what we feel to be that
determines our identity. Mr Hussein’s ‘I am Muslim’ is, therefore, the sym-
bolic communication of his emotional commitment through which he expe-
riences his autobiographical self. As we have seen, we can represent the
process that forms personal identity as a circuit. Bateson has explained how
‘positive gain’ or progressive escalations, which he refers to as schismogenesis,
could disrupt the circuit. Indeed, the relationship between the autobio-
graphical self and the process (identity) that allows human beings to make
sense of it could be subjected to schismogenetic events, often caused by a
circle of panic to which people react, trying to self-correct their identity
through ‘acts of identity’. 
Today an increasing number of Muslims feel that Islam, as religion and
identity, is under attack. In certain circumstances, this ‘rumour’ traps some
Muslims who react to the schismogenetic process with the rhetoric of jihad
as a form of an act of identity. Jihad in this sense goes beyond Islam to
become part of some people’s identity processes. Of course, the general sur-
roundings in which Muslims live (environment) could influence the degree
of the schismogenetic process. So, it is fundamental to understand the
dynamics through which the schismogenetic circle of panic develops and is
maintained. In the next ethnographic chapters, I shall observe some of these
dynamics in different contexts and their consequences in the formation of
jihad beyond Islam.
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Notes 
1. As we shall see in this chapter, emotions here should be understood as bodily
changes such as such as changes in heart rate or brain activity, some of which
become visible to others because of facial expressions or agitation. Indeed, fol-
lowing Damasio’s theory (2000) I will argue the distinction between emotions and
feelings (i.e. fear, joy, love and so on). The latter are reserved for the private,
mental experience of an emotion.
2. See, for instance, Alsayyad and Castells 2002; Gerholm and Lithman 1988;
Haddad 2002; Haddad and Esposito 2000; Kepel 1997; Lewis and Schnapper
1994; Nielsen 1985, 1992; Nonneman, Niblock and Szajkowski 1996; Werbner
2002, just to mention some.
3. Alan Watts (1915–73), British-born US philosopher.
4. For more discussion on this point see Ingold 1992 and 1996, as well as
Milton and Svaslek 2005. 
5. As Ingold (1992 and 1996) has suggested, culture could be easily seen as a
human-environment relationship. 
6. For an interesting list see Holland 1997. 
7. For a discussion of this distinction see Ashmore and Jussim 1997. 
8. The name ‘social identity theory’ was coined by Turner and Brown (1978)
to regroup the varied terminology Tajfel employed in his research and which might
otherwise create some confusion.
9. See, for example, Markus and Kitayama 1991; Kitayama, Markus and
Liberman 1995.
10. The Ojibwa are a native American ethnic group located in the upper Great
Lakes (i.e. Lakes Superior and Huron) in both Canada and the United States.
11. See for instance Davies and Harré 1990; Harré and Van Langenhove 1991;
Kondo 1990.
12. I think that it might be useful to mention all the contributors to this debate:
Driessen, Ewing, Fuchs, Gellner, Haley, Mageo, Rapport, Schlee, Beek and
Werbner. 
13. As far as collective identities are concerned and the concept of ummah, see
Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Discussing Jihad with Muslim Migrant Men
Migration is probably one of the most ancient things human beings have
practised since we populated planet earth. Actually, we know that migration
is not just a human trait, it is also a non-human activity as well. Animals
move to reach the most hospitable place in order to reproduce and survive.
Yet the majority of human beings became inhabitants and few of them have
remained truly nomadic. Is this the reality? This is what we might learn at
school during our first approaches to human history, but today people
migrate as never before, as far as foreign locations, over great distances and
to different cultures. It is just not a truism that millions every year leave their
home for good (which however is still a migratory act). Many of these are
the people we sometimes call aliens, foreigners, migrants and refugees. They
are people who have left their homes to find a new one near other people’s
homes. Home, a deep-rooted concept in our mind, which has been affected
by our childhood experience, is becoming today a concept difficult to
define. So as Rapport and Dawson have argued, a more mobile conception
of home should come to the fore, ‘home as something “plurilocal”, some-
thing to be taken along whenever one decamps’ (1998: 7), since home
would be, ‘a cognitive environment in which one can undertake the routine
of daily life and through which one finds one’s identity best mediated’ and
a person could feel ‘homeless when such cognitive environment is
eschewed’ (1998: 10). It is not difficult to see that the ‘cognitive environ-
ment’ Rapport and Dawson are discussing is influenced by what we have
referred to as emotions and feelings. For many migrants, as we shall see,
Islam become this ubiquitous ‘cognitive environment’ we may call home. 
Many Muslim migrants reaching our cities had great-grandfathers and
grandparents who were levied under the rule of European ‘Empires’. Others
have personally collected the memory of the oppression of colonialism per-
petrated by what today they call ‘the West’. Others again, who never expe-
rienced nineteenth-century colonialism, have transformed the history of
colonialism into a powerful metaphor to explain contemporary oppressions.
(see Bhabha 1994; Ganguly 1992). Among Muslim migrants I interviewed,
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colonialism has not been limited to the idea of land usurpation, political
oppression and lack of independence, though according to many
Palestinians and Iraqis these elements are felt as part of the everyday life of
their people, but also include the disruption caused by Western ideas, cul-
tures, lifestyles (Bonnet 2004; Buruma and Margalit 2004) to that ‘cogni-
tive environment’ called Islam. 
Being a Muslim and living in the land of the ‘colonizer’ raises some ques-
tions which even the most moderate Muslim might ask themselves.
Emotions run high when people find themselves trapped between the
assumed right ‘moral code’ and the advantages of disregarding it. So,
Muslims migrants living in the West could easily feel guilty about their new
status and the advantages achieved through adaptation and negotiation of
their learned ideas of morality and honour. It is not difficult to find in
Islamic literature, newsletters, websites and sermons the condemnation of
Muslim migration to non-Muslim countries, when the act is purely eco-
nomic and not dictated by the need for refuge or by missionary work. Yet if
fatwas never had real power over ordinary Muslim opinions, these seemed
to have even the opposite effect since statistics tell us that from the 1991
Desert Storm operation to Bush’s 2003 pre-emptive Iraqi war, Muslim
migration to the West has not decreased, but considerably increased. 
Increased also is the mistrust between Muslims and non-Muslims, with
the last attacks in London challenging community relationships in one of
the most cosmopolitan and multicultural cities in Europe. Discussing in the
aftermath of these events with Muslims as well as non-Muslims, I had the
impression that some non-Muslims read terrorism as axiomatically Islamic,
and a similar number of non-Muslims read anti-terrorism as axiomatically
anti-Islamic. In both cases one word plays a central role: jihad. Recently, I
have asked my first-year students to write down what they thought jihad
might be. Although I expected some students to refer to the traditional
argument that jihad means ‘holy war’, I was surprised when a consistent
number ‘translated’ the Arabic word into terrorism or the murder of inno-
cent people. To understand how some of these students had formed their
conceptions of jihad is not difficult like a sudoku puzzle: Hollywood, televi-
sion, fictions, novels and bad journalism provided them with fertile ground
for misconceptions. Yet I started my ‘sudoku’ when I asked myself how
ordinary Muslim migrants form their ideas of jihad. Why do they have dif-
ferent opinions about it? On which occasions do they discuss jihad? 
The majority of studies concerning jihad have focused on the historical
meaning of the term (see Chapter 2), or the political discourses of Islamic
leaders, ulemas and imams, or both (see Kepel 2002; Lewis 2003; Sanchez
2002).1 The already amplified voices of the Islamic ‘leaders’ (better,
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‘extremists’ or ‘radical’) have been further amplified by the mass media, so
that the Muslim laymen’s opinions have remained silenced. Jihad among
Muslims has been neither a secret word nor a taboo, but a religious
concept.2 The word jihad could be mentioned as part of an aya recited
during one of the daily prayers, as reference to the striving for a Muslim
lifestyle in a predominantly non-Muslim place in the context of political or
religious discussion. It is not the word in itself that tells us something, but
the formation of rhetoric around the idea of jihad, which becomes a possible
act of identity for some Muslims. 
In Chapter 3, I used the fictional character Mr Hussein to present, and
simplify, different theories of identity. Now, it is time to leave Mr Hussein
to meet my respondents, their idea of jihad, their life-experience in non-
Muslim contexts, their being Muslims sometimes trapped in what I have
called ‘a circle of panic’. Yet they share with Mr Hussein, and all of us, the
way in which we make sense of their autobiographical self, their identities.
Although I shall focus on the dynamics that brought some of my respon-
dents to develop a rhetoric of jihad because of the circle of panic they ended
in, and compare them with others who avoided it, it is important to
remember that people experience the world through their emotional com-
mitment, as Milton has correctly suggested,
As fully conscious beings, who not only experience feelings but also know that
we do, we can use them to guide our actions. We can plan to avoid sadness and
fear, and to maximize happiness. This is how emotions motivate; they identify
what matters to us. Whatever we find most emotionally compelling – most
exciting, most interesting, most tragic, most satisfying, most awe-inspiring, most
guilt-provoking, most enjoyable – becomes what matters most, what we hold
most sacred. (2002: 149)
Therefore, in this chapter, I shall explain how in the case of some migrant
Muslims, social rejection and guilt inducers have facilitated the circle of
panic and consequently their rhetoric of jihad. 
Jihad and the Mosque: The Religious Context
I still remember the strange feeling, a mixture of curiosity and fear, which
grasped my friends and me when, aged between ten and thirteen years old,
we used to walk near the entrance of a recently opened mosque in Florence.
The mosque did not match our childish imagination – minarets and intri-
cate oriental arabesques – but rather it was a small prayer room: a former
garage turned into a busy, multi-ethnic, colourful place of worship. The
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coming and going of the worshippers, the incomprehensible sound of
Arabic, and the loud voice of the mu’adhdhin (the prayer caller) calling daily
prayers marked the place with an aura of mystery. Of course, parents had
recommended their children to avoid the former garage and to cross the
street. We had to avoid the ‘Mohammedans’, the ‘Saracens’. In our imagi-
nation, affected by adult xenophobia, the garage was transformed into the
scene of horrific crimes, magical and demonic rites as well as indescribable
plots against ‘us’, the ‘Christians’. Children’s fantasies, somebody might
say. 
9 June 2003: A Muslim friend has phoned, ‘Watch BBC 3 now; there is
an episode of Spooks that you must see.’ The authors of the fiction have set
this episode in Birmingham. The local mosque looks like an ordinary place
of worship; in reality Muslim children are trained to become suicide
bombers ready to hit the UK. The episode increases in its shocking and
violent narration; a child carrying out a suicide operation in a Birmingham
school; Muslim children taught to hate the West; MI5 spies caught and
beaten to death; ‘bad Muslims’ with long beards and turbans; ‘good
Muslims’ showing a Western appearance and ready to collaborate with MI5.
Of course, jihad was the main topic of this episode and Muslim children
were made to say words like, ‘if I kill an infidel, I will go straightway to par-
adise’. 
In both my childhood fantasies as well as the childish imagination of the
Spooks’ authors, the mosque was the ‘lions’ den’; the place in which bearded
fanatical cut-throats organize the next plot against Western civilization. In
the aftermath of 9/11, incidents like the ‘shoe bomber’ have reinforced the
idea that mosques are ‘madrassas of terror’. Indeed, journalists have
overemphasized that Richard Reid, better known as the shoe bomber since
he failed blow up his foot and the transatlantic aeroplane he was travelling
on with explosive hidden inside one of his shoes, worshipped in Brixton
mosque, in south-west London; a mosque increasingly accused of attracting
radicals. On 20 January 2003, the word ‘mosque’ appeared again in the
main banner headlines of British and international newspapers. This time
police in body armour and equipped with battering rams, and supported by
helicopters, special units and sniffer dogs, decided to pay a ‘visit’ to the
North London Central Mosque in Finsbury Park, one of the most notorious
and controversial places of Islamic worship because of the radical cleric Abu
Hamza. Officers, some dressed in chemical protection suits, searched the
premises. Briefing journalists on the operation, a Scotland Yard
spokesperson said ‘Police believe that these premises have played a role in
the recruitment of suspected terrorists’. These few words transformed the
mosque, an inanimate building, into a dangerous entity capable of changing
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common people into Muslim terrorists. Many non-Muslims seem to fear
mosques; I have noticed this fact when students are writing their final year
dissertation on an Islamic topic, asking whether I could introduce or take
them to the local mosque for their research; something that other students
writing on Buddhism, Sikhism or Jehovah’s Witnesses have never required.
At this point, somebody may be curious to know about the activities
hidden behind the closed doors of an ordinary mosque, and whether
mosques should be blamed for religious intolerance and Islamic radicalism.
Although mosques differ in their architecture, organization and Islamic affil-
iation, they share (at least those I have visited) a certain standardization in
their daily activities. Usually, the members of the mosque elect a president,
a committee and some trustees. The committee (rarely the president)
appoints an imam to lead the prayers and guide the religious life of the
mosque. Yet many mosques in the West cannot afford a full-time paid
imam, and would rather opt for volunteers. 
We could divide the weekly activity of mosques into three main parts:
weekdays, Fridays and Sundays. During the weekdays, the five daily prayers
(salat) are performed at dawn, after midday, mid-afternoon, at sunset and
about an hour and a half after that. The attendance may vary considerably
from prayer to prayer, with the last two (salat al-maghrib, and salat al-‘isha’)
being usually the best attended. These daily prayers are performed without
any sermon and tend to be very short. Then, while Muslims who are
working leave the mosque quickly, unemployed and young Muslims spend
more time in the premises, indulging either in religious or everyday talk. 
Friday is the most important day in the Islamic week; although the five
daily prayers are performed as usual, a special congregational prayer (yawm
al-jum‘a) is organized around midday and the imam, who leads the prayers,
has the responsibility of delivering the khutba (sermon). Most Muslims,
even those who avoid congregational prayers during the rest of the week, try
to attend the yawm al-jum‘a, since it is an emphatic part of the Islamic tra-
dition (Sunna). So, on Friday, if one walks near a mosque, one can see
groups of Muslims chatting in their local dialect. The atmosphere is festive
since it is an opportunity for Muslim migrants to meet their fellow coun-
trymen, discuss events and exchange opinions and, of course, comment on
the khutba. Friday is also the day in which some mosques organize the halqat
(circles) dedicated to men and women who wish to memorize the Qur’an
and learn the practice of tajweed (proper recitation). Almost all mosques
have an internal self-organized madrassa (school) for the worshippers’ chil-
dren, which for preference meets on Sunday. In this ‘Sunday school’ chil-
dren study the Qur’an and receive basic Islamic education. Parents collect
their children at the mosque after midday, when congregational prayer is
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also held, though some spend the time of their children’s lesson talking to
each other. In the majority of mosques, madrassa volunteers and untrained
Islamic teachers form the teaching staff, many of whom are the children’s
parents and Muslim university students. 
So, on what occasions might the word jihad reverberate within the
mosque’s halls? Potentially, people could mention ‘jihad’ during any of the
described activities. For instance, the imam might recite one of the ayat con-
cerning jihad (i.e. Sura 9:73, 25:52, 66:9) during one of the daily congre-
gational prayers or discuss jihad in one of the khutbas. A teacher might
decide to explain what jihad means to his class. Muslims spending time
within the mosque with their friends might discuss jihad as a conversational
topic. However, the few times I heard the Arabic word ‘jihad’ mentioned in
a mosque was in some khutba discussing the duty of Muslims to fight temp-
tation and because of my questions to my respondents. Indeed, imams
leading congregational prayers usually select the shortest suras among the
last thirty in the Qur’an, and these do not mention jihad; khutbas rarely
focus on topics that require a use of the word, and so far, I have never
observed Muslim children receiving an explanation of what jihad is during
their madrassa classes. Actually, this could explain why many of the Muslim
children whom I asked if they could tell me what jihad was were lost or
influenced by the stereotyped representation of the mass media. Surprised
by my findings, which remained the same despite changing cities and
mosques, I decided to ask one of the teachers why Muslim children were not
told about jihad, despite the word being widely (mis)used in different con-
texts in which these children might come in contact with it. Abd al-Tawwab,
a 23-year-old Yemeni student, who volunteered to be a teacher in Dublin
mosque, replied:
The most important thing is that our children memorize the Holy Qur’an and
recite it. We have a lot of problems with this task, because many of the children
do not speak Arabic. Then, we have to teach them how to pray and the basic
things of Islam. Although, many children know how to pray because they see
their parents doing it, often they make mistakes that need to be corrected. Then
we have to teach the life of the Prophet, be peace upon him, and basic elements
of personal Islamic law. Jihad is not one of the most important things. But there
is another reason, we do not know what their parents think about this topic
[jihad]. Everybody seems to have their own opinions on jihad. It is too sensitive
a topic today. 
The fact that an increasingly popularly debated Islamic concept such as
jihad has been ignored in the children’s madrassas is certainly a negative
factor. I had grasped from the few questions I had asked some Muslim chil-
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dren (about jihad) that they tend to form their idea of jihad from their peers,
TV and the Internet. Within the majority of mosques in the West, a serious
discussion of jihad is lacking, leaving space, as we shall see, for possible
manipulative appeals aimed at instigating or reinforcing guilt among the
migrant Muslims who know they are enjoying better lives than their
‘brothers and sisters’ left behind in their homelands. 
Despite what the Spooks episode suggested, the ‘jihad triggers’ rarely
sound ‘Go and kill the infidels so you can enjoy the paradise, wine and
carnal pleasure.’ The process through which the circle of panic is facilitated
is more complex. Usually, the main actors are what we might call ‘Muslim
itinerant preachers’. Although they do not need a mosque to pass on their
messages, some of them, when visiting a mosque, are kindly invited, as a
symbol of hospitality and respect, to give the Friday khutba. One might
expect these preachers to deliver inflammatory speeches, but in my experi-
ence, this is often not the case. In fact, after attending many khutbas, I have
noticed that not only are heated sermons unpleasantly aggressive, but also
incredibly ineffective, since they could only arouse an audience that shares
the preacher’s radical views. By contrast, these preachers deliver the most
successful controversial khutbas through apparently harmless rhetorical
expressions, sometimes accompanied by particular studied body language,
facial expressions and voice-tone patterns, aimed together at convincing the
listener that Islam is endangered while Muslims are enjoying themselves.
Before I provide an ethnographic example of these subliminal, controversial
khutbas, it is important to know how they are traditionally delivered. 
The standard khutba is divided into four parts; first, the official imam (or
any person selected to be in charge of that prayer) praises Allah and recites
a prayer celebrating the Prophet. Then he stands up and delivers the first
section of the khutba, often discussing a specific Islamic topic, or a topical
argument regarding the local community, or events in the Islamic world. At
the end of this first sermon, the imam sits down and, together with the con-
gregation, concentrates on a silent du‘a’ (supplication to Allah). Then, after
standing up again, he presents the second part of the khutba, which may be
either a shorter summary of the first speech, a translation of the khutba into
the local language, or a new brief reflection on the selected topic. Finally,
the imam recites two supplications, one which is a standardized prayer
asking Allah for forgiveness for all believers, and a second which is made by
him. It is particularly in this second supplication that emotional triggers may
reach a climax. We shall follow the experience of Nasim, a 45-year-old Iraqi
migrant who has spent his last twelve years in Britain as the owner of a suc-
cessful takeaway. 
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The Invited Shaykh’s Khutba 
Nasim defines himself as a moderate Muslim; he rejects any form of radi-
calism, and 9/11 had horrified him. Although he usually does not pray five
times per day, he constantly attends the Friday congregational prayers at
one of the local mosques. This Friday, the president of the mosque has
invited a guest to deliver the khutba. The ‘shaykh’, whom I had met the day
before, speaks with a strong American accent, although he is of Saudi origin;
but has a very wahhabi3 style both in his behaviour and dress. The shaykh
wears a long white one-piece tunic that drapes just above the ankles
(dishadasha) and a red chequered head scarf folded diagonally to form a tri-
angle and placed with the fold in front (ghutra or smagh). Despite his young
age (no more than thirty years old), the shaykh, with his soft, persuasive
tone, inspiring eyes and smiling face framed by a short line of beard, is cer-
tainly someone who could overawe others with his charisma. 
The shaykh enters the prayer room; Nasim is seated near me. The shaykh
adjusts his red ghutra and, welcoming the congregation, says his ‘salaam’. He
slowly sits on a chair while listening to the second adhan (call for prayer)
being recited; then, when the last words of the mu’adhdhin echo in the
mosque, he stands up. With a soft voice, looking at his congregation, he says
the introductory praise of Allah and His Prophet. This introduction is emo-
tionally neutral and is used to prepare the congregation for the main body of
the sermon. In the main body of his khutba, the shaykh questions the lifestyle
of contemporary Muslims and contrasts it with how Muslims used to live
during the time of the Prophet. Then, after quotations from the Qur’an and
some hadiths, he recalls how the Mongols disrupted the centre of Islamic life
when they invaded Baghdad but how Islam prevailed because the people
defended it. Finally, the shaykh rebukes his fellow Muslims in the congrega-
tion because of their laziness, ‘You are enjoying a nice life, you are selling
your soul for an earthly enjoyable life.’ The shaykh increases the emotional
level and mentions the ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters’4 suffering around the world
because of abuses and injustice. He describes how children are killed in
Afghanistan, the desperation of elderly Muslims in Chechnya, the horrible
experience of raped Palestinian women. ‘How’ he asks, raising his forefinger,
‘could you feel ready to meet your Creator, how could you explain to Allah
that you have enjoyed your money, family and life while your brothers, sisters
and their children are suffering the worst torments at the hands of kafurs.’
Now, his voice changes, his face turns grim, his eyes point toward the
ceiling. The shaykh seems to address an invisible entity while saying ‘They
[Muslims around the world] are suffering the worst torments, but you know
that such torments will be nothing compared to the eternal sufferings we will
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endure if we do not forbid …’ A long, extenuating, pause, the shaykh’s eyes
slowly point back to his captivated audience, his hand moves down again
with his middle finger curling, in mute cryptical language, while finally he
spells ‘… what is wrong and only allow what is right.’ Silence. Unhurriedly,
the shaykh sits down. He concentrates on his silent supplication, his face has
a fascinating expression of religious devotion. 
During the first silent du‘a’, the Muslim congregation starts to feel
uncomfortable while, in their supplications, they address Allah, the Creator
and final Judge. Nasim, later that day recalled and discussed with me this
first part of the khutba, 
You are there, you hear about Allah and his Prophet; how Muhammad lived and
conducted his ummah. He [Muhammad] is our example, the perfect one! I mean
you listen to the shaykh’s words, you look at his expressions and you see a good
Muslim, a person who has strong din (faith). His words condemn the differences
between the Prophet’s ummah and our lifestyle. So, after all this, you have to
approach Allah directly in your du‘a’. I mean, you have to ask Him something
and you feel completely uncomfortable because you know your sins, you know
that you are enjoying your life while other Muslims have miserable lives. So, you
realize that you contribute to making their lives even more miserable. You realize
that you pay the taxes to this country [UK] and they used them to bomb
Muslims and attack Islam.
The first part of the shaykh’s khutba has emotionally destabilized Nasim, it
has made him feel uneasy about his Western lifestyle. Nasim feels guilty.
The shaykh has challenged Nasim’s Muslim identity. Yet this is only the first
part of the shaykh’s khutba. So let me flash back to the mosque. 
Nasim stops his du‘a’, his hands are open in front of him as if holding a
symbolic Qur’an, and then he passes them over his face in a simulation of
washing it. A few minutes later, the shaykh speaks again surrounded by an
attentive silence. The second part of his khutba is a short English version of
the first. Yet the shaykh’s gesticulations increase in intensity. When I con-
centrated on the shaykh’s gestures, I observed that it was very difficult to
relate the words to the hand movements. His hands seemed to deliver a dif-
ferent message.5 
After the standardized supplication, the shaykh’s second supplication
begins. The emotional climax increases while the congregation, in a respon-
sive form to each supplicant section, repeats the ‘Ameen’ (Amen). The
shaykh pronounces the supplication faster and faster in Arabic; he rhetori-
cally controls the rhythm. The words sound hypnotic while he is suppli-
cating Allah to protect the mujahidin and glorify the martyrs in Afghanistan,
Chechnya, Kashmir, India, Iraq and other less known places. By contrast,
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the shaykh asks forgiveness for the Muslims who are qu‘ood (lazy).6 The
strings of repeated ‘Ameen’ become less clear since some people are crying.
Nasim is crying. His hands holding the invisible Qur’an, his eyes closed and
his mouth half open while repeating the rhythmical ‘Ameen!’ Nasim’s body
is near me, but his mind is lost in feelings triggered by the artificial emo-
tional environment the shaykh has created. Nasim could no longer under-
stand the shaykh’s warlike supplication. He has to say ‘Ameen!’ even when
the shaykh openly praises Allah for the recent successful mujahidin opera-
tion in Palestine, which also killed some children. The khutba ends, the
shaykh sits down and makes another silent du‘a’ while some members of the
congregation make other salats. 
When, in our post-khutba conversation, I asked Nasim some comments
about this second part of the sermon, he observed,
I felt guilty. You pray for the people that do something, when you know that you
are not doing anything. Du‘a’ is important because it puts you in direct contact
with Allah, and it is the moment in which, if you ask something right with you
heart, you know that Allah will do it for you. So, you realize that you are a hyp-
ocrite, and you know what the Qur’an says about hypocrites. The supplication
was the strongest part, you feel that everybody does concentrate on asking Allah
to help the people that defend Islam …We need to do something; Islam is under
attack. We sit, pray, and then we go back to our business. They [Muslims] die,
and you say in your heart: ‘I am among the hypocrites.’ 
Although the shaykh carefully avoided the word jihad, his khutba achieved
its aim; he challenged the identity of his audience, he raised strong feelings,
he pushed them towards the circle of panic. 
Discussing the Islamic Concept of Jihad 
We have observed that many mosques in the West provide religious services,
but rarely become places of intellectual discussion. While at the mosque
children receive some basic Islamic knowledge and learn traditional tech-
niques for memorizing the Qur’an, the teachers usually tend to emphasize
the proper recitation of the Qur’an rather than its understanding. Adults
just pray, listen to the sermons, read the Qur’an and, sometimes, debate the
internal political affairs of the mosque. In this religious intellectual vacuum,
how do Muslim immigrants form their views on the religious concept of
jihad? Often lacking any form of exegesis, from which sources do they
develop their concepts of jihad? To answer these questions I present four
different accounts which summarize the approaches to jihad that I have
encountered during my researches. 
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The spiritual struggle 
Faruq is a 38-year-old Egyptian who lived in Milan and worked in a bakery
located not very distant from a small local prayer room. Faruq migrated to
Italy ten years before our meeting at the local Friday prayer place. He spoke
good Italian, looked smart, and was very polite. He used to enjoy Lebanese
music as well as Western pop, and on Saturday nights he used to attend one
of the most famous Milan discos. Yet he defined himself as ‘good, practising
Sunni Muslim, with some interest in mystical Islam’. Faruq explained jihad
in these terms:
In Islam we do not have the concept of holy war. Definitely, jihad is about spir-
itual things and let me say that the Qur’an is clear about that. So, according to
the Prophet there are only two kinds of jihad: a greater and lesser jihad. Jihad
al-asghar is the struggle against oppression. Yet I ask, do we need to use weapons
or to kill people? Sorry, but I do not think so. The Qur’an does not teach vio-
lence but love. I want to also say something that may be surprising. Jihad is not
something that only Muslims have to conduct. The Qur’an is a universal book,
and we can see that some non-Muslims have conducted both jihads. Take
Gandhi for example. He struggled against the occupation and oppression of his
country with religious fervour. For example, I have no problem in describing his
actions as jihad. The jihad al-akbar is something different and deals with your
soul. This is the jihad that fights against the shaitan [the devil] and his tempta-
tions. 
Faruq had formed his idea of jihad by reading some articles on the Inter-net
and discussing the topic with a Senegalese marabout,7 who reinforced
Faruq’s beliefs in the spiritual values of jihad. Indeed, Faruq’s knowledge of
Islam is derived from different sources. His concept of jihad perfectly suited
his Muslim identity, the way in which Faruq has experienced his autobio-
graphical self. Observing Faruq’s life, we notice that he certainly was not
trapped in the circle of panic affecting other Muslims today. He had a happy
life in Milan, enough money to lead a comfortable life and buy presents for
his family in Egypt. Faruq had Italian as well as Maghribi friends; as he used
to say ‘I feel at home here and I am respected as a good Muslim back in my
country’. Indeed, in Egypt Faruq is seen as a successful young man of whom
his parents are proud. He has never felt guilty because of his ‘privileged
status’. Jihad for him was just one of the many religious concepts within
Islam and it was not charged with a particular meaning or rhetoric. Faruq
did not need a specific act of identity to feel Muslim. 
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The Ultimate Jihad 
I met Tahar when I was in the library of the Institut du Monde Arabe,
during my fieldwork in Paris (August 1998). I was waiting for the lift to
reach the café-restaurant at the top of the building when a young dark curly-
haired smiling Maghribi politely asked me which floor I wanted. We were
going to the same place, the nice panoramic café. Our conversation, one of
the many which then followed, started when he asked whether I was a
‘Spaniard’ tourist. Before I could even satisfy his curiosity and correct the
mistake, he told me that he had lived in Oran, Algeria, and many times had
crossed the sea separating his native town from Alicante. Slaloming between
his torrential words, I presented myself as an Italian anthropologist con-
ducting research in Paris. Perhaps Tahar had an idiosyncratic inquisitive-
ness, but this was certainly useful to an anthropologist. Indeed, when I told
him that I was studying the cultural identities of Algerians living in France,
he straightforwardly said ‘So, I am your man! Shall we have a coffee?’ 
Tahar, a 32-year-old Algerian living in Paris since 1990, worked in an
Algerian music shop in Barbés, the traditional Parisian Arab neighbour-
hood. Tahar sold music cassettes and CDs of raï music (an Algerian pop-
rock). Of course, this is a genre of music that Islamic extremists have
labelled harmful; so harmful that they allegedly killed one the most famous
raï singers, Hasni (Marranci 2000a, 2000b and 2003a). In one of our inter-
views, I asked Tahar whether killing Hasni could have been an act of ‘jihad’.
He replied 
I do not think that targeting Muslim singers may be a jihad. These [the terror-
ists] are only people who have mental problems. What they do in Algeria is hor-
rible and against Muslims. In some rural village, they have killed pregnant
Muslim women and have removed their foetus; they have killed elderly people,
children and even imams. These fake mujahidin say ‘jihad! jihad!’ and whom do
they kill? Muslims! Sorry I cannot buy it. Jihad does exist in Islam. But the target
is very different. It’s written in the Qur’an ‘And kill them wherever you find
them.’ 
OK, you probably need some explanation. There are two jihads, one which
you do every day, fighting temptations like … well … lust, and if you look
around [pointing to a group of French girls sitting nearby] you understand what
I mean, don’t you [laugh]? The other is called lesser jihad, and it means to fight
non-Muslim enemies without rest, for this reason the Qur’an says ‘Wherever
you find them kill them.’ This does not mean that now [taking a knife from the
table and making the gesture as pointing it toward me] I have to slit the throat
of the first non-Muslim I may meet. 
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He went on to explain that there were some rules. Muslims could start jihad
only if non-Muslims attacked first. In this case jihad meant that Muslims do
not stop until they have killed their enemy or the enemy has killed the
Muslims. At this point Tahar smiled when he emphasized that to be killed
was even a better blessing from Allah because the Muslim in question would
become a shahid, a martyr, and despite his previous sins would end in par-
adise. This was not so new to my ears, but finally Tahar disclosed his theory
of jihad, ‘I tell you something; I strongly believe that one day there will be
an ultimate jihad and all non-Muslims will have to decide whether they
want to accept Islam or be destroyed.’ This last sentence left me surprised,
I did not know that there was such a doctrine within any orthodox inter-
pretation of Islam, or even jihad. 
During the time I spent with Tahar, it became clear that he was certainly
not a mosque-going Muslim. He did not respect the five daily prayers and
sometimes his breath smelt unpleasantly of alcohol. Yet I learnt not to try
to challenge his firm conviction that he had a Muslim identity. This was
what Tahar felt to be, despite his contradictory behaviour. Tahar’s rhetoric
of jihad had something unorthodox about it. He learnt the concept of jihad
from family, friends, and reading the most disparate material he had come
across in the Institut du Monde Arabe; of course some Islamic websites8
played a major role. I would probably not be far wrong to say that Tahar
and Faruq had derived their concept of jihad from similar sources; yet we
can see that their interpretations could not have been more divergent.
Although Tahar’s apocalyptic battle between Muslims and non-Muslims
was not part of any orthodox vision of jihad, it was part of Tahar’s
dichotomized experience of the West and, in particular of France. During
our interviews, Tahar narrated that, since his arrival in France, he had felt
rejected and marginalized. Before living in his new location, Tahar had
lived in a northern Paris banlieue (suburb) in which the majority were
Maghribi and Muslim. Furthermore, he worked in a music shop in which
the customers were almost exclusively Maghribi and the few contacts he
had with French non-Muslims were not free from discrimination.9 As for
any other human being, Tahar’s understanding of himself was derived from
his primary emotional commitments. The fact that he was perceived as the
‘dangerous Other’ (Dewitte 1999; Khellil 1991) and often rejected
because, as he half-jokingly observed more than once, ‘I have the face of an
Islamic terrorist’, facilitated Tahar’s vision of jihad as the last hope for final
divine justice. 
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An Eye for an Eye, a Tooth for a Tooth
Yesterday (5 March 2003) a suicide bomber blew up himself in Haifa killing
the passengers of an express bus packed with Israeli high school and college
students. The Palestinian suicide bomber claimed the lives of thirteen
people, injured forty and left many shocked for life. The ‘martyr’ was
himself a student, a Palestinian from Hebron. He blew himself and his
victims to pieces when he ignited his explosive belt. ‘Allah Akbar’, the first
sentence of Muslim prayer, became his last in the conflagration of his jihad. 
Today, Husayn is sitting in his preferred corner of the quiet, empty
mosque and whispering the hypnotic Arabic letters of a torn old Qur’an.
Part of Husayn’s family is still living in Hebron and suffering the oppression
of the Israeli occupation. Twenty years before the Palestinian Hebron
student decided to become a shahid, Husayn had reached Britain. Now,
aged forty-seven, Husayn works in a local shop, has a Palestinian wife and
three British children. One of his children is the same age (thirteen) as Yuval
Mendelovitch, the youngest victims of this last Hamas carnage. Husayn is a
lovely father, a kind, clever and in many respects open-minded person. But
he supports the actions of Hamas. He calls them jihad. 
I enter the prayer room, when, raising his eyes, Husayn sees me. He
stands up, carefully kisses the Qur’an’s cover and puts it on the shelf among
the others. Husayn knows my opinions about Hamas and its jihad. It was
something that we had discussed over and over again. Yet it is the first time
that we have met after one of these atrocities or, according to him, one of
these ‘successes’, has taken place. Husayn welcomes me and says, ‘You want
to speak about what happened in Haifa, don’t you?’ I did. He slowly shakes
his head in disagreement, ‘You know that we have two opposite views about
these actions.’ Yes, definitively we have, but I strongly wanted to understand
why such a nice person could still support such horrible actions. Husayn
retraces his steps, takes two books from the mosque’s bookcase; an Arabic
copy of the Qur’an and a book of al-Bukhari’s collection of hadiths. Back to
the corner, he taps his hand against the floor in a typical friendly gesture and
invites me to sit. Then he starts,
. 
I do not have any personal opinion about jihad because the Qur’an and the
Prophet’s Sunna are neither questionable nor negotiable; but I can show you
that Hamas’ actions are Islamic and part of a rightful jihad. Jihad means fighting
an enemy, as you can read [pointing to an opened page of Sura 2: 90–1]. Now,
it is clear that the enemy has to attack first, and we, the Palestinians and
Muslims around the world, were the ones attacked first. Jihad is total war and
this is clear when Allah says ‘Slay them wherever ye catch them.’ The other part
of the text stresses that jihad should be stopped only when order has been re-
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established. Order means justice and respect of Allah’s will. ‘Well, observe an
important point here’, [he points with his finger to the Arabic words] ‘But fight
them not at the Sacred Mosque, unless they (first) fight you there.’ You see? You
can even fight in the Sacred Mosque, Mecca, if they, the enemies, attack the
Muslims there. So, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, as the Jews say. But
there is a difference between them and us: we are defending our lives and Islam,
not just our lives. 
I tell him that I am still unconvinced that killing innocents is acceptable, and
I still see some contradictions between Allah as a merciful and peace-loving
God and the Allah as petitioner of violent, indiscriminate jihad. But what
might be illogical to me, is logical to Husayn, 
OK, the problem of civilians, children and women, [he takes the ahadith book]
… where is it? … where is it? … uhmm … Here, listen to this point, 
When he [the Prophet], salallaahu ‘alayhee wa sallam, passed by a slain woman
(after one of the battles), he said: ‘She was not (able) to fight’ This was narrated by
Ahmad and Abu Dawood. 
So, the Prophet was saying ‘She was not fighting.’ You see, this means that if
a woman fights against the Muslims, she could be killed, and since military
service in Israel is compulsory for everybody, each of them could be seen as a
fighter. Many of them [Jews] voted for Sharon and in doing so they supported
the oppression of Muslims. As for children, another hadith explains that jihad
should not be stopped because of the presence of women and children or in
general what you call civilians.
Although Husayn acknowledges that Islam forbids suicide, he does not con-
sider suicide bombers to be people taking their own lives, rather, according
to him, they are just mujahidin who employ an extreme stratagem. To con-
vince me, Husayn recalls a hadith in which the Prophet stated ‘War is the
name of stratagem and astuteness.’ Yet when I still challenge his ideas and
define suicide operations as carnage without justification, Husayn radical-
izes his position and his answer becomes very emotional, 
Are you speaking of your people? I mean Italians? No! You are speaking of
Muslims. Have you seen our children, baby, little girls killed? Yes, surely you
have on al-Jazeera. Have you experienced the Israeli oppression? Surely, you
have not. Have you seen your neighbour’s only house, built with incredible sac-
rifice, razed to the ground by the Israeli tanks? I can mention a thousand other
horrible things they have done to us. Non-Muslims fear jihad because it is some-
thing more than war. We can only act and He decides when to accept or refuse
mujahidin sacrifices. If He accepts their lives, they become shuhada. You have to
feel all this in your heart and not in your mind.
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It is late and we decide to leave the prayer room. Outside, we meet Husayn’s
youngest daughter who flings her arms around his neck. In front of my eyes
Husayn metamorphoses into the nice, smiling father I have always known.
While holding his daughter, tanks and jihad seem to be so remote. 
There are some common points between Tahar’s conceptualization of
jihad and Husayn; both of them see jihad as the last resort as well as a form
of apocalyptic event. Yet while for Tahar jihad was a theoretical aspect of his
religious beliefs, for Husayn jihad was, though indirectly, part of his life, part
of the experience of his people. Similar also are the selection of the Qur’anic
verses that they referred to in trying to justify their rhetoric of jihad. Both of
them have emphasized that jihad is not aimless but eschatological. It tends
towards justice, freedom and Muslim pride being re-established. Emotions
play a fundamental role in the interpretation of jihad that Husayn has devel-
oped. Although distant from the battlefield, Husayn’s support for jihad
helps him to overcome his guilt of being in Europe, enjoying his nice house
and well-paid job. 
The bin Laden Syndrome 
Dublin, the Winding Stair Café; two salads and one cheese sandwich, three
coffees, from the windows we admired the Ha’penny Bridge shining on a
beautiful day in the summer of 2002. Haroun, a Tunisian, 29 years old,
Ratib, an Algerian, 33 years old, and an anthropologist, Italian, 29 years old,
have just finished their salad. An elderly couple stand up and vacate the
table next to us. Throughout their lunch the elderly couple, while sipping
their soup, had looked at my two Maghribi guests and listened to their
Arabic accents. ‘Tell me anthropologist, who hates whom?’ Haroun asks me
sarcastically.
Ratib and I had met Haroun only three hours earlier, while we were
buying some fresh halal meat at the mosque’s shop. Haroun immediately
surprised us because of his overfriendly attitude. Indeed, he was talkative.
Although tormenting us with his inquisitive questions, he revealed very little
about himself. Haroun had arrived in Dublin as an English student, he
found a job (which he did not specify) and decided to settle in Dublin, or at
least this was his story. He began by patronizing Ratib and me about Islam
and the best halal meat from the mosque shop, when Haroun decided that
we should have lunch together. Muslim politeness forced us to accept and
together we started to walk towards the Winding Stair Café. Ratib and
Haroun started a mixed Tunisian-Algerian conversation on Bush’s war on
terror. During the time it took to reach the café I became increasingly
worried that the different opinions Ratib and Haroun had on Islam could
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turn the discussion into an argument. Indeed, Haroun could not under-
stand how a Muslim brother such as Ratib who was as Arab as him could
reject ‘the truth’. 
Haroun’s truth: Muslims are responsible for the rotten condition of Islam
because they do not defend their religion. The CIA is paying fake Islamic
leaders and mullah in order to change the revolutionary message of Islam.
Haroun explained to us that Islam is the ultimate revolution, the Qur’an a
revolutionary message to be imposed. The new dar al-harb (mainly symbol-
ized by America) fears this revolutionary spiritual force and tries to under-
mine and destroy it. For this reason, Haroun concluded, Islam is under
attack. Haroun had just finished this argument when, facing me, he pointed
at the elderly couple and exclaimed,
Tell me anthropologist, who hates whom? They [Westerners] hate us, but we
[Muslims] do not hate them. We must fight them with jihad because they do not
believe in Islam and reject it. This is what the Qur’an says. They [non-Muslims]
can fight against us, but you know that Muslims will win; Allah clearly says so
in the Qur’an.
Ratib was visibly upset, rejecting Haroun’s argument, he rebuked the
Tunisian,
It is people like you that ruin Islam and shame Muslims. Your ideas are wrong.
I do not know if CIA agents are infiltrating our mosques and I would not be so
surprised if they are doing so. But do you really think that they can control Islam
without Allah allowing this? If you think so, you are the kafirun! Your interpre-
tation of the Qur’an and ahadith is inaccurate and very simplistic. 
Ratib reinforced his argument by reminding Haroun that in the Qur’an
Christian and Jews are called People of the Book and are not kafirun.
Haroun remained unimpressed and unexpectedly shifted from an aggressive
to a polite, teaching attitude; he had his well-prepared counter-argument,
which he revealed with a smile on his face, 
Yes, I know your point of view; it’s exactly what hypocrites use. You read the
Qur’an without knowing the rule behind it. The Qur’an is a complex book.
Allah told the Prophet that he could replace some revelations with new revela-
tions. This is called abrogation and it is clearly explained in the Qur’an. Now, if
you look carefully at the Qur’an you can see that all the tolerant verses have been
abrogated by the verse in al-tawba [The repentance], which states [speaking in
Arabic] ‘But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the pagans wher-
ever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every
stratagem (of war).’ [Sura 9:5]
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Ratib could not stand one more word and with an excuse he left me with
Haroun. When the discussion between Ratib and Haroun began, I had
promised myself to remain just an observer and record the conversation. Yet
before paying the bill and going back to the station with Ratib, I could not
help myself and reminded Haroun that the aya he had quoted mentioned
the musharikun (pagans) living in the Arabian peninsula at the time of the
Prophet. Haroun’s middle finger points, like a gun, to a group of people
waiting just in front of me for their turn to pay, and whispered,
Who are the ahl al-kitab [People of the Book i.e. Jews and Christians] today?
Certainly not these people who just do all the wrongdoings their religions have
forbidden them. Allah has abrogated all the tolerant verses. Sorry for them. In
the first phases of the ummah Muslims needed the support of Christians and
Jews, but when Muslims took Mecca, by Allah’s Will, they became strong
enough to fight their jihad. They [Christians] are kafirun [infidels] because they
believe that Jesus is the Son of God. Do you think that Islam could accept this
heresy forever? By the way, could you tell me how many of these people believe
in God? I tell you the truth, the majority of people in the West are musharikun;
they do not even worship Jesus any more, they just play at being the good
Christian. 
I caught up with Ratib outside the café and we rushed to the station trying
to catch our train home. On the way Ratib appeared quite depressed. He
told me that he could not understand how some people could turn Islam,
‘that it is a hymn to love and peace’ into an ‘ideology of violence.’ 
The improvised trip to Dublin had become an interesting ethnographic
experience; the fact that Ratib was not only Muslim but also North African
had compelled Haroun to proudly defend his viewpoint on jihad. Haroun
had an essentialist vision of Islam, according to him there was a ‘true Islam’
and a ‘fake Islam’, and he constantly compared our contemporary world to
the time of the Prophet. It is not difficult to spot the schismogenetic circle
of panic trapping Haroun, who believed that a reactionary and regressive
force called ‘the West’ was threatening and disrupting the revolutionary
message of Islam. There is a fundamental difference between Haroun and
my friend Ratib that goes further than their understanding of jihad.
Although I do not know any aspect of Haroun’s life, I know something
about Ratib’s. Ratib came to the UK to study as a PhD student in engi-
neering. He married an Irish woman and now has two children. He has a
good job, a nice semi-detached house and many friends, both Muslim and
non-Muslim. Ratib is a very religious Muslim. He prays five times a day and
attends the local mosque not only on Friday, but also in late evenings at the
‘isha’ prayer. Ratib believes that there is no division between Islam and
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everyday life; Islam for him is strongly associated with the knowledge and
experience of life. During his lifetime, Ratib has not experienced any major
traumas, he has defined his life as ‘normal’ and ‘happy’. Although he
believes that the war on terror is wrongly conducted and the Western
approach to Muslims and Islam is misleading, Ratib does not believe that
the ‘West’ is purposely attacking Islam as religion, but that ignorance and
blind Islamophobia should be blamed for certain controversial political
actions. Ratib feels unchallenged in his Muslim identity; he does not need
the rhetoric of jihad in order to feel Muslim. By contrast, although Haroun
used some ‘theological’ arguments to justify his interpretation of Jews and
Christian as kafirun, what mattered to him was the question, ‘who hates
who?’ Emotions had guided Haroun in his rhetoric of jihad, which clearly
appeared to be his main act of identity. Haroun felt himself to be Muslim
because of his rethoric of jihad, because he knew that following it he was not
part of the musharikun, the other Muslims accepting and living among
those whom ‘hate him because of Islam.’
Conclusion 
In this chapter we have started to observe how some of my respondents have
discussed the topic of jihad. Being Arab migrants and defining their identi-
ties as Muslim are the only two things that Nasim, Faruq, Tahar, Husayn,
Ratib and Haroun have in common. Their ideas of jihad appeared to be dif-
ferent and partially unrelated, though all of them referred to the Qur’an and
Sunna. Each of them interpreted the Islamic sources according to the feel-
ings that shape their autobiographical selves, their identities. Faruq and
Ratib were not trapped within a circle of panic, since their relationship with
their environment was not marked by emotions inducing feelings such as
guilt. By contrast, Tahar, Husayn and Haroun have experienced their envi-
ronment as emotionally negative and confrontational. They felt that ‘the
West’ was attempting to ‘colonize’ Islam and consequently their personal
Islamic identities. They have formed a rhetoric of jihad as a primary act of
identity. Yet the circle of panic could be facilitated by emotional manipula-
tion. We have observed how a Muslim preacher was able to trigger and
induce certain emotions in parts of his audience without resorting to direct
violent expressions. Not only did Nasim react to the preacher’s words but
also to the preacher’s meta-communication (gestures, facial expressions and
so forth). The preacher succeeded in making Nasim feel like ‘a bad
Muslim’, he subjected Nasim to emotions that translated themselves into
depressing feelings affecting his identity and how Nasim felt to be Muslim.
In the next chapter, we shall observe how some Muslim families have
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reacted to the broadcasting of tragedies affecting the Muslim world. Indeed,
some Muslim satellite channels have used particularly emotional language
and graphic images to produce reactions in their audience. We would
observe the dynamics of this process that has facilitated the spreading of the
circle of panic among many Muslims. 
Notes 
1. I also suggest Peters 1996, Rashid 2002 and Rattu 2002.
2. Although in the aftermath of 9/11 the Muslim speaker’s voice tends to be
softer while pronouncing the word in public places, and recent plans brought fore-
wards by the UK government to outlaw words and sentences which could be inter-
preted as an invitation to conduct ‘jihadi’ violence, such as (according to the UK
government advisors) ‘jihad’ and ‘shahid’, could jeopardize the ordinary use of
terms among ordinary Muslims. Actually, if terrorism has achieved anything so far
it is jeopardizing freedom of speech, although as we shall see, it is not by listening
to extreme sermons that Muslims can be manipulated in order to become suicide
bombers. 
3. Wahhabis are the followers of the very strict teaching of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab,
which is the official Islamic school based in Saudi Arabia. 
4. Muslims call each other brothers and sisters in Islam.
5. In France, about five years before this khutba, an Algerian, who claimed he
was involved in an ‘Islamic Algerian resistance movement’, told me that the
members of his group used particular coded movements of their hands in order to
communicate sensitive messages when, for instance, speaking to another member
about completely unrelated things. He also added that in certain circumstances
what he called the ‘messenger’ could even be unaware of the presence of a
‘receiver’ among the audience the ‘messenger’ was addressing. The messenger had
only one task to perform: to repeat on each different occasion and in each place the
coded message; many of which, the Algerian revealed, dealt with military instruc-
tions and terrorist operations. The shaykh’s gesticulations had the power to recall
that five year old conversation to my mind. Although I could not exclude that that
day a hidden message was delivered, I was sure that Nasim was not the receiver.
6. It is interesting to mention that many Muslims see qu‘ood as the antinomy of
jihad. 
7. Marabout means ‘a holy man’, but in Senegal also indicates a religious func-
tionary. 
8. On the role that the Islamic website might have, see Bunt 2003. 
9. For other experiences of North African Muslims in France see Lepoutre
1997. 
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CHAPTER 5
Sofas, Families, Tellies and Jihad
Stephan was reading the last news on the Internet when, with a horrified
expression, he told me ‘An airplane has crashed into one of the Twin
Towers in New York, such a horrible incident!’ We had not recovered from
the shock while watching CNN from the screen of his PC, when another air-
plane struck the other tower. Osama bin Laden had kept his promises.
Although the terrorist action did not hurt Stephan’s family or his friends, he
felt as if he had lost all of them. A mixture of depression and anger over-
whelmed his mind the day after. Stephan blamed Muslims, all of them.
They represented the apotheosis of the bloodthirsty terrorists, a barbaric
and cruel people, unmerciful and inhuman people. It was not the attack,
however, that turned Stephan into a Muslim-hater, rather the Palestinian
celebrations of 9/11, which the CNN had broadcast. The footage showed
some Palestinians in Lebanon, East Jerusalem and the West Bank cele-
brating the atrocities. Stephan concluded ‘They [Muslims] just sit watching
jihad and enjoy it on their sofas.’ Nonetheless, some Palestinians had
cheered not because of the carnage, rather for the ‘divine punishment’ on
the most powerful of Israel’s main weapon suppliers. 
In recent years, academic publications attempting to analyse the role that
the mass media have in both Bush’s war on terror and Osama bin Laden’s
terrorizing strategy have flourished (cf. Greenberg and Thompson 2002;
Hess and Kalb 2003; Schechter 2003). Not only was 9/11 a cruel act of ter-
rorism, but also an unprecedented mass media event. People could watch
each second of the tragedy as they would in the case of the subsequent
Afghan and Iraqi wars. Millions connected to the Internet, spent nights
watching satellite channels, exhausted their eyes scanning newspapers and
could not help watching 24-hour all-news channels. Many of us turned into
‘newsaholics’, at least my Muslim friends did. September 11, however, did
not mark the first minute-by-minute mass media coverage of a tragic event
involving Islam. In 1991, Saddam Hussein blessed CNN by allowing an
exclusive broadcast of Desert Storm’s operations. To Americans belonged
the bombs and comments, to Muslims belonged the indignation. Despite
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the fact that many Muslims1 foresaw a new Vietnam for the multinational
coalition, the Iraqi dictator suffered a humiliating defeat. This was the first
and last time that the West had the monopoly of widely broadcasting war
tragedies. Since 1996, al-Jazeera has guaranteed not only an unprecedented
international access to Arab opinions, developing a kind of pan-Muslim-
Arab forum (Al Theidi 2003; El-Nawawy and Iskander 2002), but it has
also become an ambitious competitor of Western satellite channels. In the
aftermath of 9/11, al-Jazeera, with its shocking reportage, has won the heart
and minds of Muslims (and as we shall see not only Arabs), yet it has alien-
ated Western governments. The main reason is that Osama bin Laden’s
seraphic face, soft snakelike voice and warlike messages have provided the
Qatar-based satellite channel with publicity it could only have dreamt about
at the beginning of the venture. With its reporting of Muslim suffering often
narrated more through pictures than texts, al-Jazeera has attracted a varied
Muslim audience, some of whom have basic Arabic or none at all. 
We know that the mass media has an impact on opinions and ideas, and
is able to provoke emotions. Muslims living in Western countries have
always been a loyal audience for satellite channels because of their interest
in following the many Middle East crises. Yet they often have a tense rela-
tionship with the mass media. So, since the Rushdie affair and the 1991
Gulf War, Muslims have shown an increasing mistrust in the Western mass
media representation of Islam and Muslims. Many of my respondents, who
came from different Muslim countries, believe that this misrepresentation is
in reality an attack on Islam for the sake of political interests. They, as we
shall see, argued that the Western mass media hide what the Arab satellite
channels have shown openly; Muslim children, women and elderly people
being killed. 
Nonetheless we may observe that these Muslim channels do not just show
the suffering, but professionally dramatize it while presenting the controver-
sial Islamic ‘insurgency’ as legitimate ‘resistance’. If we analyse the political
comments, pictures and texts of some Arabic-Muslim satellite channels we
notice that they aim to raise emotions to such a pitch that, according to my
theory of identity, they are able to facilitate the circle of panic. Before
observing some ethnographic cases, I shall discuss my respondents’ version
of the events that, according to them, have marked not only an unprece-
dented tension between Muslim and non-Muslim countries, but also what
they perceive as new colonization that is aimed not just at land and oil, but
Islam itself. 
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From Desert Storm to Operation Iraqi Freedom
The 1991 Gulf War, militarily known as ‘Operation Desert Storm’, started
when the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein refused to withdraw his forces
from the invaded and then annexed Arab state of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein
hoped that Kuwaiti oil could revitalize the disrupted Iraqi economy, which
was still suffering the consequences of the eight-year (Western sponsored)
Iraq–Iran war (Freedman 1993). The war started on 16 January 1991. The
UN allowed military force to be deployed and used. The USA, with the
support of a large international coalition (in which some Muslim countries
took part) attacked the dictator’s country. Saddam asked for a ceasefire just
eleven days after the first bombs hit Baghdad. Although influential Muslim
states supported the military operation, many Muslims living in the West
deplored it2 since they interpreted the American intervention as an attempt
to reinforce Israel’s position within the Middle East. Nevertheless, it was the
presence of American soldiers, invited by the Saudis and camped close to
Mecca that shocked Muslims the most. Amid the uproar, there was the
unknown voice of Osama bin Laden, who was the member of one of the
most influential and powerful families in the Saudi Kingdom. At that time
only the Russians would have defined Osama bin Laden as a terrorist. For
the USA and other Western governments, bin Laden and his mujahidin rep-
resented the heroic freedom fighters who had liberated the Afghan people
from the USSR communist yoke (Robison 2001). 
Muslims have never loved Saddam the dictator, but have appreciated
Saddam the defender of Arab-Muslim pride. In 1998, during my field-
work in Paris, I did not expect that Desert Storm could still be ‘storming’
the feelings of my respondents. The 1991 Gulf war and the subsequent
UN embargo had become the symbol of a brave resistance (some pre-
ferred the word jihad) against the new American ‘Satan’. Yet Muslims
knew that Saddam used Islam to reinforce his image. So, another group,
which seemed faithful to the precepts of Islam, the Taliban, became the
new myth in the hope of the construction of a perfect Islamic country. The
Taliban’s successful jihad against the Russian communist occupation
(from 1979 to 1989) was fought with Islamic faith, Muslim blood,
Western money and weaponry. In 1996 this radical faction of Afghan and
Arab Muslim fighters took power in Kabul after an internal struggle with
other mujahedin. The Taliban enforced a violent and gruesome version of
the shari‘a which disregarded basic human rights. Again Muslims became
disillusioned and found themselves between the devil and the deep blue
sea whether to accept and recognize the obscurantist, tribal Islamic views
of the Taliban or reject the Islamic experiment for a ‘real’ state based on
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shari‘a. For instance, in 2000, Iqbal, a 53-year-old Pakistani man living in
Ireland, told me, 
The Taliban don’t know very much about Islam and they are making some mis-
takes, in particular about women. But we must remember that they are con-
ducting an experiment: a new kind of Islamic state, and you know, we mustn’t
concentrate on the mistakes but appreciate the good results. Afghanistan was
pure hell; now it’s sort of state with a certain rules and order. The people in the
West have to thank the Taliban. You know, they are very active in fighting the
cultivation and exportation of opium that kills our children here. Jihad in
Afghanistan was successful and inspired many people; but now we need good
Muslim politicians and leaders. Afghanistan could provided a new solution for
all Muslims. 
Indeed, the majority of my respondents have recognized that the Taliban’s
Islamic state had an oppressive view of shari‘a, but they also emphasized
that to have an Islamic state was better than having none. They believed that
with time and international help the Taliban would have changed their
medieval regulations.
The US also had their plans for Afghanistan. What the US government
envisaged was not democracy and human rights for the Afghan people, but
securing through agreements with the Taliban regime its oil-related interests
(cf. Rashid 2002b). The Taliban were enjoying a friendly relationship with
Washington when bin Laden started his terrorist organization and set up its
anti-American training camps in the country. Osama decided to turn his
back on the West. Now that he had defeated the ‘Red Devil’ (Russia), he
aimed at the Devil in Stars and Stripes. In his monolithic view, the USA per-
sonified the evil and corrupt ‘West’. This time the heated and violent
khutbas and fatwas of bin Laden, which were unknown to the West during
the mujahidin’s struggle against the USSR, reached non-Muslim ears. On
23 February 1998, he issued his most famous fatwa against ‘America and its
allies’, which other extremist ulemas readily endorsed. The fatwa touched
emotional themes for many pious Muslims such as the ‘American occupa-
tion’ of Mecca since 1991, the cruel trade embargo against the Iraqi people,
and the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Finally, bin Laden invited Muslims,
wherever they lived, to act:
We, with God’s help, call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to
be rewarded to comply with God’s order to kill the Americans and plunder their
money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema,
leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch raids on Satan’s US troops and the devil’s
supporters who ally with them, and to displace those who are behind them so
that they may learn a lesson.3
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Osama bin Laden had a better chance of fascinating Muslims than the grim
Saddam. Some Muslims read Osama bin Laden’s victory against the ‘Red
Devil’ in Afghanistan as the evidence that Allah had blessed his jihad. Bin
Laden’s anti-Americanism forced the US government to list him among the
most dangerous enemies of America, though the bin Laden family had eco-
nomic relationships with influential American politicians such as the Bush
family. 
On 19 April 1995, a bomb exploded at the Alfred P. Murrah federal
building in Oklahoma City killing 168 people and injuring hundreds of
others. The American mass media hurriedly blamed Muslim extremists and
Osama bin Laden for this atrocity. Anti-Muslim crimes increased to
unprecedented levels, but the culprit was a fascist extremist group led by
Timothy James McVeigh (a white American). Nonetheless, the US govern-
ment knew that bin Laden, one day or another, would carry out his threat
to strike against American interests. The expected attack arrived three years
later, on 7 August 1998. It was directed against two US embassies in
Nairobi (Kenya) and in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania). Although different
Islamic terrorist groups claimed responsibility for the attack, the US gov-
ernment presented Osama bin Laden as the mastermind behind the plot.
The US government retaliated and on 27 August 1998 a missile attack hit
six sites in Afghanistan hoping to assassinate the former anti-communist
hero Osama bin Laden, while other missiles hit a Sudanese factory, which
the US intelligence had indicated was producing chemical weapons. Later
investigation would prove that the factory had produced pharmaceutical
products and the attack had resulted in the loss of several innocent Muslim
workers’ lives. Nobody apologized for the terrible mistake. President
Clinton’s attempts to assassinate Osama bin Laden remained frustrated. Bin
Laden did not waste time and, playing the victim card, asked Muslims to
punish the ‘American terrorist actions’. 
The US retaliation could only reinforce the popularity that bin Laden
enjoyed among some young Muslims. According to some of my respon-
dents he had all the necessary requirements to present himself as the paladin
of the oppressed Muslims. Bin Laden had exchanged his rich and comfort-
able life for a uncomfortable jihadi lifestyle, his jihad against the Russians
was miraculously successful, he wished to replace the corrupt Saudi power
with an Islamic state and he could easily make parallels between the
Americans attempting to assassinate him and the pagans who attempted to
assassinate the Prophets. Furthermore, even the US government could not
prove, beyond any reasonable doubt, his involvement in the terrorist
actions. The Oklahoma bombing had set a precedent; the majority of my
respondents were ready to suggest that bin Laden was a scapegoat, while
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others observed that Osama bin Laden had attacked military forces in dar
al-islam, something that many Muslims considered an acceptable jihad. 
During these years, Muslims have not only paid attention to the Middle
East crisis, but also to another, less discussed, conflict. The cruel conflict in
Chechnya has indeed attracted less mass media interest and attention than
the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. The brutal Russian repression of the
Chechen struggle for independence started in 1994 and officially ended in
1996, when the Russian forces left Chechnya (German 2000; Hafez 2004).
In 1999 several bombs exploded in Moscow and in two other southern
Russian cities, killing 200 people. The Russian authorities blamed Chechen
Muslims and this gave them the excuse to retake control of Chechnya.
While Russia presented its action as anti-terrorist operations, the reality was
that the Russian military forces have been conducting an inhuman repres-
sion of all Chechens. Yet on 23 October 2002 a suicide Chechen commando
group unexpectedly stormed a Moscow theatre and the Chechen war again
attracted the attention that it had been missing. The terrorists, many of
whom were widows, kidnapped over 800 hostages, 130 of whom would die
four days later because of the lethal gas the Russian special forces employed
to overwhelm and kill the rebels. If the Russian military operations in
Chechnya passed unnoticed in the Western mass media, the Chechen
tragedy was emphasized on Muslim satellite channels. Al-Jazeera and the
radical Lebanese al-Manar overwhelmed their Muslim audience with
shocking pictures. They showed the atrocities of the Russian mercenaries
through the crude and tragic pictures of mutilated children and women,
footage which had allegedly been taken as souvenirs by Russian soldiers
showing raped women was screened, causing uproar among many Muslims. 
While the Russians were fighting their last post-Soviet conflict, the
Americans suffered another attack. On 13 October 2000, a suicide bomber
struck the ‘Cole’, one of the most powerful American warships. The ship
was docking in a Yemeni port when the blast killed 17 sailors and injured
33. The terrorists had planned the action to inflict not only the most exten-
sive damage, but also produce the most spectacular attack on an American
warship since the Second World War. The attack killed several American
soldiers and revealed the American forces’ vulnerability to suicide attacks.
My respondents, both South Asians and Arabs, welcomed these attacks
against US military targets and rejected the description of these ‘operations’
as terrorist. Bilal, a 32-year-old Pakistani living in Birmingham, explained
to me that during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the UK and USA
advertised through Pakistan’s secret service (ISI) Osama bin Laden’s
training camps as the bulwark of liberty, ‘You know’ said Bilal, ‘politicians
are just hypocrites. They praised Osama bin Laden for his operations
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against the communists, but now that his jihads move against American
arrogance it becomes terrorism.’
My Palestinian respondents were the most critical of the term terrorism,
which they label as ‘controversial and politically manipulated’. On 28
September 2000, Sharon visited the Al-Haram As-Sharif (Temple Mount)
and declared it ‘eternal Israeli territory’. With a few words, he alienated the
Muslim and Christian Palestinian population and triggered the al-aqsa
intifada. The 1993 Oslo agreement, which reinvigorated the hope of a
peaceful solution to the endless conflict, among both Palestinian and Israeli
people, was finally over. The circle of violent riots and Israeli retaliation cul-
minated in Mohammed A-Dura’s death being internationally broadcast in
our homes. Millions of Muslims watched the images of the Israeli-
Palestinian crossfire trapping the twelve-year-old boy and his father behind
a wall until deadly bullets reached the young boy’s body. Muslim resent-
ment and anger against Israel and Jews reached its climax the day after. In
every mosque and Islamic centre I was visiting, I could perceive a mixture
of distress, disillusion, rage and anger. Many shared the impression that
Islam was under attack and that Muslims had to react. In particular, young
people saw the defence of the threatened ‘Muslim identity’ as a priority. 
An imam, whom I interviewed in Ireland at the time, felt very frustrated
by the tension he could perceive among his co-religionists. Islam asks for
rationality, he emphasized, while observing that many contemporary
Muslims seemed to have lost this essential requirement, 
If you speak to our brothers and sisters, you find out that they use their tongues
and souls (naf) irrationally. Muslims that describe jihad only as fighting against
Americans, Muslims saying that all Westerners are ‘Americans’, Muslims who
want to kill all non-Muslims, Muslims accepting unbelievable conspiracy theo-
ries. Some of them say that America would destroy Mecca if we did not conduct
a global jihad. I think that these Muslims think as non-Muslims because they do
not realize that only Allah can decide the future. There is no rationality at all in
the things these people like bin Laden are saying. I fear that some Muslims may
have reduced relational Islam to irrational jihad. 
However, many Muslims felt guilty at the oppressed condition of their
‘brothers and sisters’ living in other Muslim countries and particularly in
Palestine. Nonetheless, the worst was still to come. 
A terrorist commando unit hijacked four commercial planes, transformed
them into flying missiles, hit the twin towers of the New York World Trade
Center, part of the Pentagon, but failed to target the White House, and
killed about 3,000 people. It was 9/11. The mass media broadcast the
tragedy in real time. Shocking images reached the eyes of astonished people.
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All of us watched people jumping from the windows of the Twin Towers, all
of us heard again and again the broadcast ‘Oh my God! Oh my Gooood!’
and the collapse of the Towers. Some non-Muslims had the impression that
‘Western civilization’ itself was under attack, some Muslims interpreted the
attack as Allah’s punishment for American actions. The rumble of the col-
lapsing towers had not yet become silent when Osama bin Laden’s name
reverberated as the evil mastermind of the tragedy. Although bin Laden
strongly denied direct responsibility for the terrorist attack, he claimed
moral responsibility by praising the perpetrators and encouraging other
‘pious’ Muslims to follow the example of the nineteen ‘martyrs’. 
The day after the attack, CNN showed a group of Palestinians, in partic-
ular women and children, celebrating the tragedy of 9/11. Despite the
Palestinian authority revealing allegations that CNN had made up the
footage, those images had a devastating impact on many Muslims living in
America and Europe since Islamophobia spread quickly and claimed some
innocent lives. Meanwhile, the Taliban decided to protect bin Laden by
arguing that the US government had not provided sufficient evidence to
charge the shaykh under shari‘a law. The Taliban’s position found support
among the majority of my respondents, which believed that a Muslim could
not be deported from an Islamic to a non-Muslim country without the latter
providing clear evidence of the alleged crime. Furthermore, some Muslims
had started to blame Israel for the attack. Yet the American administration
was no more careful in its political language. Bush Junior emphatically
called the American commitment to stop bin Laden’s organization a
‘Crusade against terrorism’. Muslims saw Bush’s gaffe as evidence that by
‘terrorism’ Bush in reality meant Islam. The Bush administration realized
the mistake they had made and adopted a generic ‘war on terror’. Yet my
respondents thought that the word ‘Crusade’ better represented the inten-
tion of the hardcore Christians in the neo-Conservative movement; to get
rid of the Islamic world and present Islam as an inhuman religion. 
On 7 October 2001 the US and British Armies launched their attacks
against Afghanistan in the attempt to topple the Taliban regime and
capture, or kill, the ‘Master of Terror’. The American and British govern-
ments had raised extensive international support for the Afghan military
campaign among not only Western countries, but also some Muslim
nations, such as General Pervez Musharraf’s Pakistan. The American
troops easily gained control of Kabul and other important Taliban bastions
such as the city of Kunduz. Yet they failed to capture their most important
target: Osama bin Laden. He had mocked the ‘Satan’ again and despite
losing his jihad in Afghanistan, he had won the hearts and minds of many
Western Muslims. Although not all of them appreciated bin Laden’s actions
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or him as person they liked the idea that he had mocked the Western super-
powers. 
During the Afghan anti-Taliban war, the Western mass media emphasized
that this war, which cost at least 4,000 civilian lives, could bring democracy
to the Afghan people and in particular its burqa-covered women.4 By con-
trast, the main Muslim mass media broadcast the other side of the coin: the
suffering children, the distressed and starving refugees, the innocent victims
of missed targets, the women mourning. Indeed, for many of my respon-
dents these represented the real American gift to Afghanistan. Furthermore,
rumours spread that in Afghanistan food was exchanged for conversions to
Christianity. Even the most moderate Muslims I knew started to fear that
9/11 had irreversibly changed the relationship between the Islamic world
and the Christian one. The feeling of being oppressed and recolonized rose
among my respondents when the USA and several European countries
introduced special anti-terrorism legislation. It did not take much time
before the images of the extra-juridical Camp X-Ray and Camp Delta,
which the USA run at the military base of Guantanamo Bay (in Cuba), con-
vinced even the most sceptical Muslims that Muslims and Islam were being
treated with contempt and oppressed. As Rashid, a 29-year-old Bangla-
deshi, put it ‘if you are Muslim you are guilty before proof’. Independent
organizations such as Amnesty International and the Red Cross criticised
the international anti-terrorist policies that the Bush administration had
implemented; they feared that innocent Muslims could face mistreatment.
This time, Muslim and non-Muslim organizations started to campaign
against the anti-terrorist legislation and the war so the Muslim community
felt less isolated than before. Nonetheless, although the British government
officially disagreed with the controversial US solutions, it issued a no less
damaging Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill. The majority of British
Muslims interpreted the new legislation as being aimed at Muslims rather
than targeting terrorists. The most controversial point regarded the deroga-
tion from Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
in order to detain, without trial, non-British citizens suspected of terrorism.
This legislation increased British Muslims’ mistrust of their government. 
The tension between Muslims and the US and UK governments could
only rise to an unprecedented level when President Bush and Prime
Minister Blair accused Saddam Hussein of threatening the security of the
world (and in particular Israel) by possessing weapons of mass destruction
deployable in forty-five minutes. Bin Laden was still freely sending his mes-
sages but he was no longer target number one. Bush Junior had to conclude
what his father had started. France and Germany, supported by millions of
Europeans, opposed the new Iraqi war, and the opposition to this new war,
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resulted in an astonishing majority of European non-Muslims joining with
Muslims in their protests. Democracy is often a very odd machine, so
despite the majority of people in the UK opposing the war, Prime Minister
Blair joined his friend Bush in this campaign. They started their war on 20
March 2003. The war was relatively short: on 1 May 2003 the Bush admin-
istration declared the end of ‘major military operations’, underestimating
the local resistance and foreign mujahidin, which would result in the highest
number of civilian and military casualties since the end of the Vietnam War. 
Although politicians who send soldiers to war traditionally do not trouble
themselves with the destiny of these young people, they tend to be very sen-
sitive about their own political future. A shadow seemed to be cast over
Bush and Blair when they had to face the fact that neither the international
nor the American inspections could confirm that Saddam had weapons of
mass destruction. The war left, according to Lancet, 10,000 civilians dead
and many others struggling with poverty, hunger and everyday terrorism.
Allegations that American soldiers were systematically sexually abusing and
torturing Muslim prisoners in Iraq reached several Western mosques long
before the press confirmed their disgraceful actions. Then the photos of
abuse in Abu Ghraib prison confirmed what many had said to me. The tor-
mentors had specifically selected their humiliating torture in order to deni-
grate the Islamic identity of their victims. For many Western Muslims, the
American attacks against Islam now had unchallengeable evidence. Muslim
Arab satellite channels started their campaign to reinforce such an idea.
Before discussing the effects that these satellite channels might have on their
audience, let me explain how Arab channels have become what they are
today. 
Discovering the Arab Muslim Satellite Channels 
I met Karim (a 33-year-old Algerian migrant) in 1998; he used to pray in a
small mosque located in a suburban area of Paris. After knowing him for a
while, I discovered that Karim still saw the 1991 Iraqi war as a tragedy for
the Arab and Muslim world.5 The humiliating defeat of what he considered
a powerful Arab country turned into the humiliation of his Muslim pride.
Karim had many reasons to dislike Saddam. Karim’s Kurdish friends told
him terrible stories about the persecution of their families and how Saddam
had also oppressed the majority Shi‘a population. When Karim used to
speak of the Iraqi dictator the preferred reiteration after saying Saddam’s
name was ‘bloody secularist!’ Yet he still saw the Iraqi tyrant as the only one
who could protect Muslim interests in the Middle East. Karim followed
Desert Storm from the start, eager for the latest broadcast news. He could
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not believe that, in his words, ‘the Americans planned to invade Iraq as the
Mongols did centuries ago’.6 Karim’s supposed Middle East superpower
melted after just a few days. The Iraqi defeat frustrated Karim but what
really upset him was that the only political comments and images Muslims
could receive from Baghdad were as American as the supposed ‘intelligent’
bombs which were killing Iraqi Muslims. Indeed, Karim had to depend
upon the CNN, being the only channel operating in bombed Baghdad. As
if this was not enough, Karim could not help noticing that the Arab news-
papers available at the Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris were, of course,
just reporting what the CNN journalists said. In other words, Karim, as
other Muslims, had no choice other than to rely on the Western viewpoint. 
When I met Karim and some of his friends, they expressed their fear that
the Western mass media could colonize the ‘mind of too many Muslims’
(see also Eickelman and Anderson 1999). In the same suburban Parisian
mosque in which I had met Karim, worshippers hoped for the development
of a real Muslim voice in the world of the mass media. Some of Karim’s
friends presented this difficult task as part of a jihad to maintain a Muslim
identity. So, Hakan (a 42-year-old Turkish man) argued,
We are between the devil and the deep blue sea; we can only select between
news provided by corrupt Arab regimes or put up with the anti-Muslim Western
mass media. We need something that can challenge both. I mean something that
is similar in quality to Western products but having a Muslim soul. If we could
have very good Arab channels, Muslims who don’t speak Arabic would easily
learn the language of the Qur’an, something that every good Muslim should do. 
Finally, in the 1990s, some Arab channels seemed to move in the direction
Karim and his friends hoped for. Soon they would achieve a totally unex-
pected success. Two factors have assisted this success: the increasingly
affordable costs of satellite technologies, and an improvement in the quality
of the Arab programmes. These are the two elements that have allowed al-
Jazeera to claim eight million subscribers in Europe (Guardian, 25 March
2003). Although al-Jazeera has been the most successful satellite channel, it
was not the first. 
Wars, tragedies and economic interests often go arm in arm and this is
particularly the case when we observe the causes of the mass media. The
Lebanese civil war triggered the mass media race to win the hearts and
minds of the Christian or Muslim Lebanese living in Canada (Kraidy 2002).
In the late 1980s, the Lebanese LBC (Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation)
decided to target an Arab and Muslim migrant audience. If the civil war was
behind the development of a Lebanese satellite system, the reasons for
starting the MBC (Middle East Broadcasting Corporation) dealt with the
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struggle for the political hegemony over the Muslim world. The Saudi bil-
lionaire Saleh Kamel set up MBC in 1991 in London to broadcast pro-
grammes of general interest; MBC achieved relative success since it was a
no-subscription channel (Boyd 1999). Nevertheless, the alleged independ-
ence of MBC from Saudi control ended in 1994, when the channel passed
to Walid and Abdelazziz al-Ibrahim, both brothers-in-law of King Fahd. 
After the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Saudi regime understood the
role that the mass media could play against revolutionary Shi‘a forces inside
and outside the kingdom as well as against the Egyptian hegemony in the
sector. Indeed, since the 1960s Egypt had the monopoly of regional broad-
casting and used to depict the Saudi Kingdom as an un-Islamic reactionary
regime, sometimes even calling for its downfall (cf. Hafez 2001). The
involvement of the Saudi royal family in the satellite broadcasting business
reached its apogee in 1994, when ART (Arab Radio and Television) and
Orbit started to operate. These channels broadcast general programmes as
well as television news but they carefully avoided any criticism of Saudi pol-
itics. Local Arab regimes could easily control the terrestrial Arab TV sta-
tions, but starting from the 1990s, satellite technology increased the
possibility of pluralistic opinions. New satellite stations, which could reach
Muslims in different places and particularly in Western countries, started to
broadcast. Among those, al-Manar (meaning the beacon) was surely the
most politicized. 
The Lebanese government licensed al-Manar in 2000 and the station
became the voice of the radical Shi‘a party Hezbollah. Symbolically, the
channel decided to start broadcasting (eight hours per day) on the same day
on which the Israeli troops withdrew from South Lebanon (24 May 2000).
Self-defined as ‘The Channel of Arabs and Muslims’,7 al-Manar’s propa-
ganda is not only pro-Palestinian but also anti-Israeli and overtly anti-
Semitic. Unsurprisingly, Al-Manar again increased its broadcasting time to
ten hours when the al-aqsa Intifada began. September 11 and the subse-
quent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq increased the channel’s traditional
attacks against the ‘Nazi-Zionist Jews’ and ‘the ‘American Devil’. The
majority of these controversial materials were broadcast through video clips,
some of which praised jihad and Islamic resistance. These video clips in
MTV style quickly became the channel’s most attractive feature. I have to
admit that almost all my respondents, even people who I would never dare
to define as radical, showed a certain appreciation of al-Manar and its
videos. 
In July 2001, I had occasion to watch Al-Manar for the first time. Farid
(a 40-year-old Lebanese Shi‘a) had invited me to his home for a cup of
coffee. I arrived at his home, he opened his door and told me to wait for him
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in the lounge while he was preparing our Lebanese coffee. I started to watch
the Arabic programme that Farid had on. An anchorman, speaking in
Arabic, was presenting the latest news from Palestine. At the close, he
praised the courage of the Palestinian shahid (martyrs) who sacrificed their
lives while conducting jihad against the ‘Zionist enemy’. After the news,
there followed a video clip. The images, many of which were highly
shocking, portrayed the funerals of children, women crying and crowds fol-
lowing the flagged coffin with photographs of the Palestinian martyrs.
Heroic mujahidin songs accompanied the footage. Farid came back and
smiled, ‘Do you know this channel?’ I shook my head to say no. ‘It is al-
Manar’, my host went on, ‘it is a satellite channel linked to Hezbollah, the
Lebanese Shi‘a resistance. They broadcast many religious programmes,
dua’a [supplications] and jihad songs. It may be a bit radical but at least you
know that the programs are Islamic and not haram.’ 
Notwithstanding the success that the al-Manar channel has achieved
among many Muslims, my respondents increasingly reported that al-Jazeera
was the best Arab satellite channel. The exclusive coverage of the 2001
Afghan war had transformed the Qatar broadcaster into the CNN of the
Muslim world. Surprisingly, the audience of al-Jazeera is not restricted to
Arab Muslims, but extends to a number of Muslims from non-Arabic
speaking countries. Al-Jazeera broadcast its first programme in November
1996; it primarily focuses on television news and political analysis. Today
we can consider al-Jazeera a pan-Arab-Muslim channel (El-Nawawy and
Iskander 2002). In a Muslim audience disaffected with Western mass
media, al-Jazeera has achieved an unprecedented influence. The recent
success of this satellite channel is such that Jessica Hodgson, in the
Guardian supplement, The Observer,8 has observed, ‘British Asians have
taken to Al Jazeera like pre-teens to Harry Potter – some 87 per cent have
access to the channel via Sky.’ Hodgson’s reference to ‘British Asians’ is not
a mistake, as some people might think. Some British Asians are indeed al-
Jazeera addicted. Yet we might ask, for instance, what could make al-Jazeera
so interesting to a 26-year-old man of Pakistani origin. I had occasion to
understand it when I went to Saad’s home. 
On 9 April 2003, the American troops reached Baghdad. Saad and I were
listening to al-Jazeera’s commentator describing the American soldiers top-
pling the dictator’s huge statue, when unexpectedly a black American
soldier covered the bronze tyrant’s face with the American flag. The al-
Jazeera journalist commented ‘This flag shows what the new Iraq will be.
Everything will smell American and this flag shows what Americans want to
do to Iraqi Muslims.’ Saad became upset and started to say, ‘Shit! Bastards,
bloody imperialists, I would know what to do with your fucking flag.’ He
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hated Saddam as much as the American flag. Saad can understand some
Arabic, and he claimed he had improved incredibly since he had started
watching al-Jazeera. Saad explained that if Muslims wished to avoid
Western propaganda and manipulation they had to learn Arabic. Yet young
South Asians like Saad do not watch the channel just to learn Arabic, but
because they can watch on al-Jazeera what the Western channels censor:
videos and photos showing a very different reality about ‘the war on terror’.
So Saad observed, ‘Al-Jazeera has shown Bin-Laden’s messages without any
cuts so this channel lets us to know the reality of the Afghan and Iraqi war;
I mean, the dead children and women.’ Saad loved another aspect of the
Arabic channel, its capacity to challenge American and British hypocrisy.
He provided me with this example, ‘al-Jazeera recently dared to show dead
British soldiers and for these reasons, they [Americans] bombed al-Jazeera’s
installations and killed some of its journalists.’ Saad told me that Muslims
could see al-Jazeera as conducting a defensive battle against hypocrisy and
Western propaganda. Yet we might wonder what effects this shocking
reportage might have on some Western Muslim families. 
Muslim Families Watching Western ‘Just Wars’ 
In many Muslim (and non-Muslim) homes watching television programmes
represents a collective family ritual which may also involve the family’s
guests. Before 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’, films and television dramas
glued Muslim families to their sofas (see also Eickelman and Anderson
1999). September 11 and the Afghan war shifted Muslim families’ prefer-
ence towards television news and political talk shows. As I have mentioned
before, the mass media, and in particular television programmes, may
provoke powerful emotional reactions in their audiences (cf. Christiansen
2004; Nisbet, Scheufele and Shanahan 2004). Channels such as al-Jazeera
and al-Manar purposely employ very shocking images and provocative com-
ments as part of their strategy (Nisbet et al 2004). During my fieldwork, I
had occasion to observe the effect of such emotional triggers on some
Muslim families. In this section I shall discuss two different examples. 
Ali’s family comprised four members. Ali, 47, worked as an engineer,
and was happily married to a 40-year-old Palestinian, Afra. They had two
children: Ibrahim, 11 years old and Aminah, 22 years old. The family
enjoyed a standard lifestyle. I experienced the hospitality of this family
quite often. On 3 November 2001, Ali had organized a dinner at his home
to which he invited me along with his friend Ahmad, a 29-year-old
Algerian. The dinner would be special not only because of the fantastic
Arabic food Afra cooked, but also because al-Jazeera would broadcast one
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of the recurrent Osama bin Laden videotapes inciting Muslims to act
against the Afghan war. 
That evening, at about seven, Ahmad and I reached Ali’s home. Ali,
despite his modern lifestyle, had maintained some of his family traditions,
the most radical of which culminated in gender-segregated dinners. So, after
serving our meal, his wife and daughter relegated themselves to the kitchen,
which also proved to be a taboo area for a curious anthropologist interested
in Algerian food. The first time I had dinner with Ali, Afra and her daughter
emphasized that they preferred the gender-segregated dinners, which took
place only when guests were invited (something that happened quite often).
Indeed, it seemed that the two women could not bear Ali and his guests’
preferred topics of discussion: sport, politics and, in particular, business. In
the large kitchen Afra could enjoy the company of guests’ wives and have
their gossip while her daughter was entertaining the other children. I started
to worry about what Afra said about ‘enjoying gossip’ when my own wife
expressed grateful appreciation for these gender-segregated dinners!
The first time I became aware of this ritual, I expected that the ‘segrega-
tion’ would have extended to other gatherings, activities and spaces, yet I
proved to be very wrong. Despite the fact that the house had a living room
and a lounge, both equipped with televisions, Ali’s wife and his daughter
used to join us in the living room to watch the TV. Before my last visit, Ali
had bought an outstanding super-slim TV screen, and he proudly illustrated
the futuristic qualities it had. The select channel of the night was al-Jazeera,
which remained as background noise to our conversation. This was until al-
Jazeera broadcast the last of bin Laden’s messages promptly subtitled in
Arabic. Afra asked me whether I could understand it. Before I was allowed
to answer, she translated the message while the others focused on Osama
bin Laden’s gentle words.9 At the end of the message, Ali and Ahmad com-
mented on bin Laden’s words. Partially cut off from their discussion, I could
observe it in detail. Ali’s son, Ibrahim, had just moved to the right side of
my armchair. Excited by being part of my research, Ibrahim helped me to
understand the conversation when it started shifted to shift to a fast Arabic
dialect. Osama bin Laden’s message triggered off an animated discussion
between Ali, Ahmad, Afra and her daughter.
Afra stated that Muslims could disagree with bin Laden’s actions or ideas,
but should recognize that Osama bin Laden was a ‘faithful Muslim’. Her
husband seemed less convinced yet she defended her viewpoint, ‘Brother
Osama has abandoned his rich life and wealth for defending Islam.’ Ali
observed that he could not know how much din (faith) bin Laden might
have, because only Allah could know, then he said, ‘Yet his actions could
jeopardize the peaceful lives of many Muslims and families like us.’ Afra was
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convinced that since bin Laden had escaped American punishment, this
might have been a sign that Allah had accepted his jihad. In any case, Afra
refused to believe that bin Laden had planned 9/11 and argued, ‘Allah
would have punished him, but since He has not, this means that Bush and
the Zionist members of his government planned the plot.’ Ali disagreed,
‘Bin Laden has acted as a “prima donna” without thinking of the conse-
quences for Muslims and Islam.’ Ahmad agreed with Ali that bin Laden’s
actions could jeopardize the image of Islam among non-Muslims, but
Ahmad added, ‘Osama is shaking Muslims out of their torpor. Something
good for us who are so passive.’ Although the people who were sitting
around me offered different opinions, I had the impression that everybody
was ready to agree on the most popular conspiracy theories available. They
were reading 9/11 not just as an attack on ‘the West’ but on Islam. So, Ali’s
daughter, Aminah, supported her mother’s viewpoint that Allah had allowed
9/11 to happen. She emphasized, ‘Americans believe in God’s punishment,
so why do they want to blame others for something that only God could
allow? Why do they not understand that this was a punishment for all their
mistakes and dirty wars.’ 
While some crude images passed over Ali’s slim screen, Ahmad started to
notice that al-Jazeera had not cut bin Laden’s message and, laughing, he
observed, ‘the Americans should be mad about it. They [Americans] speak
of freedom of speech, but they don’t like our freedom of speech. Americans
like American style of freedom that is like American food, junk.’ At this
point, an emotional al-Jazeera anchorman announced to his audience that
during the holy month of Ramadan the invading forces had not stopped the
bombing of ‘Afghan Muslim families’. While speaking, graphic pictures of
attacks on Kabul’s eastern area were screened. The news outraged my hosts.
With a quick exchange of remarks they agreed that, yes, Islam was under
attack. The fact that Bush had ordered the continuation of bombing during
Ramadan was producing an uproar within the family. Afra exclaimed, ‘try
now to convince me [speaking to her husband and daughter] that this was
not a Crusade against Muslims and Islam’. Ali points his finger to his expen-
sive technological screen and told me, as if he needed to convince me of the
terrible acts the USA were perpetrating, 
They [Afghans] are poor people; they don’t have anything, and watch here,
watch these powerful explosions against a country that has virtually nothing.
What do these poor Muslims have? They have only Islam and their din. Poor
children, Ramadan is so important for them; Ramadan for Afghan children is
more than Christmas here, because they do not have all the things we can have
all the days of the year. They [Americans] do not respect Muslim blood; for
them our blood is the cheapest in the world. In Afghanistan, think about that,
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they are killing people that don’t even know why they are killed. But I am pretty
sure that they could erase Afghanistan itself and the rest of the world, but if
Allah wants bin Laden to survive, well, he will survive. Wait and see. 
Aminah observed that during one of the talk shows she watched on al-Jazeera
it had been suggested that the USA had decided to attack Islam because
Bush needed a counter-ideology to fight in the same way that Reagan had
with communism, so she argued, ‘They [Americans] are a very divided
society who oppress the poorest and therefore they could have a revolution.’
Ali generally agreed and with an empathetic voice told me, ‘They fear Islam
because Islam imposes social justice. So Islam appeals to the black commu-
nity and Muslims know very well that Islam is a revolutionary force.’ Ahmad
challenged his friend, ‘if you are right, are there sufficient reasons to conduct
a defensive jihad?’ The question, however, remained unanswered. 
Afra wished to show me that the Western mass media tries to mislead
their non-Muslim audience by hiding Muslim suffering, so she switched to
the BBC News 24. After a while I could recognise some familiar images,
indeed the BBC was broadcasting some of al-Jazeera’s images, but the
shocking and crude ones, showing some mutilated women and children,
had disappeared in the BBC version. Afra was repeating, ‘Cut! Cut! All cut.
The horrible war now is just a new videogame. They [the Western mass
media] want to show a clean war. No blood, and no amputations caused by
cluster bombs, just fake happy Muslims who are grateful for democracy.’
While speaking and waving the TV controller, she turned to her husband,
‘Do you remember what the CNN journalist, who stood on the hotel roof
said the first time the Americans bombed Baghdad [1991]?’ Ali immediately
answered ‘Fireworks! The journalist on the top of the hotel roof said fire-
works … could you think that … people were dying, but for him the pow-
erful explosions were just fireworks! A party, you see?’ Unexpectedly,
Amhad turned towards me and said sarcastically, ‘I guess that they [the
Americans] did not compare 9/11 to a pyrotechnic show, did they?’
Although I am an anthropologist and tend not to judge my respondents,
at the beginning I could not help feeling disappointed at the lack of sym-
pathy the family and the guest had shown for the victims of 9/11. However,
when I started to analyse their discourses, I noticed that even in the case of
Muslim casualties they emphasized that Islam had lost Muslims rather than
saying that people have been killed. They observed the tragedy of this ter-
rible new war from a different perspective. This family seemed to interpret
bin Laden’s actions and the consequences they had brought to the Muslim
world, through the concept of qadar (predestination). In other words, each
of these events happened because they were part of Allah’s plans. Yet qadar
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does not imply passivity or fatalism but Allah’s will does take place and
Muslims should act. The crude pictures available on al-Jazeera and al-
Manar had subjected the family members to two emotional processes, the
raising of feelings such as fear, frustrations and anger, and at the same time
exporting them to a systematic desensitization to suffering which leads to a
particular interpretation of qadar. This rapidly sucked Ali’s family into the
‘circle of panic’. The second ethnographic example that I shall discuss
below confirms this dynamic. 
Majd is a 58-year-old Iraqi Shi‘a married to Asma, a 50-year-old Iraqi
Sunni woman. They have four children, three daughters, Amal (27 years
old), Ilham (22 years old), Jamilah (17 years old) and one son, Azhar (10
years old). The family had bought its detached house in a mainly white
British neighbourhood. All of them hold British passports of which they
used to be very proud before Blair ordered the war in Iraq. The members of
these families saw themselves as British Muslims. In the aftermath of 9/11,
Majd’s business had suffered some economic hardship, since the non-
Muslim customers declined in number, but the worst Islamophobic event
took place when some local youngsters started to hurl abuse at his children.
Yet Majd and Asma had continued to trust British society and repeatedly
told me, ‘The truth is that we are more respected as Muslims here in Britain
than we were in Saddam’s Iraq. We can be good Muslims here.’ Notwith-
standing the assimilation process, their faith in the justice and democracy of
Western countries collapsed when the British soldiers had to attack Iraq
despite the British people’s massive opposition to the war. Since the begin-
ning of the new Iraqi war, Asma had started wearing the hijab (headscarf),
despite her husband’s concerns, who feared his wife could become a victim
of Islamophobic attack. Islam was a constant presence during the everyday
life of Majd’s family. 
That night, after a superb Iraqi-style dinner and while Majd was settling
down for his satellite TV news, Asma revealed, ‘Since the beginning of the
[Iraqi] war, Majd has spent every night looking for new information about
Iraq. You know, we have relatives there.’ Since Majd is a Shi‘a Muslim. I
would have expected him to support the war to topple Saddam’s regime. On
the contrary, from the beginning of the war I came to know that Majd
openly supported the Sunni dictator; the very same tyrant whom had killed
thousands of Majd’s co-religionists and forced him into self-imposed exile.
Majd justified his controversial position by arguing that Bush had declared
a war not just against Saddam but the whole Islamic world. None of Majd’s
family members could understand why their host country (the UK), which
was their children’s country, had opted for a dangerous conflict which finally
would result in thousands of dead civilians.
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Werbner (1994) has correctly observed that in 1991 the British Pakistanis
made a counter-productive choice in supporting Saddam Hussein. She has
suggested they had access to two narratives which she called ‘fabulations’.
Indeed, Werbner has distinguished between ‘myth’, which achieves signifi-
cance by detaching from the time flow, and ‘fable’, which achieves signifi-
cance by detaching from space. Therefore, she has suggested that, on the
one hand, the non-Muslim fable had ‘cast Saddam as a vicious, tyrannical,
insane villain’, on the other, the Muslim fable had transformed the Iraqi
‘insane villain’ into an Islamic super-hero (1994: 213). Werbner has con-
cluded, ‘significant current affairs have the potentiality to become fables
shared in space by a Islamic global community as “simultaneous con-
sumers” in calendrical time’ (1994: 21). But analysing the following
account of what happened in Majd’s home that night, we can go further
than the culturalist interpretation Werbner has suggested. 
Majd and his wife told me during an interview that the images they
watched on Arab satellite channels had left them deeply shocked. Yet they
needed to see them, and no effort was made to protect the youngest son from
the grim pictures. After our dinner, Asma, who as usual held the TV remote
control, was zapping between BBC News 24, al-Jazeera, CNN and al-
Manar, while Majd complained of the hypocrisy of our Western govern-
ments and their ways of presenting and justifying the war. Majd made the
same argument I heard so many times during my research, ‘they show
Muslim prisoners, dead Iraqi soldiers, but if one of the Muslim channels
dares to show even two British soldiers bloody dead, they [politicians?]
immediately make an outcry’. Of course, Majd was referring to what had
happened the day before (26 March 2003), when Al-Jazeera made the con-
troversial decision to broadcast a video showing two dead British soldiers.
The al-Jazeera decision had provoked great indignation among the British
and American public, politicians and Western journalists. Nevertheless, the
indignation that the British politicians showed upset many Muslims such as
Majd, since the same disgusted expression was missing from the Prime
Minister’s face when the mutilated bodies were Muslims. So Majd noticed, 
I might be sorry for them [the soldiers] as human beings, but I am not sorry for
them as soldiers. OK, I know I will become unpopular, I know that you will
write these words, but should I lie? British soldiers and in particular Americans
have to kill Muslims that never attacked Britain or America, and of course these
Muslims defend themselves and their families. This it the right of any Muslim,
I mean, to defend Islam. Come on! You did not need a war to topple Saddam,
we needed the British and American intelligence services to reinforce the
existing Shi‘a militia. The reality is different. American and British politicians do
not like Islam, they do not want a real Islamic state anywhere, so they did not
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help the Shi‘a people but bombed them. Freedom? Bollocks! They want to
prevent people living according to Islamic principles. It is important to show
these pictures so that British people can understand what Tony Blair is ready to
do to our and their children. You know, his children are safe at home in their
beds, aren’t they? Saddam is surely an evil man and Muslims should have fought
him, but I am sorry to say that this time he is bloody right. 
The British government and its war certainly have no support in this
British-Iraqi house, and, let me say, why should there be? For Majd’s family,
and also for millions of other British people, the war is unjustified. However,
Majd is expressing his resentment against the British government not in
nationalistic terms, as an Iraqi, but in religious terms, as a Muslim. He told
me that an attack against Islam requires a defensive jihad, which any
Muslim, despite their origin, nationality, ethnicity, financial means, is
required to perform everywhere. ‘I foresee a fiercely Islamic resistance in
Iraq and for the craziness of politicians lots of people will die on both the
Muslim and non-Muslim sides.’ If Ali had only alluded to the concept of
qadar, Majd and his wife mentioned it overtly, ‘people, said Majd, will die
because of their qadar, but Muslims are fighting for justice and will see the
Garden (Paradise).’ 
Asma was watching al-Manar and interrupted Madj to tell me that she
liked the channel because of its dua’a for the mujahidin, its jihadi songs, of
which their ten-year-old Azhar seemed to know some words. We watched
some of the video clips. As any other child, Azhar liked to play soldiers, yet
I could observe that within Azhar’s childhood fantasies, the soldier was not
wearing any camouflage jacket and helmet, but rather a green bandana and
a dark cloak typical of the Hezbollah’s mujahidin. Azhar was not playing war
but jihad. The propaganda song was playing, I could watch fully armed
young people walking in an anonymous countryside with their faces
covered, apparently they were reaching their next battlefield. A deep mas-
culine baritone voice accompanied the images with words from the Qur’an
and Shi‘a songs on a military soundtrack. Asma praised the Muslim
mujahidin in Arabic and asked Allah to protect them and their families,
Azhar parroted the martial steps of the soldiers, while his father and sisters
smiled at him. Nobody but the telly had explained to Azhar what jihad is.
Jihad is cool on al-Manar!
Conclusion 
Different theories have tried to explain the processes through which some
people are radicalised and start to follow a fundamentalist version of their
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faith (see Bruce 2000; Esposito 1999; Hafez 2004; Sayyid 1997). Some
scholars, such as Halliday (1997), have de-emphasized the role that religion
might play in fundamentalism; others, such as Bruce (2000), have argued
the opposite, and suggested that certain religions may encourage funda-
mentalism and radicalism. Indeed, in these theories, Islam has been por-
trayed as the religion which may easily push worshippers toward
radicalization. Bruce has compared several religions (but in particular
Christianity and Islam) and reached the emphatic conclusion, ‘I cannot
accept that, as matter of principle, we should suppose religion to be without
consequences’ (Bruce 2000: 103). According to Bruce a tendency to fanati-
cism characterizes religion, but each doctrine differs in the degree to which
it could become fundamentalist. This, the scholar has suggested, depends
on the theological characteristics of the particular faith. Consequently,
Bruce has ended in arguing that the most fertile ground for the development
of fundamentalism may be found in Islam, because ‘for Islam, religion is
matter of obeying the Holy Law. As what God requires is obedience to the
Law, then its imposition is not just acceptable but necessary’ (Bruce 2000:
107). 
I consider Bruce’s statement, ‘Fundamentalism is perfectly consistent
with the logic of the religious tradition from which it grows’ (Bruce 2000:
116) to be flawed. Bruce, by focusing on what he calls ‘the fundamentalist
mind’, has axiomatically linked people’s personal faith to people’s theolog-
ical knowledge. For these reasons, he has stated, ‘Fundamentalism is a
rational response of traditionally religious people to social, political, and
economic changes that downgrade and constrain the role of religion in the
public world’ (Bruce 2000: 117). In short, Bruce has brushed up the old-
fashioned theory which says that fundamentalism is derived from a counter-
reaction to modernization and economic changes. Nevertheless, he has
failed to observe that in the majority of worshippers of any religion the
axiomatic link between personal faith and theological knowledge does not
exist. Many Muslims do not have a clue about what Islam is beyond the
practical aspects of their prayers and festivities, and what imams may say to
them. 
Certainly, some Muslims may start to develop a fundamentalist interpre-
tation of their religion, yet this does not mean that they have to know par-
ticular theological aspects of their religion, and this does not mean that they
reject modernity only because they are Muslims. The members of the two
families, which I have presented, have combined strict cultural-religious tra-
ditions with a radical modern lifestyle, particularly in the case of their chil-
dren. Their personal interpretations of Islam influence both the modern and
traditional spheres of their lives. According to the theory of identity I have
Sofas, Families, Tellies and Jihad 93
01Jihad  30/3/06  4:31 pm  Page 93
explained in Chapter 3, we know that Islam, and in these cases, jihad, could
go beyond the sphere of religion and faith and become part of a complex
mechanism shaping personal selves thanks to the role that emotions have in
their lives. 
Since the 1991 Gulf war, Arab satellite channels have played a funda-
mental role in shaping Muslims’ social, political and religious views on the
Middle East and the international crisis (Taylor 1992 and Werbner 1994).
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of 9/11, these channels have exercised an
unusually persuasive power over their Muslim audience, sometimes erasing
the independent analytical capacity of some of their audience. The main
Arab satellite channels (which also have a consistent non-Arab audience)
portray themselves as not only Arabic but also Muslim. Nisbet et al (2004)
have argued that satellite television news has amplified Muslim resentment
towards the United States of America and the West. Some of these satellite
channels have facilitated the development of the common misrepresentation
that the West is monolithic and is so represented by the USA. By contrast,
Osama bin Laden has received via Muslim channels the status of rebel
rather than that of mass-murderer. But it is the overuse of shocking images
that, as I have argued, facilitated the pushing of some Muslim families into
the circle of panic, through two processes. On the one hand, these images
overexpose Muslims, particularly if young, to emotions that are translated
into feelings such as frustration, oppression and anger, on the other, they are
exposed to processes of systematic desensitization to suffering and compas-
sion. Furthermore, many Muslims living in the West are sitting on their
sofas, eating crisps and drinking Sprite and Coca-Cola in front of their tel-
evisions while they watch their Muslim brothers and sisters suffering and
being killed in that dar al-islam from which they have sought refuge. The
guilt they might feel is another element that facilitates the circle of panic,
which leads to acts of identity expressed through the rhetoric of jihad.
Nonetheless, Western politicians seem to be unaware, or ignore, the circle
of panic affecting part of the Muslim population, and are dangerously
increasing the schismogenetic elements. Indeed, some of them have empha-
sized that there exists a clash of civilizations between the ‘Occident’, the
expression of the most ‘civilized’ people because marked by Christian
values, and a ‘bad’ version of Islam. 
Was Stephan right in suggesting that Muslim families watched and
enjoyed jihads? After analysing the facts, I strongly do not believe it to be
so. Bruce (2000) has interpreted fundamentalism as the direct result of an
Islamic theology. The families I spent time with clearly had no specific
knowledge of jihad from a theological perspective. Some members of these
families were discussing jihad not because it was part of their religion, but
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because it was part of their emotional reactions; their idea of jihad was
beyond Islam but ‘within’ their identity. 
Notes 
1. In Britain Saddam received the moral support as an antagonist of the USA,
not only from Muslim Arabs but many South Asians as well (see Werbner 2002).
2. Yet Kurdish migrants supported the war since the Iraqi dictator had killed
and oppressed Kurds and their hope of an independent Kurdistan. By contrast
Iraqi Shi ‘a migrants showed a less homogenous opinion. 
3. From http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/1579043.stm
4. The burqu‘ is a traditional Pashtun Islamic veil that the Taliban imposed on
all the women of the country despite their ethnic origin (El Guindi 1999). 
5. It is interesting to observe here how Karim saw the terms ‘Arab’ and
‘Muslim’ as interchangeable. 
6. Tamerlane (or Timur the Lame, 1336–1405), sacked Baghdad in 1401
killing thousands of people and devastating hundreds of towns.
7. See http://www.manartv.com/.
8. www.observer.guardian.co.uk, 7 September 2003.
9. A translation of this bin Laden message can be found at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1636782.stm 
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CHAPTER 6
Baraka, Coca-Cola and Salah al-Din
In this chapter, I shall discuss some of my youngest Muslim respondents’
understanding of jihad. I refer to the children of Muslim migrants as
‘Western-born Muslims’ instead of the more common ‘second generation’.
In doing so, I wish to respect my respondents’ opinion that the appellative
‘generation’ misrepresents the relationship that they have with their soci-
eties, which are indeed their parents’, or even grandparents’, host societies.
As Assad put it, ‘You can like it or can dislike it, but the West is part of us
and we are part of the West, we are not just Muslim and Paki, we are
Western Pakistani Muslim.’ Nonetheless, the most recurrent question these
young people have been asked, ‘Are you … or Muslim?’, aims to deny such
a reality. Please, feel free to fill the gap with whatever adjective of Western
nations may come to your mind (i.e. British, French, Italian, American and
so on). 
The question may not surprise a philosopher, our (Western?) common
sense suggests that A could not be B, and although it admits ‘in-betweens’,
these are often perceived as ‘deviant’. So, the identities of those whom aca-
demia has labelled ‘second generation’, who seem to fit neither A nor B,
we just defined as ‘in-between’. Yet I very soon became aware that my
respondents, like probably other Western-born Muslims, did not feel ‘in-
between’ but just themselves. Individuality has a central role in the way
these young people perceive themselves, though the Islamic concept of
ummah, as we shall see, is relevant to their feeling Muslim. I shall suggest
that their idea of the ummah is shaped in a ‘community of emotions’ rather
than, as often suggested, in a sort of imagined community (Anderson
1991). Both their conceptualization of ummah as well as their strong indi-
vidualism has produced an ‘a-cultural’ understanding of Islam, an Islam
without ‘contamination’. Before we discuss their idea of Islam, we must
observe the effect of this loyalty questioning, which eventually became a
nagging issue. 
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Are You … or Muslim? 
‘Are you British or are you Muslim?’, ‘Are you French or are you Muslim?’,
‘Are you American or Muslim?’, in other words, ‘Are you one of us?’ Here
is the Shakespearean dilemma which Western-born Muslims are asked to
answer. It is a rhetorical question of denial, a rhetorical question of
ostracism, it dichotomizes ‘otherness’ by transforming difference into ‘cul-
pability’. This is the very process that could easily transubstantiate into per-
secution, with the Holocaust being the most horrible example. Today,
rather than being worn on coats, ‘yellow stars’ take the form of re-imagined,
stereotyped, crisped, imposed, social identities. This imposition forces the
person into a cage of objectification in which restraints have been imposed
on their identity affirmation. This process has contributed to a new
Orientalized, post-modern, neo-colonial freak show, but the ‘abnormal’, the
‘monster’ which repulses, but intrigues, is the Muslim, the more so if
Western born. 
Because of the 1991 Gulf war, this reality powerfully epiphanied in
Nusarat. Still a teenage Muslim boy of Pakistani origin, his teacher asked
him to explain why the Muslim tyrant, Saddam Hussein, had invoked a jihad
against the West. Nusarat had just wanted to be a student among the others.
Yet the teacher turned him into the school’s ‘Grand Mufti’ of what for
Nusarat was still a foggy family tradition, Islam. The now 25-year-old
Nusarat recalled, 
I felt uncomfortable to stand in front of the other pupils. I mean, maybe the
teacher thought that it might have been a good idea to ask me, the Muslim, to
explain something to the class. But, at that time, I was Muslim because my
family was and I did not want to be seen as ‘different’. By the way, I did not
know what to say. The teacher’s focus on my religion was enough to frame me
as the ‘evil’ Muslim who wanted British soldiers dead. I started to dislike school
because the other pupils started to bully me. 
By highlighting Nusarat’s otherness, the teacher (I presume unintentionally)
had metamorphosed him, the black Paki Nusarat, into the evil Muslim,
whose new nickname became ‘Saddam’ (of course, with evident geographic
and ethnic licence). 
Twelve years later, another Gulf war, another classroom, another Muslim
child, another teacher; yet the same question: ‘Umar, are you British or
Muslim?’ The eleven-year old-boy answered, ‘I have a British passport’.
The teacher seemed to be fazed by the politically correct answer. Then, the
teacher loudly read a newspaper article about the Iraqi war. The article was
about to end and with it Umar’s happy school life. The teacher raised his
98 Jihad Beyond Islam
01Jihad  30/3/06  4:31 pm  Page 98
head and then the ‘question’ struck again. But this time the question ‘are
you … or Muslim’ was shaped into a much more sinister, grimmer and
inquisitorial sentence. ‘Umar’, asks the teacher, ‘if you were a British soldier
would you have killed Muslims?’ Checkmate. ‘I am Muslim’, replies Umar,
‘I would rather conduct jihad.’ So, the tolerated ‘other’ Umar has meta-
morphosed into Umar the ‘enemy within’, Umar the symbol of the eternal
traitor. The micro-social process, which years earlier had affected Nusarat’s
life had started again. Paradoxically, Umar’s iron mask did not reproduce
Saddam Hussein’s face, but rather Osama’s, the archetype of the terrorist.
Umar’s childish heroic imagination of the modern Islamic chevalier, the
mujahid, had affected his answer disrupting his previous British standard
student life. Umar’s family have been living in the UK for more than
twenty-five years and had easily integrated into its host country. Of course,
Umar was as Western as his schoolmates but this fact had not shielded him
from discrimination and ostracism. After the teacher’s provocation, Umar
was no longer the joyful child I had met previously; all his ‘friends’ were
calling Umar ‘terrorist’ and ‘bin Laden’. 
Other Western-born Muslims have experienced the same discrimination
that Nusarat and Umar suffered. For instance, in the aftermath of 1995
GIA’s (The Armed Islamic Group) terrorist attack against the Parisian
metro station ‘Place de l’Etoile’, Western-born Muslims, in particular those
of North African origin, suffered similar discrimination. People often nick-
named them ‘terrorists’. In 1999, one of my Parisian respondents recalled,
‘They [French people] saw us as enemies. It did not matter whether you
were French or Algerian, you had an Algerian face and surname and this
was enough to dislike you. Sometimes I felt that I had no control over whom
I was, because they decided who I had to be.’ Immediately, his last words
recalled to my mind a paragraph of Luigi Pirandello’s novel One, None and
a Hundred Thousand. Written in 1927 by one of the most famous Italian
writers, the story narrates the identity crisis of Vitangelo Moscarda, a simple
man living in an anonymous south Italian province. Vitangelo suddenly
realizes that the nature of man is not essence but appearance. He does not
have one personality but rather a hundred thousand that people are able to
discern in him. Below, I quote the very moment in which he grasped this
insight, 
[Vitangelo stands in front a mirror during a storm while outside there is light-
ning] Was it my image, which I saw in a flash of lightning? Am I the thing that
I saw, and people see from the outside, which while living I cannot feel? Thus,
for the others I am that alien whom I have caught in the mirror: I am that
person, and not that ‘me’ that I know myself to be. I am that alien whom I am,
myself, unable to recognize while I see him. I am that alien, whom I can see
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living only through unthinkable time. I am the alien whom only the others can
know and I cannot. (Pirandello 1927: 42, translation mine)
‘Are you British or Muslim?’, ‘Are you French or Muslim?’, ‘Are you …
or Muslim?’ These questions, many of my respondents have observed, are
just a form of rhetoric. Since 9/11 and in particular after the Afghan war,
politicians, journalists, scholars as well as ordinary people have challenged
and questioned the loyalty of young Muslims to their countries. Hundreds
of newspapers and magazines articles have periodically alleged that Western-
born Muslims are turning against the UK and the rest of the West, by
fighting British and American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. This has rein-
forced the spreading view that Western-born Muslims might be a threat to
Western ‘civilization’ and ‘democracy’. This loyalty-paranoia has created its
victims among Western-born Muslims, some have been arrested under the
different national anti-terrorist legislation, some have been accused of
‘jihading’ shoulder to shoulder with the West’s number one enemy Osama
bin Laden but often no evidence is provided. The witch-hunt has begun and
in a short time will affect the life of millions of our fellow citizens. For
instance, the Guardian has reported (20 November 2001), 
Detectives … are expecting to gather more evidence about the involvement of
Britons from prisoners captured by the Northern Alliance. ‘Any individual who
arrives back in the UK having fought for the Taliban in Afghanistan could be
arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000 for a number of different offences,’ a
security source said. ‘We are waiting for these people to arrive back in the UK.’ 
The innocent British Muslims who were held in Guantanamo (and recently
released without charges) or the repeated anti-terrorist action against UK
mosques (without the police having reliable evidence of terrorist activities)
have increased the fear that the barbaric ‘others’, the ‘collaborationists’
hiding among us are ready to strike with their jihad. Yet, these controversial
headlines1 and such an overemphasis on young British Muslims being
involved in suicide operations2 have achieved a dangerous effect: the
spreading of panic among non-Muslims and Muslims alike. On the one
hand, non-Muslims, but also Muslims,3 fear becoming victims of jihad, on
the other only Muslims fear becoming victims of Islamophobic attacks. 
Bhabha (1994) has suggested that stereotyping is not only a fixed repre-
sentation of the subject in the construction of the colonial ‘other’, but also
a process similar to fetishism. ‘The fetish or stereotype gives access to an
“identity” which is predicated as much on mastery and pleasure as it is on
anxiety and defence, for it is a form of multiple and contradictory beliefs in
its recognition of difference and the disavowal of it’ (1994: 75). In this
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complex process, contradictions between the known and imagined become
the reality of representation. In other words, the object is understood not in
its integrity but as metonymy. Bhabha has emphasized how the identity of
the ‘other’ becomes fetishized not for the sake of false representation which
may become ‘the scapegoat of discrimination’, but for ‘the fantasy that
dramatizes the impossible desire for a pure, undifferentiated origin’ of the
colonizer (1994: 81). The rhetorical question ‘Are you … or Muslims?’, this
metonymical re-imagination of Muslim identity through stereotypes, emo-
tionally destabilizes young Muslims’ identities and induces a sort of
Pirandellian ‘I am one, none and a hundred thousand’. 
Ali a 29-year-old of Algerian origin, described his experience in these
terms, 
You start your school life with other children; you are very young and don’t feel
any real difference between you and them. Actually, you don’t even think about
it. Then you go on, you grow up, and you understand that there are differences;
the other students will tell you, often just bullying you. This stage is very hard
because the bullying is aimed at your religion. When you become a teenager, you
start to rationalise your position within the society and so you start to see the dif-
ferences between you and your parents. You feel confused and ask yourself ‘who
am I?’ The answer is not so simple: or at least it was in my case. I felt like a
patchwork that needed just one colour and one pattern. This colour and pattern
became Islam. 
Identity confusion and identity ubiquity are common experiences among
many young Western-born Muslims. So, the majority of my respondents
have mentioned these difficult processes in order to define their ‘I’.
Adolescence is also the time in which conflicts with both family and society
may arise (see Lepoutre 1997). 
The young Muslims find themselves projected into parallel dimensions in
which ethical and moral, as well as political, values may become cacoph-
onic, almost schizophrenic. For some Western societies, such as the British
and French, these Western-born Muslims represent the materialization of
an unwanted and unplanned post-colonial present, as their parents repre-
sented the objectification – this time, desired and wished – of a glorious
colonial empire (see Doty 2003: 44–57). The colonizer’s resistance to the
self-determination of the colonized used to repeat ‘you belong to us’. Now,
in an inverted performance of power, the former colonizer feels colonized
and asks ‘are you one of us?’ Bhabha has discussed this process under the
label of ‘mimicry’, ‘Mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other,
as subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite, which is to say,
that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order
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to be effective mimicry it must continually produce its slippage, its excess,
its difference’ (1994: 86, italics in the original). The colonized, through
mimicry, become part of the process that defines the colonizer. In other
words, the colonized claim power by being the ‘Other’ of him/herself.
Mimicry is a form of political and identity mockery that may leave the
subject personal self because, as Bhabha has observed, he/she is ‘almost the
same but not white: the visibility of mimicry is always produced at the site of
interdiction. It is a form of colonial discourse at the crossroads of what is
known and permissible and that which though known must be kept con-
cealed’ (1994: 89 emphasis in the original). Almost the same but not British
(French, Italian, German, etc.), the denial of authenticity became, for some
of my respondents, the trap of their ‘I’ set in a difficult ubiquity, a form of
eternal questioning that if they wanted to become ‘real’ they had to answer.
A 27-year-old man of Bangladeshi origin living in Scotland emphasized, 
I really could not recall how many times somebody has asked if I was British or
Muslim or if I was from here or where my home was. Home, well this word
became my problem: where is my home? Am I from here or Bangladesh? I feel
myself to be part of this [British] society but people seem to question my idea of
myself. Do we need that others recognize us as part of something before we can
claim to be part of it? I do not think so, I am what I am, despite what people
think I should be. However, I grew up with many questions and all the answers
seemed to be wrong until I understood that I am Muslim. In Islam it does not
matter what you are and what others say you are; if you are Muslim, you have a
Muslim identity. 
‘I’m Muslim’ was the usual answer I received from the majority of my young
respondents. But what does it mean to them to be Muslim in their contem-
porary societies? 
Looking for Baraka while Drinking Coca-Cola 
Studies of youth subculture have particularly focused on the analysis of style
as counter-hegemony in the class conflict (cf. Cohen 1980; Hebdige 1979).
This led to the interpretation of youth subculture identities as marked by
dichotomies. Later sociologists criticized these 1970s works for their lack of
attention to other relevant factors such as gender and ethnicity (see , Cohen
1980; McRobbie 1991; Thornton 1995). If we observe studies on young
Muslims, we may invert this criticism, since ethnicity and gender have been
over-scrutinized. The real issue is how scholars have discussed the identity of
these young people. Indeed, in Chapter 3 we have seen that identity has been
often interpreted as ‘fluid’, ‘hybrid’ and ‘multiple’.4 This has facilitated the
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false impression that Western-born Muslims may lack self-determination.
Reacting to such overgeneralizations, other more recent studies, some of
which I shall briefly discuss below, have tried to ‘re-empower’ Western-born
Muslims.5 These studies, however, have based their understanding of iden-
tity on implicit or explicit social identities and culturalist theories, missing the
vital relationship existing between the autobiographical self, identity and
Islam. The undesired side effect of these theories is that they end in empha-
sizing the problems that Western-born Muslims have, instead of observing
the solutions that they have developed. So, in her analysis of young Asians’
identities, Archer even used a pathologizing language when she observed,
‘second and third generation young Asians suffer from “mixed up” and “con-
fused” identities because of the “cultural clash” that results from occupying a
contradictory location between conflicting ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ cultures and
identities.’ (2001: 82, emphasis added). 
Other scholars have instead undervalued the emotional role that Islam
plays in young Muslims’ formation of identity; for instance Jacobson (1998:
101) sees Islam as merely, 
a source of guidance in the young people’s lives; guidance which allows them to
undertake a ‘quest for certainty’, and thereby to resolve some of the ambivalence
over identity engendered by their social circumstances. Second, I argue that the
persistence of religious identities can be understood in terms of the boundaries
which practising Muslims, by virtue of the demands of their religion, construct
and maintain between themselves and others.
The statement ‘I am Muslim’, as I have explained in Chapter 3, expresses
something deeper than just affiliation, culture and acknowledgement of
moral guidance for young Muslims’ lives. So, the ‘in-between two cultures’
theory raises more questions than it may answer (Baumann 1996). Nielsen
has suggested, ‘Culture is a rather more complex phenomenon to speak of
in-betweenness’ (2000: 27), and Werbner has observed that Muslims do not
perceive Islam simply as ‘culture’ but as something more rooted in their
identity. In making her point, Werbner has told us about an experience she
had during her fieldwork. She saw some English louts insulting a Pakistani
mother and her child and the mother and child did not react at all, nor did
they report the matter to anyone because ‘unknown to the English louts,
there is an invisible shield protecting the little boy and his mother. That
shield is Islam. Despite the insults, they feel protected, morally superior’
(2002: 133).
I had occasion to observe something very similar, but this time the louts
verbally abused some young British Pakistanis. From that experience, I have
concluded that my respondents did not dichotomize their social space and
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environment through Islam as religion, but Islam as identity. The ‘invisible
shield’ that Werbner has described does not represent a Muslim versus non-
Muslim contraposition, by which Muslims feel ‘superior’ to other human
beings. As some of the young British Pakistani Muslims abused by the louts
in the middle of the street explained, as Muslims, they have baraka pro-
tecting them. Baraka (from the Arabic root brk, ‘blessing’) is a divine super-
natural power and energy. In Sufism, people believe that holy men achieve
this divine essence through their spiritual journey toward Allah. But baraka,
as any other form of energy, could pass from one point to another; so holy
men could impart baraka to other people or even objects. The Islamic tra-
dition of visiting shrines resides in the pilgrims’ belief that holy men’s dead
bodies emanate baraka that the visitor is able to absorb (Werbner and Basu
1998). Yet my respondents, as we shall see in the next paragraphs, have
reinterpreted such an ancient Islamic concept, since the majority of them
disagree with the practices often followed by their relatives living in Muslim
countries of visiting shrines and give offerings to holy men. They see these
traditions as derived from human superstition and the ‘unorthodox’ within
real Islam.
So, 22-year-old Yasir, of Pakistani origin, strongly criticized his relatives
in Pakistan and labelled them as ‘shrine addicted’. He argued, ‘They dissi-
pate fortunes in offerings to pirs [holy men].’ He went on to explain that his
relatives had hoped the pir could bless them and their business with pow-
erful baraka. Yasir was very quick to tell me that his criticism was not
showing disrespect to part of his family but to emphasize that ‘only the One
(Allah) may bless you and give you baraka’. He added, ‘we do not need
human agents to receive baraka’. Because of the opinions of baraka I had
started to collect, I thought that Western-born Muslims might have rejected
this idea. Yet I observed that they do not deny the existence of baraka, rather
they reinterpret it a mono-directional flow of divine power descending from
Allah, through the Qur’an and the Prophet’s example, to reach the believer;
baraka for them means the embodiment of Islam itself. An Algerian whom I
met in a local mosque in Saint Denis, Paris, said,
Baraka has nothing to do with marabouts (holy men). Baraka is the power of
Islam, the power that you feel by reciting the Qur’an, the power, I mean, that
you feel while fasting during Ramadan. Of course, you need to detach yourself
from the cultural contamination of Islam. You have to go to the root of Islam if
you want to have baraka. 
If, as we have seen in Chapter 4, some Muslim migrants saw a certain
paradox in being Muslim and living in the West, the paradox dissolved in
the comments of their children. Islam, the ‘real’ one, has no geographical
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space, no culture, no interpretation. Islam could only be lived and
embodied in the soul of the believer. 
Therefore, 19-year-old Ajaz, of Pakistani origin, could not find any con-
tradiction between his Western lifestyle and his Muslim (he preferred the
term Islamic) identity, 
I can tell you that I do not see any contradiction between seeking baraka and
drinking Coca-Cola. Both of them are part of my world. Maybe the others can
see contradictions or find it strange. I want to obtain baraka from the Qur’an
and from the Prophet’s example. If you want, I am both a Coca-Colaholic and
a proud baraka-seeking Muslim. 
The re-imagination of the concept of baraka has another relevant implica-
tion. Although the relationship with Islam is individualistic and the achieve-
ment of baraka can change from one person to another, Muslims share their
faith, emotion and experience through the ummah. The individualistic
experience of Islam does not mean the self-isolation of the single believer.
On the contrary, believers are part of a spiritual community in which they
can share their experience of Allah. 
The Ummah: From Discourse to Emotions 
Nowadays, it is not unusual to read the word ummah in newspapers and
popular books on Islam. Conventionally, the ummah has been translated as
the ‘community of believers’. So, what is a community? Anthropologists, as
well as other social scientists have answered the question in different ways.
Some, such as Hillery (1995), have even listed several definitions of ‘com-
munity’ on which he thought scholars might agree. Of course, an agreement
was never reached and attempts such as Hillery’s have been dismissed as
pointless. Others have taken the extremist path and asked whether we still
need the word ‘community’.6 Nevertheless, community, as a culturally con-
structed concept, still remains central to anthropological studies. Olwig
(2002) has suggested two main notions of community as culturally con-
structed. In the first, communities have been portrayed as ‘belonging enti-
ties’, in the second, as imagined units based on ‘sentiments’ (cf. Appadurai
1996). If we understand communities as ‘belonging entities’, face-to-face
relationships play a fundamental role (Rapport 1993; Strathern 1982). By
contrast, if we understand communities as being based on ‘sentiments’, it is
the symbolic relationship that matters. Following the latter, Anderson has
argued:
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The members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the
image of their communion. … it is imagined as a community, because, regardless
of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is
always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this frater-
nity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of
people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.
(1991: 5–7)
This interpretation has become fashionable in the analysis of ‘diasporic and
transnational communities’ (Clifford 1994; Vertovec 2001). 
The Internet, satellite TV and mobile technology facilitate contacts as
well as community formation. So, in his studies of migration and mass
media, Appadurai has further developed Anderson’s theory, suggesting that
the complex media network connecting the world enables people to rethink
their lives through the circulation of cultural domains (Appadurai 1995,
1996). 
The Muslim migrants I have interviewed present the ummah as an
Andersonian ‘imagined community’ in which local and global dimensions
are entangled, but within which individuals might maintain, if not national,
at least religious differences. I have argued in previous researches (Marranci
2003a and 2003b) that Muslim migrants live the ummah more as an instru-
mental answer to their environments than as religious dogma. In other
words, they develop what we call an ideology of ummah. Emotions play a role
in their experience of ummah, since emotions facilitate unity beyond
locality, which ‘seems to have lost its ontological moorings’ (Appadurai
1995: 204). For this reason, Appadurai has suggested the term ‘neighbour-
hood’ to represent this new dimension (Appadurai 1995) So, in the case of
immigrants, we may argue that the ummah becomes an ideology through
which they can share (in order to make sense of) analogical experiences of
displacement or colonial (as well as neo-colonial) memories. 
By contrast, I have observed that the idea of ummah among Western-born
Muslims may carry a different meaning. Grown-up and educated in the
West, Western-born Muslims develop an Islamic knowledge that is more
influenced by, for instance, Islamic websites (Brückner 2001; Bunt 2003)
than their cultural heritages. Furthermore, lacking the experience of dis-
placement their parents knew, Western-born Muslims tend to categorize the
concept of local and global as their non-Muslim peers do. Therefore, I
noticed that within the same Muslim family living in a Western country we
could find different understandings of ummah. This became particularly
evident during a visit to an Iraqi family I knew in Dublin. While discussing
the last Iraqi war, the parents told me that we should not compare Iraq and
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Arab Muslims to the ‘still uncivilized Afghan Muslims’. Arabic religious
nationalism and prejudice affected their concept of ummah. By contrast,
their children (a 19-year-old daughter and a 23-year-old son) rejected their
parents’ opinions and rather emphasized the humiliation that the war had
brought on Islam; cultures and nations had disappeared from their argu-
ment. This was not an isolated case, many Western-born respondents
described the ummah as a-national,
The concept of ummah is central to Islam but I think that because we were born
here [Paris] we developed the authentic Islamic concept of ummah. Remember
that Islam is one and we should behave as one nation only. (France; Djamel, 19-
year-old of Algerian origin) 
The ummah is like your hand, single fingers form it but when you close them
together, they become a powerful fist. About Islam, Muslims share sentiments,
this make us unique. Our parents have cultural traditions to defend, but I don’t,
ummah and Islam are just one. (Northern Ireland; Azan, 26-year-old of
Bangladeshi origin)
When you see what Palestinians and other Muslims around the world are suf-
fering, you feel as if your family has been attacked and your brother or sister
killed … the ummah is like … when you go to a concert of pop-music, you don’t
know anybody but you feel part of the group. (Italy, Nadia, 23-year-old of
Egyptian origin)
Hetherington (1998) has criticized sociologists and anthropologists for
overlooking emotions in their study of communities. Instead, Hetherington,
starting from Maffesoli (1996), Bauman (1992) and Scheler (1954), has
suggested that people form communities in order to share emotions and
empathetic identifications. These, Hetherington has observed, are ‘inten-
tional “communities”, that can be seen as either moral communities or
emotional communities’ (1998: 50). Although this process requires identi-
fication, Maffesoli has argued that personal identities find their expression
in the community through a mutual transformation: ‘this bond is without
the rigidity of the forms of organisation with which we are familiar; it refers
more to a certain ambience, a state of mind … It is a case of a kind of col-
lective unconscious (non-conscious) which acts as a matrix for varied group
experience, situations, actions or wanderings’ (Maffesoli 1996: 98 emphasis
in the original) I think that Western-born Muslims experience the ummah
exactly as a ‘community of emotion’. 
Many Western-born Muslims argue that the ummah needs a spiritual
(also political) leader who can catalyse the emotional powers of the ummah
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towards coherent action capable of changing injustices into ‘justice’, the
only one which according to my respondents matters, Allah’s justice. 
Looking for a New Salah al-Din 
My friends Labib, a 26-year-old Algerian student at the local university, and
Nusarat, a 22-year-old Western-born Muslim of Pakistani origin, and a 30-
year-old Italian anthropologist (me) met for one of their recurrent meetings
at the ‘same place’, a local café. Labib and Nusarat’s disagreements tradi-
tionally marked these conversations. The diatribes became particularly
lively when they used to discuss halal (acceptable) and haram (unaccept-
able) in Islam. Since the different schools of Islamic thought have different
approaches as to what might be harmful or halal, it is easy to grasp that
Muslims from different backgrounds hold contrasting opinions. Basic ques-
tions such as ‘May Muslims wash their mouth with an alcoholic mouth-
wash?, ‘May Muslim men have long hair?’, ‘May Muslim women show their
bare feet?’ trigger endless discussions; at least they did between my two
friends. 
Thus they raised the hot topic of whether terrorism might be considered
halal or haram in Islam. Labib argued that Islam rejects terrorism under any
circumstances; so according to him actions such as 9/11 betrayed Islam and
possibly (indeed ‘only Allah knows’) condemned the perpetrators to hell.
Knowing that Nusarat was a nice guy, I confidently expected his agreement.
My expectation remained frustrated. Nusarat rejected Labib’s argument,
and he was not joking. Although Nusarat emphasized that any loss of
human life was regrettable to him, he argued, ‘People call Islamic terrorism
what in reality is an absolute justified jihad.’ He explained that the word ter-
rorism had been used to discredit the mujahidin that today have to fight
unconventionally because ‘they could not overwhelm Western forces or
Western supported dictators’. So, according to Nusarat, Islam allows
mujahidin to use stratagems, ‘What both of you call terrorism, I call legiti-
mate stratagems.’ We, of course, noticed that Western bombs kill civilians
no less than suicide operations. Nusarat described in vivid detail the hor-
rible images he had seen in Birmingham when fellow Muslims showed him
some MP3 videos recorded on mobile phones in Jenin during the Israeli
retaliation (19 June 2002). This had strongly convinced him that jihad was
required. 
Our coffees cooled on the table. It was so strange to hear our friend
Nusarat speaking in such terms. Nusarat realized how much we had been
left surprised by his argument and tried to convince us:
108 Jihad Beyond Islam
01Jihad  30/3/06  4:31 pm  Page 108
I am not surprised that the mujahidin targeted the Twin Towers in New York.
It was a strike against the American economic oppression of Muslims; so let me
say that it was a legitimate target. Americans do the same during their wars, they
target economic, military and political infrastructures to change, for instance,
the regimes that they dislike. When they bombed a factory in Sudan because
they [Americans] thought it was a WMD factory, they did not think about the
civilians working there. During 9/11, the mujahidin had targeted economic, mil-
itary and political symbols. Muslims have the right to retaliate. We’ll win, no
doubts. Muslims are ready to use their lives and become shahid. Try to find one
non-Muslim ready to do the same. We have faith, we have a spiritual strength,
we have baraka, and most important we have our Muslim identity. 
Being an Algerian, Labib knew the consequences that ‘terrorism’ may have
on ordinary people. Terrorism had devastated Algeria for years. Labib tried
to persuade Nusarat that Islam forbids terrorism, that even Muslims might
die in these random attacks, that the Prophet, ‘was a great diplomat; he
signed more treaties than declarations of war’. But I became aware that the
two were just speaking two different languages: what for Labib was ter-
rorism, for Nusarat was heroic jihad; who for Labib were terrorists, for
Nusarat were mujahidin. 
Nusarat had his philosophy. He emphasized that Muslims must believe in
predestination (qadar), ‘nobody could become shahid without Allah’s
allowing it, also nobody would die if it was not his last day,’ he said. Nusarat
was extending qadar to the issue of civilian victims; people die in terrorist
actions only because it is their qadar and not because of the mujahidin
decided to kill them. Thus, he declared, ‘People die during war; it is not
something new. Bush and Blair speak of “the war on terror”, I say that the
West started its war on Islam long before 9/11, but I agree with Mr Bush
and Mr Blair at least on this, there is a war.’ Nusarat believed, however, that
the mujahidin would stop their global jihad when justice was restored and
Muslims and Islam respected.
At this point, I became curious to know whether Nusarat saw Osama bin
Laden as a leader of the ummah. In other words, if he would have accepted
bin Laden as the rightful khalifa. First, Nusarat reminded me that this jihad
was defensive, so it did not require any authorization but, he said, ‘Each
Muslim has to act according to his means and degree of faith.’ Nonetheless,
Nusarat did not consider bin Laden to be a good candidate for the post. He
explained, ‘He lacks respect from the majority of Muslims. I think that bin
Laden is just an instrument of Allah to start jihad.’ This was the first time I
had seen Labib and Nusarat agree on something, beyond good Indian food.
Labib, who had rejected any form of violence, reinforced Nusarat’s view-
point, ‘the Muslim ummah needs a leader who is capable of creating a real
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Islamic state’. This idea that Islam today needs a new khalifa (caliph) has
been shared by the majority of my Western-born Muslim respondents. The
main reason used to explain this is that today Muslims are disoriented, lack
guidance and remain very weak. 
At this point we may wonder which qualities a modern caliph should
have. Although, as expected, my Shi‘a respondents answered that ‘Ali
would have been the perfect example of an Islamic leader, the Sunnis
showed a similar homogeneity in their answers. The archetype of the perfect
Islamic leader was not to be found among either the well-known Ottoman
caliphs or the contemporary Muslim leaders or scholars. The name that
catalysed the imaginations of my respondents, came from an Islamic history
that was entangled with the European medieval Crusades. The archetype
had the name of Salah al-Din, the respected and feared Muslim com-
mander. Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi (better known to non-Muslims as Saladin)
was a name that for centuries the Muslim East had forgotten but the West
feared and loathed. His name reminds us of the 1187 capture of Jerusalem.
Despite the campaign of defamation that some Crusaders launched against
the ‘ferocious Saladin’, the character achieved such fame that even the most
‘Islamophobic’ Italian poet, Dante Alighieri (1265–1321), who in his Divine
Comedy sentenced Muhammad to eternal hellfire as a false prophet, granted
Salah al-Din a place in Limbo (the acknowledged residence of pre-Christian
souls). 
During his studies Salah al-Din preferred religion over military strategies.
Despite his inclination to philosophic and religious studies (Lyons 1982), he
had to accept a military career and serve the state administration. In 1174,
the caliph named Salah al-Din as the first ayyubid (Sultan of Cairo). When
Salah al-Din retook the holy city of Jerusalem from the Christians he
ordered that the captured Christians could leave the city after paying a
ransom which Salah al-Din himself paid for the poorest. Since he decided
not to take revenge on the 1099 Crusaders’ carnage among Muslim civilians
living in Jerusalem, his reputation of being a just warrior, who respected the
shari‘a, fascinated Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Furthermore, Salah al-
Din followed the Qur’anic precept of respecting religious buildings and,
against the suggestion of his advisors, preserved the Church of the Holy
Sepulchre (Lyons 1982). Often romanticized, his character has appealed to
young Muslims not only because of his Islamic devotion and his successful
jihad, but also because of his efforts to unite the increasingly scattered
Muslim ummah. 
According to my respondents, Salah al-Din possessed baraka so that
Islam guided all his actions. Kamil, a 25-year-old Muslim of Libyan
descent, observed, 
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He [Salah al-Din] was an important historical character. Jerusalem and
Palestine are now reoccupied, all Muslims hope that sometime in the near future
a Salah al-Din will liberate Jerusalem. He was a just, respected and admired
leader, even by his enemies. His jihad started from inside and for these reasons
was successful outside. Allah blessed him. Today, we just have Muslims who
want to protect their own interests, they do not really care about Islam and do
not have spiritual power at all. 
It is clear that Western-born Muslims, as we have seen in the case of Muslim
immigrants, do not have a monolithic, standardized opinion on jihad. Yet
for the sake of clarity, I shall categorize my respondents’ opinions into three
main viewpoints.
First, young Muslims such as Kamil, who reject violence, but do not
renounce the idea of non-violent jihad to achieve Allah’s justice. These
young Muslims agree that the Islamic world is suffering but recognize that
the ummah is too weak to oppose Western or Western-supported military
forces. They argue that not only has Islam forbidden terrorism but also ter-
rorist action further divides the ummah and damages the image of Islam.
Said, a 22-year-old Muslim of Syrian origin observed, ‘Stupid actions
achieve stupid results. The more people fear Islam, the less Muslims can
influence the West.’ He argued for a jihad (a struggle) that could enable
Muslims to achieve hegemonic positions within their Western societies. 
The second category may be defined as the ‘messianic’. Although these
young Muslims have also rejected current international terrorism, the
reasons are deeply different from those within the first category. They do
believe in violent jihad but they think that some Muslims are jihading at the
wrong time since Muslims need a leader first. The Muslims in this category
consider resistance against ‘Western’ occupation justified, but they do not
consider it as jihad, rather as an anti-colonialist struggle for independence.
These young Muslims strongly believe in the Islamic concept of qadar by
which they explain the sufferings of Muslims eschatologically. Hafiz, a 28-
year-old Muslim of Pakistani origin, explained with regard to this idea of
qadar, 
The Prophet clearly reminded his ummah that Muslims must suffer before
reaching the Day of Atonement. There are two kinds of signs, minor and major.
Of course, we are not at the stage of the major signs, which are, for example,
Masih ad-dajjal [the Antichrist] and the destruction of the Ka‘bah. We are living
in the final stage of the minor signs such as the disruption of nature in that we
have acid rain, an increase in the number of poor people, the people of Iraq not
receiving food and money because they are oppressed by Romans, that today
means the Americans, corrupt Muslim leaders conducting an unjust war,
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fanatics who by their actions damage the reputation of Islam. We don’t need to
fight, we need just to wait and pray. Islam will reign at the Day of Judgement. 
The final category is formed by a minority of radicalized Muslims for
whom jihad means to kill the infidels, in other words, everybody but
Muslims; so what for us is terrorism, for them is a defensive jihad. Here as
well, the concept of qadar is used, but this time to explain why, for instance,
suicide bombers are not required to ask whether Muslims are around before
blowing up their victims (Muslim and non-Muslim alike). Those Muslims
who believe that acts of international terrorism are defensive jihads, do not
interpret death as something either good or bad. According to them, death
is part of our human experience and you will die only when Allah decides.
What matters is not death but after death. As Nusarat explained to me in a
follow-up conversation, ‘All the victims of a terrorist attack become martyrs
and all their sins, whether they are Muslims or not, will be forgiven by
Allah.’ You can see that from this perspective, the victims and their relatives
should even thank the terrorist who decided to bless them! It is clear that for
the would-be suicide bombers, taking one’s own life (and those of their
victims) becomes a test of their Muslim Islamic identity, i.e. the supreme act
of identity. 
The few people I had occasion to interview from this last group had expe-
rienced two phases in their lives: what one of them defined as a ‘denial of
Islam’ and a ‘rediscovering of Islam’, while his Pakistani friend preferred the
joke expression, ‘He saw the light.’ The process brings some of these
Muslims to sink deeply into the circle of panic. They suffer such a schismo-
genetic process that needs to test and retest their identities, ending with a
possible desperate act of identity. Martyrdom becomes simultaneously the
ultimate test and the final freedom from temptation. 
Tensions and Divisions among Western-born Muslims
Having met both Western-born Muslims who sympathize with violent jihads
and those who reject them, I wondered what they might think of each other.
Do they consider each other as ‘Muslims’? One fact was clear from the
beginning, both groups represented the other through stereotypes. So, the
respondents who rejected violent jihad represented the ‘fake mujahidin’ as
Muslims who did not pray from their hearts, did not respect Ramadan, had
girlfriends, and patronized pubs and bars. The reason for this behaviour was
blamed on a lack of Islamic knowledge, difficult childhoods and depression.
The latter suggestion was made to explain the suicide attacks. The majority
of Muslims who rejected terrorism had a straightforward theory about
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Muslim suicide bombers. They covered the sin7 of taking their own
depressed lives by the concept of holy martyrdom. Following this theory,
Amir tried to analyse 9/11 and why the Muslim hijackers committed such
an atrocity,
We know that Atta [leader of the group who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks] was
addicted to pornography, went to pubs, bars, and many people saw him in the
‘red light district’ of Hamburg. Atta had a conflict between his behaviour which
was non-Islamic and his being a Muslim. He wanted to prove that he was a real
Muslim. The Muslims who take their lives are often living in fitna [confusion,
lack of order]. I mean, was the Shoe Bomber a Muslim with a nice and normal
life? Of course not! These Muslims want to die but suicide is a terrible sin in
Islam, they want to think that they will go to Paradise. So, here you are, they
take their lives and kill innocent people and say ‘we are shuhada!’ when they
have just committed one of the most horrible acts against Allah’s Will. 
Notwithstanding all this criticism, the majority within this category tend
to consider the violent ‘jihadi’ as still being true Muslims. Amir, a 21-year-
old of Pakistani origin, tried to explain why this is so. He observed that
Muslims who are ‘fake’ mujahidin are still Muslims because they recite the
shahada (the Muslim profession of faith). Despite their horrible actions,
they have not disowned the shahada. Indeed, they would be judged by God
for their actions, but they would still be judged as Muslims despite their
unlawful killings. In other words, only Allah can judge whether people
might be Muslims or not, since Muslims, unlike Catholics, do not have any
form of excommunication. 
While, for instance, Muslims such as Amir and Hafiz , who reject vio-
lence, argued that only Allah knows the degree of ‘Muslimness’ of each
person, those supporting violent jihad saw Muslims like Amir and Hafiz as
munafiq (plural munafiqun, hypocrites). In Islam, munafiqun indicates
Muslim believers who in their hearts and actions deny Islam. The Qur’an
(Sura 4:145) reminds Muslims that munafiqun will hold the lowest position
among the damned souls. Shahid, a radical 22-year-old Muslim of Pakistani
origin, observed, 
Muslims who deny that Islam is under attack and that we have the duty of con-
ducting jihad are munafiqun. I hope, inshallah, that they would change their
mind, maybe by speaking to me and understanding the situation. Nobody likes
death but life is not in people’s hands, is it? It is in Allah’s hands. Allah asks you
to sacrifice your life and wealth for Islam, it is your duty to perform jihad. When
you do jihad you kill or die, or both. Muslims rejecting the call would die
together with their kafirun friends. These Muslims are worse than kafirun, they
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are munafiqun; they say and say that they are Muslims but they just play at it. I
certainly do not want to be one of the munafiqun, I prefer to die in this world
and be saved from hell in the afterlife. 
As I have explained, the circle of panic traps the radical Western-born
Muslims. They cannot accept Muslims with different ideas because for them
Islam is one, Islam cannot be interpreted and must only be obeyed. Radical
Western-born Muslims feel their identities jeopardized by non-Muslim envi-
ronments and they react following their emotions. Many of them fear ‘Allah’s
judgement’ because they are aware of previous immoral conduct. For many
of them Islam is merely providing a standardized terminology. 
Conclusion 
Western-born Muslims belong to the West like any other person educated
and born in this part of the world. Yet Western people and governments
have challenged this obvious fact by the mass questioning of Western-born
Muslims’ loyalty. The great majority of Western-born Muslims have reacted
by strongly denying the existence of a contradiction in being British,
German, American, French (just to mention only a few possibilities) and
still Muslims. Yet others have reacted more emotionally and ended in the
circle of panic. Immigrant Muslims (see Chapter 4) have lived their child-
hood at a distance from such a Western rhetoric of loyalty. The ‘terrorist
stereotype’ marks both migrants and Western-born Muslims, yet the emo-
tional significance for them is different; some members of Muslim migrant
host societies may perceive Muslim immigrants as ‘enemies within’, but
Western-born Muslims are perceived as ‘traitors’. 
Western-born Muslims actively reinterpret Islamic concepts such as the
ummah and baraka in accordance with their experiences. Many of them
reject the nationalistic and ethnic sectarianisms that still affect the relation-
ships between Muslim immigrants. The Western-born Muslims’ under-
standing of the ummah as a metaphysical place in which people can share
emotions and empathetic identifications preserves the sense of a-cultural
purity that they think Islam should have. 
In the case of radical Western-born Muslims, the rhetoric of jihad goes
beyond the theological aspects of Islam to become part of fundamental
processes in the mechanism of human identity (see Chapter 3). In this, as
well as in the previous chapters, we have focused on Muslim men. Yet, as
we shall see in the next chapter, some Muslim women not only can become
the victims of the circle of panic but actively develop an inspired rhetoric of
jihad.
114 Jihad Beyond Islam
01Jihad  30/3/06  4:31 pm  Page 114
Notes 
1. See for example, ‘British Muslims take path to jihad’, Guardian, 29
December 2000. 
2. See for example ‘British Muslim suicide bomber’, Guardian, 1 May 2003, or
‘British suicide bombers boast about killings’ The Times, 9 March 2004. 
3. Indeed Islamic terrorists and suicide bombers do not ask whether Muslims
may be among their future victims. They just kill human beings irrespective of
gender or age, skin, faith or nationality.
4. See for instance Bhachu 1993; Brah 1979; Knott and Khokher 1993; Mirza
1989. 
5. For instance Archer 2001, 2002; Jacobson 1998; Roald 2001; Shaw 1998. 
6. See for instance Baumann 1996; Cohen 1985; Guijt and Shah 1998;
Lustiger-Thaler 1994; Macfarlane 1977. 
7. Islam forbids suicide.
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CHAPTER 7
Modern Nasibahs?
Al-Jazeera had just released another video of a new Hamas Palestinian
suicide bomber. With explosive belt and Kalashnikov, he explained his jihad
which a few hours later would culminate in his body being torn apart and
his blood being mixed with his victims’. The day after, I met a group of
Muslim women, both immigrants and Western-born, outside the local
mosque. They were speaking while waiting for their children from the
madrassa. I could hear their repeated ‘shahid’ while discussing in English
(the only language common to all them). The shahid was the man whose
video al-Jazeera had shown. Yet there was another word that attracted my
attention: honour. I asked one of the Western-born women I knew why she
was mentioning such a word. She explained that this ‘brave’ Muslim had
‘brought honour to his family’, but particularly to his mother, by immolating
himself successfully in jihad. The woman recalled the hadiths testifying to
the divine blessing that the shahid’s families would receive through their
shahid. The shahid would be able to intercede for his mother and other
members of his family, and would see Paradise. I knew which hadiths these
women were referring to, yet the women had overlooked an important fact
about these hadiths: none of the protagonists took their own lives for Islam,
they had fought as heroic soldiers to save their lives and their religion. These
historical shahida were ready to die but did not seek death. 
Notwithstanding this historical fact, the conversation I witnessed chal-
lenged the stereotype that support for jihad is only given by men. As we shall
see in this chapter, Muslim women have their opinions of jihad, though they
see it from a different perspective than their fathers, brothers and husbands.
Yet we have observed in the previous chapters that to understand the rhet-
oric of jihad we need to observe the environment in which these ideas
formed.
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Muslim Migrant Women and their Daughters
Reading some sociologists’ and anthropologists’ analyses concerning
Muslim women, we may receive the impression that Muslim women are
passive objects, without a will, unable to act either socially or politically. In
other words, they are commodities that violent and sexually jealous Muslim
men exchange like gifts. A minority of scholars, who have a very essentialist
vision of Islam, suggest that Islam transforms Muslim women into such
objects. For instance, Shankland, in his ethnography, observes:
A girl is also controlled first of all by parents. When she marries she becomes the
responsibility of her husband. She remains under his control until she becomes
a widow, when she may enjoy a greater degree of freedom. At any time, though,
she remains constrained by male relatives and the other men of the settlement,
all of whom feel the right to control her behaviour. (2003: 54)
Although Shankland has been right to denounce the oppression that some
women suffer in certain Turkish families, he has presented a black-and-white
picture that does not take into consideration the strategy that many women
(Muslim and non-Muslim) develop. Yet this is not so surprising, if we con-
sider that he has never mentioned a female respondent in his book, leaving
him only with the option of caricaturing Muslim women through the boasting
maleness of his Muslim men informants. Unfortunately, like many other
authors who have depicted Muslim women as passive beings, Shankland does
not tell us whether he was prevented from interviewing them, or in an andro-
centric fashion, he did not even try. If the latter were the case, it would mean
that Shankland had failed as an anthropologist. Feminist studies have demon-
strated that the representation of Muslim woman as passive has often been the
result of the male authors’ exotic, if not erotic, ethnocentric fantasies (cf. El-
Solh and Mabro 1994; Mernissi 1975). The scholarly debate about women in
Islam became topical after the 1970s; by contrast, the studies concerning
Muslim immigrant women tend to be very recent. 
We had to wait until the 1990s for anthropologists, together with other
social scientists, to realize that in the field of migration studies they had to
focus on the overlooked aspects of gender and in particular give back
women their missing voices. For too long, scholars have considered immi-
grant women as incidental factors in a more relevant male migration. In
some studies (particularly French), sociologists reduced Muslim immigrant
women to nothing more than another piece of luggage carried by Muslim
immigrant men. In other words, immigration had been studied as a male
phenomenon. Lutz (1991) has criticized this 1980s academic disinterest
and has argued that the colonial representation of Muslim women as merely
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sexually passive was so deep-rooted that it was increasingly difficult to avoid
reproducing the stereotype (see, for example, Sabbah 1984). She has argued
that Western scholars may consider Muslim immigrant women to be passive
because ‘the Western woman serves as counterpoint: as the standard for
measuring women elsewhere’ (Lutz 1991: 2). The over-discussed hijab,
clearly confirms Lutz’s argument. We do not need much observation to
grasp that the Muslim headscarf and its possible symbolic value has been
read through the eyes of Western Christian women as a symbol of male
sexual oppression. This is opposite to the symbolic value that Muslim
women say it has. 
Yet Lutz has made another relevant observation. She has argued that
there is an overemphasis on the difficulties and ‘foreignness’ of Muslim
immigrants. These academic attitudes of focusing on the problems instead
of the solutions can undermine the efforts sociologists and anthropologists
are making to understand the identity of Muslim immigrant women. So,
Lutz has suggested that scholars need to ‘look at them [immigrant women]
as newcomers, needing time to adjust to both differences and similarities in
the host societies life-styles’ (1991: 23). 
The number of Muslim women migrating towards the West as refugees,
economic migrants and for family regrouping has been continually
increasing. The 1990s saw an increase of Muslim women seeking jobs
mainly in European countries. The case of migrant Muslim women shifted
from being an academic ‘curiosity’ to being a cause for social scientific
research. A milestone in the study of immigrant women is the book Migrant
Women: Crossing Boundaries and Changing Identities (Buijs 1993). The col-
lection of articles has demonstrated that men and women experience dis-
placement and migration differently. The book explores controversial
topics, such as domestic violence, discrimination against women within and
outside their families, and immigrant women’s adaptation to host societies.
In one of the chapters, Abdulrahim has observed that migration may induce
fundamental changes in the ‘traditional cultural codes’ of Muslim women:
Instead of the traditional method of taking refuge with relatives or neighbours,
young women had the opportunity to turn to a German women’s centre’. These
women, in the majority of cases, return to the family household, but a small and
increasing number of exceptions is significant. Taking refuge outside the com-
munity, even if temporarily, indicates that an alternative to family organisation
now exists for women. By using it as a threat, young women have increased their
power in a conflict situation. (1993: 70)
Abdulrahim, like the other contributors to Buijs’s book, has emphasized the
social advantages that migrating towards Western countries would bring to
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Muslim women. Nonetheless, emphasizing the positive aspects, often linked
to processes of modernization, has hidden the other side of the coin: the dis-
tress and suffering that migration could provoke. The disintegration of
family and friendship networks upon which Muslim immigrant women used
to rely is one of the commonest sources of distress I have documented. Yet
this has been one of the aspects most overlooked by academics. So,
Abdulrahim has stressed the positive aspects of the fact that many Muslim
immigrant women suffering domestic violence or facing forced marriages
decide to seek asylum in ‘refuges for women’. But Abdulrahim has not
observed that these desperate Muslim migrant women, cut off from the pro-
tective extended family network they enjoyed in their homelands, had no
other choice. They had to accept the help of associations and end up in
‘women’s hostels’. During one of my interviews, a Muslim woman, who had
suffered domestic abuse, described how humiliating, degrading and upset-
ting the experience of going to a ‘women refuge’ was. She commented that,
‘Only prostitutes, in my country end in these institutions. I mean, I have a
good family and good friends back home who would have supported and
helped me during those difficult times. But here I had no choice other than
ending in the women’s refuge.’ Some Muslim immigrant women could per-
ceive what Abdulrahim has said is a modern positive choice rejecting patri-
archal and traditional schemes as yet another distress to add to the many
they have to face. 
Although academic studies have overemphasized the economic and social
problems experienced by Muslim immigrant women, there are other aspects
which are fundamental to the experience of immigration for these women.
Therefore, Mozzo-Counil, a French social worker, has written an interesting
(but unfortunately little known) book (1994) with a powerful ethnography
and analyses concerning the immigration experiences of North African
women. Being a social worker, Mozzo-Counil was able to observe the other
side of the coin which some social scientists have missed. Not only has she
recognized the relevance that women’s networks played in the pre-migration
lives of these women, but she has also recognized that Muslim immigrant
women are unable to recreate those models of solidarity among women they
used to enjoy in their homeland. Some of Mozzo-Counil’s respondents have
suffered depression and isolation because of immigration. The surprise in
Mozzo-Counil’s book is how she focused on the human aspect, disclosing the
emotions and thought processes these women went through. So, the senti-
ments of these women as well as their complex psychological relationship
with their own bodies become part of Mozzo-Counil’s narration and argu-
ment. She has reminded the anthropologist, ‘the Maghribi women of the first
generation communicate through their bodies, the cry of their suffering
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bodies, the joy of their dancing bodies’ and through them the experience of
their immigration (1994: 9, translation from French is mine). 
The year 1994 was also when Clifford, needing to reaffirm the centrality
of gender in immigration studies argued, ‘Diasporic experiences are always
gendered. But there is a tendency for theoretical accounts of diasporas and
diaspora cultures to hide this fact, to talk of travel and displacement in
unmarked ways, thus normalizing male experiences’ (1994: 313). Women,
according to him, retain a particular position within the immigrant family;
they propagate the cultural traditions of their families. Because of immigra-
tion, however, some of them may achieve an economic and social freedom
outside their families. French scholars1 have radicalized the idea that migra-
tion axiomatically means the emancipation of Muslim women. The main
argument is that the difficulties experienced by men during immigration
give the opportunity for Muslim women in the family to emancipate them-
selves from patriarchal structures. According to this viewpoint, the children,
and in particular daughters, would be the family members who would
benefit most from the disruption of the father figure within the immigrant
family. For instance, in a family in which the father suffered unemployment
and the mother had to find low-paid jobs in order to maintain the family,
the French educational system might become the only point of reference for
the children.
These facts help us to understand why an influential scholar such as
Lacoste-Dujardin interprets as positive, for example, the experience of
divorce for Muslim migrant women. In contrast with Mozzo-Counil,
Lacoste-Dujardin has failed to observe that Muslim immigrant women and
their daughters may have different opinions about female emancipation
from those of Western women. But Lacoste-Dujardin is not interested in
what these people think, but only what is conducive to their assimilation:
‘emancipation is more relevant to daughters and especially the older daugh-
ters in a family, although even the younger children, both boys and girls,
may benefit by being brought up by an emancipated mother, more able to
stimulate them in their studies and to incite them to social success’ (2000:
66). Before arguing against the supposed dynamics that these theories
present, let me say that I see a degree of collusion between these French
social scientific researches and the controversial French assimilation policy.
Reading some of these French scholars, I had the impression that the dis-
cussion was not about understanding the system and structure of Muslim
immigrant families, but how to transform the children of Muslim parents
into ‘acceptable’ French citizens. There is nothing wrong with this
(although I do not believe in the French way of l’assimilation), but this has
more to do with political policy-making than social scientific research.
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These kinds of studies have clearly failed to observe the consequences of the
disruption of traditional Muslim family structure. 
Recent anthropological studies have finally focused on the ‘dark sides’ of
family immigration. Although Pels in his studies on Moroccan families in
the Netherlands (2000) has confirmed the social disempowerment that
Muslim men suffer within and outside their families, he has rejected the idea
that the disempowerment of Muslim men could improve the lives of
Muslim women. Pels has suggested that Muslim immigrant men suffer dis-
empowerment within their family because of unemployment or low-paid
jobs, which effectively reduce the possibility of their being the family bread-
winner. Some may think that this might be just an economic issue, but the
fact is that Islamic law requires Muslim men to be the family breadwinner.
Unemployment or, more often, their husbands’ low-paid jobs ‘force’
Muslim women to experience role reversal economically speaking. In other
words, there is a dramatic inversion of the Islamic precepts structuring the
traditional Muslim family. It was exactly this inversion that Lacoste-
Dujardin (2000) and other French scholars (i.e. Lepoutre 1997; Souilamas
2000; Tribalat 1995) have interpreted as extremely positive for Muslim
immigrant women, but the anthropological study provided by Pels has
revealed a considerably less idyllic picture. He has noticed that a majority of
Muslim women he interviewed rejected Western-style gender relations and
parenthood because, according to him, they ‘are not willing to give up their
central position within the family and their power over internal family
affairs.’ (Pels 2000: 88) 
Indeed, Muslim immigrant women tend to retain and protect the cultural
tradition of their families and resist assimilation. So, Salih, who has con-
ducted an anthropological study concerning Moroccan immigrant women
living in Italy (2000) has argued, ‘Immigrant women contextually negotiate
the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion of Self and Other, according to
the diverse and sometimes intersecting hegemonic discourses that they may
face in different places and phases of their lives’ (2000: 323). Salih has
emphasized the abilities of Muslim immigrant women to renegotiate new
boundaries instead of passively assimilating the host ‘Western’ models. She
has reminded us that Muslim immigrant women actively take part not only
in their families, but also in their host societies. While the majority of
French scholars we have discussed seem to interpret Islam as an obstacle to
assimilation, Salih has argued that Muslim immigrant women integrate
Islam in their complex negotiation processes, which involve not only their
host societies but also their former homelands. Indeed, Basch, Glick
Schiller and Szanton (1994) have argued that immigrants are part of ‘deter-
ritorialized nation-states’ (i.e. a state that ‘stretches beyond its geographical
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boundaries’) so that ‘the nation’s people may live anywhere in the world and
still not live outside the state so that ‘wherever its people go, their state goes
too’ (1994: 269). However, Smith (1999) has criticized Basch’s idea of
‘deterritorialized nation-states’, arguing that it might affect the concept of
diaspora. Smith has reminded us that, despite the available communication
technology, in their host countries Muslim immigrant women may still
experience displacement. 
Avoiding the radicalism of Basch et al. (1994), Salih, in another article
(2001), has suggested that Moroccan immigrant women are plurinational
subjects. This highlights the fact that Muslim women experience ‘embed-
dedness with multiple hegemonic structures operating at more than one
national level which conditions their potential to move, their identities and
their transnational activities in a gendered way’ (2001: 669). It is precisely
because Muslim immigrant women are ‘plurinational’ that they cannot be
politically passive subjects as some have suggested. Indeed, far from being
passive ‘repeaters’ of men’s discourses, Muslim immigrant women develop
their own political and religious views. Fifteen years after the ‘head scarf
affair’ (Dayan-Herzbrun 2000), the French government has enforced a con-
troversial law which bans all visible religious symbols; in reality, this legisla-
tion aims to stop Muslim female students wearing hijabs, since the French
government reads the Muslim headscarf as anti-secular, hence anti-French.
A considerable number of Muslim women in France have fiercely opposed
the new government’s legislation in different ways, from writing passionate
e-mails to the unknown cyber sisters within the ‘virtual ummah’, to political
protests and marches. Their protest has had an international audience and
spread the protest not only to other European Countries but also to many
Islamic countries. 
The resistance to this legislation, however, has moved beyond political and
religious arguments to become an emotional experience of an anti-colonialist
denial of identity (see Chapter 5). Indeed, many Muslim women linked the
anti-hijab legislation to France’s colonialist past. Concerning the role that
memory may have in post-colonial discourse, Ganguly has observed, 
Re-making the past, then, serves at least a dual purpose. It is a way of coming
to terms with the present without being seen to criticize the status quo; it also
helps to recuperate a sense of the self not dependent on criteria handed down
by others – the past is what women can claim as their own. The past is seen as
autonomous and as possessing an authority not related to the privileges acquired
through marriage and emigration. Since self representation is so tied up with the
representation of the past, it is no wonder that some of the memories have more
to do with how things ought to be rather than how they were. (1992: 40
emphases in the original)
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Personal memories are also essential in the redefinition of ‘home’ as a place
of belonging, as Ahmed has observed, ‘Nostalgia and memory also take
what Gopinath calls “a generative or enabling” form when it is used for the
reinterpretation of homes and homelands’ (Ahmed, Castañeda, Fortier and
Sheller 2003: 9). Yet for some daughters of Muslim immigrant mothers, the
hijab and Islamic dress emphasize their re-imagined, ‘mythologized’ con-
nection with a pure, a-cultural, essential Islam. 
As in the case of their brothers, even recent studies2 have represented the
identities of Western-born Muslim women as in-between the West and
Islam. Yet as in the case of their mothers, they have been represented as
passive human beings, shaped by the culture Islam has provided. Other
studies have rejected this representation and suggested a more dynamic
relationship between Islam and Western-born Muslim women. Basit has
studied the aspirations of British Muslim girls and observed:
While British Muslims are not a homogeneous group, a collective Muslim iden-
tity transcends the regional and sectarian differences when living in a non-
Muslim country which is their adopted homeland. Shaw (1994) argues that the
assumption that these young people are ‘torn between two cultures’ is both
inappropriate and misleading. And the implied dichotomy between ‘modern’
and ‘traditional’ is in effect quite unsustainable as Muslim identity now provides
them with a powerful and ideologically effective justification … (1997: 430)
The authors who, like Shaw, suggest that Western-born Muslim women are
‘torn between two cultures’ discuss identity exclusively from a culturalist
viewpoint. Yet we have seen that another understanding of identity could be
brought to the fore, in which emotions and feelings play the major role. 
Gender and Jihad 
Khadijah was fifty-seven when I met her in 1998. She had been living for
twenty-seven years in Seine-St-Denis, a Parisian suburb in which one-third
of the population was at the time Muslim. A mother of four, she succeeded
in joining her husband when the French government allowed the regroupe-
ment familial (family regroupment). I always had my meetings with Khadijah
in her small kitchen, in which scents of different spices were pleasantly
hanging around. As usual, that day Khadijah was ‘force-feeding’ me with
another and another (and another) handmade piece of terrific baqlaw,3 while
we were speaking of her favourite Algerian Raï singer (Marranci 2000b). The
audiocassette was playing the melancholic singer’s voice singing a song in
Algerian dialect, which Khadijah translated word by word for me in her
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peculiar French accent while cooking her meal. Unexpectedly one word,
gorba, stopped both Khadijah’s translation and her rhythmical stirring. Gorba
means ‘foreigner land’ or ‘exile’, but had a particular emotional flavour for
all Algerian immigrants. Speaking more to herself than me, she said,
To emigrate is suffering. You miss your homeland, your parents and your friends
with whom you have shared your life. But the most difficult thing was to educate
my children in another country that was so different from mine. If I had not
been Muslim, I would have not survived all the problems I had to face. I can tell
you, and I am not joking, that Islam prevented me from taking my life. I was
depressed but I am a Muslim and suicide is a really really bad thing. I had to
fight against my depression and against this racist society. France wants our chil-
dren to change and they corrupt them. I had to struggle as a mother to keep my
children on the right path and this was my jihad. When I go back to my country
and I meet young Muslim women who want to come here, I repeat to them that
Muslim women who want to emigrate should be ready for nothing less than a
jihad. 
For the first time, I heard the word jihad from the mouth of a Muslim
woman. By ‘jihad’ Khadijah meant a fight against nostalgia depression, as
well as her effort to educate her children as Muslim. Although she was the
first, she was not the last Muslim woman who mentioned jihad to empha-
size the hardship she had to endure during the adaptation to the host
country lifestyle. 
The jihad was often marked through the symbolic Muslim headscarf. So,
‘A’ishah who was twenty-three when she migrated alone from an Egyptian
village to cosmopolitan Paris, told me how she used to perceive the new
Western environment as threatening and dangerous. By contrast with the
majority of teenagers leaving their homes for a new student life, ‘A’ishah
worried about her new uncontrolled freedom. She explained that the
women of her village rarely travel without at least one mahram (a male
member of the family) but her father had trusted her to go to Paris to com-
plete her studies. ‘A’ishah explained, ‘I feared that I could not resist the
many temptations around me,’ and provided some examples: ‘Drinking
alcohol, going to parties, eating during Ramadan, and finding a non-
Muslim boyfriend or having premarital sex’. She, however, decided to
conduct what she defined as a ‘jihad against temptations’. To mark the
beginning of her jihad she decided to wear the hijab everywhere and not just
at the mosque, ‘I felt strongly Muslim and I wanted to show that I was
Muslim, that this is my main identity.’
Before the second Intifada, I noticed that many of the Palestinian women
I had met charged jihad with a similar meaning to Khadijah and ‘A’ishah’s.
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Although they openly spoke and supported the Palestinian cause and the
war against the Israeli occupation forces, they avoided the word jihad and
preferred to use the generic muqawamah (resistance).4 In 1999, Fadwa, a
Palestinian wife of an influential member of the mosque in Pisa, told me
why she did not use jihad in that context, ‘Jihad is a very, very important
word, and too many journalists use it. Italians do not know what jihad really
means, they say holy war and this creates lots of confusion.’ This was before
28 September 2000, the date on which the second Intifada started.
Afterwards, desperation, fear and anger replaced the hope that Palestinians
had for a peaceful end to the conflict. But the tension and the violence had
to increase not only in Palestine and Israel, but also internationally.
September 11 saw an increase of Islamophobia and the abuse of Muslim
women: some of them had their hijab ripped off, others unfortunately, were
physically attacked.5 My women respondents believed that Islam was the
target of this Islamophobia and the circle of panic became particularly
noticeable.6 They shifted from describing jihad as mainly an inner struggle
to violent action. 
Fatimah is a 52-year-old Palestinian woman. She migrated to the UK
fifteen years ago and has a 22-year-old daughter and a 12-year-old son.
Fatimah today did not show the same wariness ‘A’ishah had in calling
Hamas’s operations jihad so she argued, 
In Palestine men, women and even children are conducting a jihad against the
Zionists. Jihad means that they cannot stop us; that we’ll kill them for what they
have done to us, Jews kill our children every day, nobody cares about them
anymore. So don’t tell me that our shuhada [martyrs, but here she meant suicide
bombers] are wrong when they go to Israel to do their jihads. 
The only concern she seemed to have about the word jihad was that I
should be convinced of the terrifying ‘power’ of it. Fatimah’s daughter, Lya,
shared her mother’s opinions. Lya had, like many Western-born Muslims, a
more international understanding of the conflict. She argued that after 9/11
non-Muslims had to take into consideration that Muslim blood would no
longer be cheap since jihad could reach everybody and strike everywhere.
She then observed, ‘the suffering of Palestinian people and all the other
oppressed Muslims have been brought to the nations that hate us
[Palestinians] and Islam’. Lya believed in international jihad, ‘Every time a
non-Muslim has been killed, people make a lot of fuss, but when a Muslim
child dies because of the terrorist actions of the West, nobody cares. If every
time a kafirun kills a Muslim the world had to show respect [followed by a
minute of silence], we would enjoy endless holidays here.’ During all our
conversations, Lya never mentioned the Qur’an, the hadiths or other
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Islamic texts. Her idea of jihad had originated from a different source, her
identity. 
After the interviews and discussions I had with Fatimah and her daughter,
I had to recognize that I felt more uncomfortable listening to these argu-
ments from Muslim women than Muslim men. Maybe the reason is that,
despite years of feminism, we still see women as mothers. This is partially
confirmed by the fact that the most effective pacifist rhetoric resorts to the
figure of ‘the mother’ as a dissuasive symbol against war.7 In Christianity,
the paramount symbol of maternal pain for the loss of her child is Mary.
Finally, we tend to think that a mother might be more sympathetic to the
pain of other mothers. In other words, in the choice between death and life
we expect mothers to choose the latter. Yet not all cultures have the same
myths, as Sparta teaches. 
We have just seen in Chapter 5, that women may support jihad no less
than male members of their family. Let me share an anecdote that happened
quite recently at Azhar’s home. Ten years ago Azhar emigrated to the UK
with his wife Jamilah. They came from a middle-class Lebanese family and
quickly adapted to the new British lifestyle. During my research, I asked if
I could interview them together on their experience of immigration. The day
arrived and Azhar invited me to his home. They seemed very pleased to
share their experiences with me and the atmosphere was very relaxed. One
of my usual questions focuses on the aftermath of 9/11 and whether the
tragic event had modified their neighbourhood relationships. Before
answering the question, Azhar gave an introduction in which he defined
9/11 as a criminal act against Islam and humanity. He then acknowledged
that people could have problems in trusting Muslims since, ‘people do not
have something like terrorist detectors; but they know that there is more
chance that Azhar could blow up their flight than my friend John’. Then
laughing Azhar added, ‘What they do seem to forget is that Azhar himself is
as worried as they are that the Pakistani men sitting on his left on the plane
could blow him up.’ I noticed that Jamilah was becoming increasingly dis-
appointed. She was not laughing at all and she was looking at the other side
of the room. 
Azhar did not seem to pay any attention to his wife’s expression and
stated, ‘Muslims have a duty to rebuild the relationships with non-Muslims
and not the other way around. The terrorist acted in the name of Islam, we
have to show that they were wrong.’ Jamilah could not help but interrupt
her husband in quite a rude manner. This would not be so surprising or
wrong, if I had not been there. In even the most modern and liberal Muslim
family, Jamilah’s rebuke would have sparked tension, since I was not part of
the family and I was conducting research. Jamilah started to speak while her
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husband tried to make strange (quite funny) facial expressions as if asking
her to avoid something. But she did not pay any attention and said,
‘Palestinians have suffered because of Israel and Lebanese Muslims like us
know what the Israeli oppression is like.’ Of course, I could understand that
this was just the beginning. Jamilah holds a very different opinion from her
husband. From his expressions I thought that he probably knew that. She
went on accusing the Americans of supporting Israel and selling powerful
weapons to Israel. With an expression of disgust she added, ‘the same
weapons have not only killed Palestinian mujahidin but also innocent chil-
dren and women’. Jamilah seemed to like her husband’s incredulous expres-
sion when she said, ‘Americans used to feel secure in their homeland, and
they thought that our Muslim suffering could not reach them. 9/11 just
taught them that America is vulnerable to jihad as we are vulnerable to their
bombs and violence.’ Azhar was visibly annoyed but unable to stop his wife,
perhaps fearing that I might be embarrassed. For this traditional family to
have such a dispute was beyond the pale. Jamilah’s final comments during
that day left Azhar evidently embarrassed and ashamed, ‘too many
Muslims’, she said, ‘are Westernized and doing nothing for Islam or their
families. They only think about money and business. I wonder whether they
are still men.’ Was Jamilah challenging Azhar’s masculinity? Perhaps this
was the impression that Azhar had, since I was never invited again and was
unable to meet him again. 
Jamilah was very critical of the Islamic behaviour of Muslim men and she,
as other women I met, seemed to guard the faith of the members of the
family.8 For instance, on many occasions I observed how Muslim women
checked and made sure that their children (in particular boys) respected
Ramadan and the prayers. Yet it was not only the mother but also older
(sometimes even younger) sisters who encouraged their brothers to read the
Qur’an and go to the mosque on Fridays. Inayah, a 21-year-old British-
Pakistani girl, explains in these terms the role of ‘guardian of the faith’ she
has within her family.
We have to remind our brothers and sometimes our fathers that Islam is impor-
tant. They [male members of the family] have many distractions so my brothers
do not want to go to the mosque. I have to tell them that they have to visit the
mosque. Our family wants to be a respected Muslim family within this commu-
nity. We want to be good Muslims otherwise others would speak about us
behind our backs or refer to our family as a bad example. Islam asks women to
be shy and lower their eyes so that their family honour can be protected but our
father and brothers have to show good Islamic behaviour if they want to make
us an honourable family that people can refer to as a good example. So we
should help our brothers to respect their din [faith]. I mean, within the Muslim
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family there is a relationship between the Muslim women’s chastity and the
men’s honour but also between the men’s respect for Islam and the respect that
others show to the women of a certain family. If you have a very good Muslim
father, people will respect you as a Muslim daughter. 
We might be tempted to link honour to masculinity and the patriarchal
sexual control of the family’s women. Yet the concept of honour is not, as
we shall discuss in the next section, mono-directional from women to men.
Muslim women care about their family honour no less than their Muslim
male relatives do. As Inayah seemed to be aware, respected fathers, hus-
bands, sons, and brothers enhance Muslim women’s status among their
peers. In other words, if the degree of sexual control imposed on their
family’s women may define Muslim men’s honour, the degree of din of their
family’s men may define Muslim women’s respectability. 
Re-gendering the Honour Shame Complex 
The honour and shame theory suggests that in certain societies men’s
honour depends on their ability to control women’s sexuality.9 Extreme
attempts to control and regulate the sexuality of the family’s women can
lead to some men performing honour killings in the hope of re-establishing
their forfeited honour. Peristiany (1965) suggested that the ‘honour and
shame complex’ has only characterized Mediterranean societies. However,
Brandes (1980) has criticized Peristiany’s monolithic view and has argued
that the relationship between honour and shame is not restricted to partic-
ular ethnic, cultural or religious groups. A short review of the British news
confirms Brandes’ opinion. For instance, the BBC reported that during
2003, Scotland Yard had registered twelve ‘honour killings’ in the whole of
the UK. Not all of them, however, saw a Muslim charged. Among the per-
petrators figured Sikhs and several British Christians.10 
Stewart (1994) has suggested that ‘honour’ has a bipartite system: the
concept of ‘honour’ should be relevant to both the honour acknowledged
and the honour acknowledger. Therefore, the members of a group must
share similar moral codes because they are then able to recognize an action
as honourable or dishonourable. In the case of honour and shame syn-
dromes, neither the single man nor the social group sharing the ‘honour
code’ has sole control over the dynamics of how honour is achieved and
kept. Women have the power to jeopardize or enhance the honour of their
male relatives through sexual behaviour. In other words, wives and daugh-
ters retain the, presumably, undesired power to dishonour their men by
breaking the shared group’s sexual norms and ‘bringing shame’ on their
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families. In the worst cases in which social sexual norms have been broken,
the husbands, fathers and brothers of the woman have to act quickly to re-
establish their honour within their social group. 
This is achieved through public violent acts (Akpinar 2003), which unfor-
tunately are rarely merely symbolic and can culminate in the murder of the
‘culprit’ woman. On 12 October 2003 Abdullah Yones stabbed to death
Heshu Yones, his 16-year-old daughter. She had planned to run away from
home and live with her Lebanese boyfriend. Because of his daughter’s
behaviour, Abdullah felt that his honour was jeopardized and his position
within the local Kurdish Muslim community ruined. His daughter’s pre-
marital relationship represented the tangible evidence of his failure as a
Muslim and Kurdish father. The fact that he was an immigrant, distant
from his family network and suffering from long-term unemployment surely
had a dramatic impact on his tragic action which ended his daughter’s life.
Abdullah saw himself as humiliated both as a member of the Kurdish com-
munity and as a Muslim model father.
When I discussed the case of Abdullah Yones with a Kurdish man I had
met in an Edinburgh mosque, the worshipper observed, ‘Only weak
Muslims, who have problems being respected even by their families commit
honour killings.’ He then explained that these Muslims use violence against
their daughters and wives because they want to stop their communities
speaking about their failure as Muslim men. ‘I tell you the truth, if you are
a failure as a father and husband the community do not take you seriously
as Muslim. Muslim men know how to deal with their children and wives.’
He acknowledged that in ‘Kurdistan’, as in other Muslim places, if one’s
daughter behaved like Abdullah Yones’ daughter ‘people there would cer-
tainly expect the father to act’. Yet my Kurdish interlocutor made an inter-
esting observation, ‘Abdullah Yones allowed his daughter to be educated
among non-Muslims here in the West; so, since Allah gave him a daughter,
he had to think carefully about the problems he had to face if Abdullah
wished to stay in Scotland.’ This was not the only critical opinion I col-
lected, others pointed out that if Abdullah Yones were a ‘real Muslim man’
having a strong faith, his daughter would have respected his honour and the
tragedy would have been avoided. 
At this point, we can wonder whether honour is only a masculine feeling.
In other words, could a Muslim man make the women of his family feel
ashamed because of his actions or lack of them? By studying the concept of
honour among Egyptian Bedouins, Abu-Lughod (1986) has observed that
in that society women hold codified ‘honour’ rules to which men (at least if
they wanted to achieve a successful marriage) have to conform:
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Women claim, for instance, that ‘real men’ control all their dependents and
beat their wives when the wives do stupid things. One woman, whose daughter
was about to marry one of the most respected men in the camp, said, ‘my
daughter wants a man whose eyes are open – not someone nice … No, she
wants someone who will order her around’ … One old woman told me, ‘when
a man is really something [manly] he pays no heed to women.’ ‘A man who
listens to his wife when she tells him what to do is a fool’ said a young woman
… many agreed adding ‘if a man is fool, a woman rides him like a donkey.’
(1986: 89, 95) 
Is this just a peculiar characteristic of Egyptian Bedouin women? Apparently
it is not. Some of my Muslim women respondents have expressed a clear
preference for men who conform to the ‘real Muslim man’ model. The list
below is based on the opinions that I have collected, and of course is over-
generalized, 
1. an observant Muslim who has Islam in his heart; 
2. acts justly towards his family, in particular his wife; 
3. is ready to defend his family and religion in any circumstances; 
4. avoids too explicitly Westernized behaviour; 
5. takes straightforward decisions; 
6. is the bread winner; 
7. controls his children and educates them in Islam, but without being
unjust or oppressive. 
In particular two aspects were linked to the concept of ‘honour’. First, the
man should show devotion to Islam; secondly, as the Qur’an requires, he
should be the breadwinner.11 Indeed, when I interviewed some Muslim
women employed outside their families, they seemed felt compelled to stress
that they kept their salaries for themselves since their husbands’ salaries pro-
vided for the family.12 By contrast, I have collected complaints from some
Muslim women who found themselves forced to find a job because their
husbands were unemployed. These women would have preferred to take
care of their children instead of spending time outside their homes. In some
cases, complaints turned into strong criticism of their husbands. In this
case, immigration was blamed for the ‘dishonourable’ state of their men,
some of whom, I came to know, had started drinking. 
As we have seen, Muslim immigrant men face challenges within their host
societies but also within their families because of their unusually weak 
position in both. Many of them went through the experience of family
regrouping with mixed feelings of joy and fear since they could not provide
the ‘standard-Western life’ which some of their wives expected. Shadi, a
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Algerian 42-year-old living in Paris, expressed a kind of nostalgia for his first
years of immigration, when his wife and son were not with him, 
I had so many troubles in finding a job and when I found one, the salary was not
good. How could I provide something for my family? My wife wanted to come
here with our son. I couldn’t refuse, could I? When she arrived, she was
unhappy as I had expected in my worst nightmare. The house I rented was too
small and in a very poor area but I could not afford any better. Women expect
that their husbands are strong and pray and are good Muslims. At that time, I
was weak, with lots of problems. Before my wife arrived, I had started drinking
because I was desperate. I was such a bad Muslim that my wife asked for a
divorce, she did not want to share her bed with a man left without any honour.
I lost everything but then she agreed to take me back because I started to prac-
tice Islam and stopped drinking. 
Some feminist scholars have highlighted the problems and difficulties that
Muslim women face within their families and host societies and have rightly
criticized the androcentric perspectives that have affected sociology and
anthropology for a long time. Yet the effort to rebalance the lack of atten-
tion to women has had the unwanted result that ‘gender’, as category, has
become synonymous with femininity, when, of course, masculinity was also
part of it. So the honour and shame complex has been mainly observed from
an axiomatic assumption that men oppress women and women passively
suffer this oppression (see Akpinar 2003).
But we have just observed that Muslim women may form their own ‘code
of honour’ to which Muslim men have to conform. A distressed Muslim
woman in Ireland told me ‘How can I feel proud of my husband when he is
even unable to achieve respect from his own children?’ It is clear that Muslim
men may ‘bring shame’ upon their Muslim women so that Muslim women’s
status can be disrupted. We now know that some Muslim men may resort to
violence to re-establish their lost honour, yet Muslim women seem to prefer
physiological and emotional pressure rather than physical violence.
Nevertheless, I have noticed that, contrary to all my expectations, during my
researches, I have come across a few cases of the violence of women against
their sons and husbands.13 As we shall see below, the fact that in many
Muslim families in the West men are increasingly unable to match the ‘real
Muslim man’ model has some effect on some women’s rhetoric of jihad. 
Past, Memory and Islamic Heroines
Some Muslim women’s circles emphasize that it is a Muslim’s duty to
defend Islam and it is the duty of good mothers and sisters to remember that
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this was particularly important for a Muslim man’s honour. For instance, a
Western-born Pakistani boy recalled how his mother ‘constantly told me
that if somebody abused the name of the Prophet, I had to act and punish
the person; if I did not, I was not only a bad Muslim but also without
honour’. Other women I met overtly stated that there was no more reward
from Allah than being a shahid’s mother or wife. Of course, they were not
referring to Islamic history. Where did these ideas come from? What impact
do they have on Muslim women’s rhetoric of jihad? 
The Islamic accounts of the most famous battles in the time of the
Prophet emphasize honour and self-sacrifice as the main characteristics of
the ‘right-guided’ Muslim hero. Muslim women have some archetypes
which they may use to test the Muslim honour of their men. These tests
may induce in some men forms of ‘bravado’ attitudes towards jihad, some
of which we have observed in previous chapters. The weaker the Muslim
man is within his family, the more effective and dangerous this rhetoric of
jihad could become. Although, a bravado jihadi attitude is often the com-
monest reaction to male honour testing, there is the possibility that it could
end in tragic terrorist action. The mass media have supplied us with many
examples of these tragedies from Palestine and Chechnya, yet Asif Hanif
became the first British citizen to act as a suicide bomber. 
Asif Hanif (twenty-one years old) took his own life, killed thirteen people
and injured many others. He was the first British Muslim to make a suicide
bomb attack in Israel. Asif’s father was a wealthy businessman and was able
to provide his son with private and state education as well as a comfortable
life. According to his friends, Asif had planned to become a teacher, in other
words, he had a brilliant future in front of him. The imam of the local
mosque that Asif used to attend said ‘[Asif was] honourable and very polite
and I never heard about any kind of politics from him’ (BBC 1 May 2003).
The word ‘honourable’ appears repeatedly in the imam’s words and as we
have seen, Muslims use this word carefully. Asif had never expressed radical
ideas, he came from a middle-class family, he was what some may call a
perfect, happy, ‘integrated’ Western-born Muslim. So, what went wrong?
I discussed this tragedy with some Muslim friends. They used the case of
Asif to challenge the stereotype that ‘an integrated Muslim always means a
safe Muslim’. Habib (a 23-year-old Syrian) has observed that some
Muslims ‘Westernized’ because it may help their lives, yet, according to
Habib the ‘Westernization’ means also that these Muslims had to compro-
mise their Islamic life and identity. Habib, however, thought that notwith-
standing the efforts that ‘these weak Muslims make they quickly discover
that they are becoming neither good Muslims nor good non-Muslims’.
Habib then explained that these ‘Westernized’ Muslims rediscover their
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faith as part of their identity but they feel the need to prove it to themselves
and to others. Indeed, it is not difficult to spot the schismogenetic process
in which these Muslims become involved. However, Muhammad, a
Western-born Muslim of Pakistani origin, pointed out other aspects that
matches what I had discovered during my research, 
Our sisters [Muslim women] are becoming more religious and better Muslims
than we [the men] are. They [Muslim women] have many occasions to remind
us that we do not have much honour left. Some of these women are more radical
than men in their arguments, believe me. It is only because Muslim women are
considered weak and oppressed that people do not pay attention to what they
say and police do not stop them so often as they stop us in the streets. Some
Muslim brothers may feel uncomfortable with the fact that they are less good
Muslims than their sisters and mothers; so they [Muslim men] have to show that
Islam is everything for them if they do not want to be less than a woman. 
The police have traced e-mails between Asif and his sister which would
suggest that the girl had incited her brother to conduct the jihad (see The
Independent, 27 April 2004). Probably, Asif had to show that he was an ‘hon-
ourable Muslim man’ by defending Islam. He became convinced that Islam
was under attack, and his Muslim identity became trapped in the circle of
panic, perhaps he was trapped. His jihad, which went beyond rhetoric to
materialize in carnage, had more to do with emotions of feeling ‘shame’ for
being too Westernized, than with Islam as a religion and jihad as a theolog-
ical concept. As I have discussed above, the syndrome of honour and shame
is never mono-directional; an increasing number of Muslim men are
becoming ‘victims’ of their lost honour. Muslim immigrant women as well
as their daughters may develop forms of rhetoric of jihad. Yet such female
jihadi rhetoric is not new but part of a long established tradition. 
Indeed, the first shahid was not a man, as some might think, but a
woman: Sumayya bint Khubbat, who was killed by Abu Jhal (one of the
fiercest enemies of the Prophet). Actually, her family became the first shahid
family since her husband and then her son also offered their lives for Islam.
Sumayya’s story became popular (and still is) among Muslim women and
they often narrate the story to their children. Indeed, Sumayya represents
the perfect Muslim woman who educated her son in Islam and encouraged
her husband to act honourably. Her story, like others involving Muslim
heroines, is even available on audiocassettes, the majority of which are pro-
duced in Pakistan (Shalinsky 1993). These stories let me realize that during
jihad the traditional Islamic distinctions between gender roles vanish; jihad
has no gender. Shalinsky has observed, 
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women may have to redirect their loyalties and transcend their immediate
concern with family and kin. … In ordinary times women express their ‘aql
[reason] by veiling and by appropriate concern for family and kin. In extraordi-
nary times like jihad too much concern with family and kin may actually be nafs
(self-indulgence). ‘Aql is expressed by a woman willing to sacrifice herself and
her kin during a time of jihad. Hence, the exalted figure of the Muslim mother
is turned into a more powerful figure: Islam’s mother. (1993: 65)
Many other Islamic stories emphasize the role of Islam’s mothers; and the
topical point is the sacrifice of maternal love for the sake of Islam. 
Another of these ‘brave women of Islam’, as a Muslim female friend liked
to describe her, was Nasibah bint Kahf Yazidi. During the battle of Uhud
she stopped distributing water to the Muslim fighters and armed herself
with a sword to shield the Prophet from fierce attacks. While fighting, she
saw her son wounded and went to help him. After she dressed his wounds,
Nasibah urged him to fight and to die as shahid. During the battle, the
Prophet pointed her towards the person who had fatally injured her son and
she killed him saying ‘Allahu akbar’ (Allah is Great). Nasibah was wounded
in her shoulder and had to leave the battlefield. At the end of the battle, the
Prophet of Islam praised Nasibah’s love for Islam and her heroism. ‘A’isha,
the youngest and most loved wife of the Prophet, also participated in several
battles and led the Muslim army against her enemies after the death of her
husband. These Muslim heroines inspire the ‘rhetoric of jihad’ that some
Muslim immigrant women have developed. These examples of heroic, inde-
pendent, brave, successful Muslim women, who facing terrible tasks only
succeeded because of their faith in Islam, inspire some Muslim immigrants
and their myth of the ‘perfect Muslim woman’. 
Today, new Muslim heroines have flanked Sumayya and Nasiba. These
new heroines are the female Palestinian suicide bombers such as Wafa Idris
who, on 27 January 2002, aged twenty-eight, killed herself and an elderly
Jew, injuring another 150; and Dareen Abu Aisheh (twenty-one), who just
one month after Wafa’s jihadi action, injured three policemen while blowing
herself up. Yet the youngest were also the most quoted by my female
respondents: Ayat Akhras (aged eighteen) who detonated a bomb inside a
supermarket in Jerusalem on 29 March 2002 and killed, among others, a
17-year-old Jewish girl and a mother of two children; and Hanadi Tayseer
Jaradat (aged twenty-nine), who on 4 October 2003 killed herself and
another other nineteen people and injured fifty. Some of these women wit-
nessed Israeli soldiers brutalizing or even killing their relatives and we can
imagine how their determination formed. 
Discussing the topic of female Palestinian suicide bombers with both
Muslim men and women, I noticed two different opinions. The majority of
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non-Palestinian Muslim immigrant men and some Palestinian men, argued
that the first duty for a Muslim woman is her family and children and then
to support their Muslim men during jihad. In conclusion, these men
believed that these women’s actions went against Islamic teachings. Muslim
immigrant women, showed a less homogeneous point of view. Palestinian
women tended to exalt the courage and faith that these women had shown
in giving up their own lives. Yet non-Palestinian women saw these female
suicide bombers as controversial. By contrast a larger number of Western-
born Muslim women I interviewed showed respect and appreciated the
courage of these suicide bombers. They called them shahida and empha-
sized that ‘they loved Islam more than many Muslim lads living in our
[Western] cities’. Jamila (a 23-year-old Muslim girl of Pakistani origin)
compared these female suicide bombers to the great Islamic heroines, 
I think that their actions have shamed Muslim men who are doing nothing for
Islam. If these women had such a strong iman [faith], why should Muslim men
have less than they had? I think that today Muslim women should be as strong
as they were in Muhammad’s time because the modern kafirun have attacked
Islam as fiercely as the Meccans did. 
Probably I do not need to mention that Jamila overtly supported violent jihadi
actions and she thought that the majority of her ‘brothers in Islam’ lacked
honour because they even criticized her radical position. Like the Bedouin
women studied by Abu-Lughod (1986), some of the Muslim women I met
had their model of the ‘perfect Muslim man’. Yet the archetype often clashed
with the reality of everyday life. To mention just one thing, Jamila’s father was
an unemployed man for whom Islam meant only Jamila’s hijab. 
Conclusion 
In some historic battles, in which the enemies of Islam tried to wipe out the
newborn religion, some Muslim men ran for their lives leaving the Prophet
in danger. By contrast, women such as Nasibah and Summaya offered their
lives and encouraged even their wounded sons to accept martyrdom for
Islam. Today, some Muslim women refer to these stories to challenge the
honour and the Islamic identity of their male relatives. Indeed, when the
first American missile hit Afghanistan during the last war, a Muslim girl of
Indonesian origin sent me this little poem, 
If you want to believe that you’re doing all that you can 
then remember Sumayya who lay in the burning sun with blood flowing
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freely from a fatal wound, yet her heart and lips overflowing with La Illahe
Illalah [the Muslim proclamation of faith].
If you want to believe that your struggle is the most difficult 
then remember the wives, sisters and daughters of the Ashab who fought along-
side the Prophet.
Remember Nasiba bint Ka‘b who took her saber [sword] and went to fight with
the Prophet when the archers disobeyed his orders at the battle of Uhud;
Remember Nasiba bint Ka‘b at the battle of Uhud when her son was injured;
Remember how she took care of his wounds and told him to keep on fighting, 
Remember how the Prophet pointed out her son’s injurer and she boldly hit the
mushrik [infidel] across his knees causing him to kneel before her making the
Prophet smile so that his molars showed. 
Remember Nasiba bint Ka‘b and the fire of iman [faith] inside her heart and the
hand she lost during the battle of Yamam;
Remember ‘A’isha, the mother of believers and the pregnant Umm Sulaym who
went with her husband into jihad and remained firmly with the Prophet while
the Muslims fled from the battle of Hunayn,
Remember her fury for the sake of Allah when she asked the Prophet to kill all
of those who had upon the conquest of Makkah accepted Islam but had
turned away when their lives were at stake.
Remember Umm Ayman who gave water to the thirsty and cared for the
wounded at the battles of Uhud, Haybar, Mu‘ti and Hunayn. 
Remember all these Mujahidas [female fighters] and so many more true
Muslimas [Muslim women] who struggled for the cause of Allah, 
Remember them and compare your iman and struggle to attain theirs not to the
shells of women living today and see whether you’re truly an exception or a
poor excuse for a Muslim Woman.
Searching the Internet, I became aware that e-mail by e-mail this little poem
had achieved certain success among Muslim girls. This text confirms the
relevance that the Muslim heroines have for many Muslim women. But at
the same time the total absence of any male figure tells us how Muslim
women feel that Islam needs them because, as in the traditional Islamic
stories, men had fled; Muslim women could save Islam; as Sumayya,
Nasibah, ‘A’isha, Umm Sulaym. However, they have to renounce their role
as mothers and their femininity, jihad has no gender.
Notes 
1. See for instance, Tribalat 1995; Lepoutre 1997; Manço 1999; Souilimas 2000.
2. See for instance, Anwar 1981; Archer 2002; Qureshi and Moores 1999.
3. Algerian sweets made of many layers of paper-thin dough with a filling of
crushed nuts and sugar between layers.
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4. It is interesting to note that Hamas is the Arabic acronym for Harakat al-
Muqawamah al-Islamiyya meaning ‘The Islamic Resistance Movement’. 
5. Muslim immigrant women or their daughters are even less likely to report
aggression and abuse to the Police than their husbands and brothers.
6. The number of Muslim female respondents who believed that Islam was
under attack exceeded the number of my Muslim male respondents holding the
same opinion. 
7. The most virulent campaigns against the last Iraqi war centred around the
figure of the mother. In Scotland soldiers’ mothers have organized protests against
the war. 
8. Other researches (see for instance Buijs 1993; Lutz 1991; Pels. 2000; Salih
2001 and Timmerman 2000) have highlighted this role of ‘guardian of the faith’
that some Muslim women have developed after emigrating. 
9. For a discussion of the honour and shame complex in different societies, see
Abu-Lughod 1996; Gilmore 1987; Murphy 1983; Wikan 1984. 
10. BBC News website, on 30 September 2003: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
england/london/3149030.stm
11. This does not mean that women are not able to work, rather that the most
important economic element of the family should be the man. For this reason
Islam allows working women to keep their salary and contribute to the expenses of
their families only if they want to do so. 
12. More than once, I discovered that some families depended upon the wives’
wages. 
13. Unfortunately, studies concerning domestic violence among immigrant
families (but also non-immigrant) have failed to acknowledge male victims. Men
tend to hide their status as victims within their families but also tend to receive less
support from their peers. 
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CHAPTER 8
Anti-Semitism, Westernophobia and Jihad
People enter the gates of Auschwitz: pilgrims forgiving but not forgetting.
Today, Jews, Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Agnostics, Spiritualists,
Humanists and people with any genre of philosophy, visit the monument to
Nazi hatred. The ashes, which still shame humanity, had spoken different
languages, believed different faiths, hoped for different vanished dreams.
Together (one body over another) were cremated Jews, Muslims,
Christians, Communists, Gypsies, political antagonists and disabled people.
Stop a second and there, in the little wired square, you may hear the silence
of their voice repeating, ‘never again.’ 
Unfortunately, anti-Semitism is still among us, in our jokes, stereotypes,
political language, ideas and behaviours. We can surf the Net and find
many examples of how the experience of the Holocaust can be often denied
or even invoked. The Palestinian–Israeli conflict has ignited waves of anti-
Semitism. Muslims, particularly if they are Arabs, have been singled out as
the new archetypes of ‘anti-Semitism’. Sometimes, the language of some of
my respondents and their conspiracy theories let me wonder whether this
might be the case. They called the Jews names, they blamed them for any
Muslim tragedy and they saw them as the worst creatures on earth. It
would be easy at first glance to admit that the still existing Nazi anti-
Semitism has been supplanted by a new Muslim and Arab anti-Semitism.
Yet I am an anthropologist and I tend not to think that the first glance
should also be the last. As in the case of the word ‘identity’, ‘anti-Semitism’
has often been used without any critical understanding. It is one of those
words that suffer from a long history of clichés. Although, the long, cruel
history of anti-Semitism within and outside Europe is beyond the scope of
this chapter,1 we need to study what anti-Semitism might be before ven-
turing upon the task of understanding what has been called ‘Muslim anti-
Semitism’.
The majority of people are united in condemning anti-Semitism as unac-
ceptable, but laymen as well as experts have been unable to agree on a single
definition. Some time ago, I tested the divergences when I asked some of my
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students, friends and colleagues to suggest their definition of anti-Semitism;
below I categorize their answers, 
1. when people hate Jews;
2. a form of discrimination against Semitic people, such as Jews and Arabs;
3. hostility towards Jews;
4. a form of racism and xenophobia;
5. intolerance towards Judaism;
6. the attempt to destroy the Jews as a people and Israel as a nation;
7. anti-Zionism and hatred against Israel.
I observed that nobody noticed the most important characteristic of anti-
Semitism, the fact that it is informed by fable. Hate or hostility cannot dis-
tinguish anti-Semitism from other existing forms of discrimination and
xenophobia, as Klug (2003), with a good sense of humour, has demon-
strated. 
Klug has used the fictional character of Mary, a London bus conductor,
to make his point. In all these hypothetical scenarios, Mary will repeat the
same action, angrily throwing Rabbi Cohen off her bus. In the first story,
Rabbi Cohen was smoking. Although the Rabbi was wearing his kipah
(which marked his Jewish identity), anti-Semitism has not guided Mary’s
decision to angrily throw Rabbi Cohen off her bus, but the bus company’s
anti-smoking policy. Indeed, whoever wants to smoke on Mary’s bus would
share Rabbi Cohen’s fate (and probably a heavy fine). In the second story,
Rabbi Cohen was singing zemiros (Jewish hymns) at the top of his voice
when Mary promptly angrily threw him off her bus. Again, Klug has argued
that Mary evicted the Rabbi not as a Jew but ‘as a lout’ (Klug 2003: 122).
The third scenario makes Mary a much grimmer character. Mary has been
depicted as a bigot, but she has no clue what a Jew might look like. Mary
spotted Rabbi Cohen on her bus and thought that he was one of the many
foreigners invading her country and challenging her British culture.
Consequently she angrily threw Rabbi Cohen off her bus. Klug has
explained that we might accuse Mary of being xenophobic,2 but certainly
could not define her as anti-Semitic. In the fourth scenario, Mary mistakes
Rabbi Cohen, who has a flowing beard, for a Muslim imam, angrily
throwing Rabbi Cohen off her bus. Of course, in this case, Mary would have
behaved as an Islamophobe but not as an anti-Semite. Finally, Mary knew
that Rabbi Cohen was a Jew and only for this reason did she evict him from
her bus. Klug has suggested that only in this case could we label Mary as anti-
Semitic. But Mary did not hate Rabbi Cohen as a person, rather as the per-
sonification of the ‘Jew’ she had in her mind. 
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Defining anti-Semitism 
Among definitions of anti-Semitism, Fein’s one is the best known and the
most used:
Anti-Semitism is a persisting latent structure of hostile beliefs towards Jews as a
collective manifested in individuals as attitudes, and in culture as myth, ide-
ology, folklore and imagery, and in actions – social or legal discrimination, polit-
ical mobilisation against the Jews, and collective or state violence – which results
in and/or is designed to distance, displace, or destroy Jews as Jews. (1987: 7)
In its report Manifestations of anti-Semitism in the European Union, the
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) has
adopted it and invited others to adopt it (Bergman and Wetzel 2004). Klug
has argued, however, that Fein’s definition needs a tiny but essential edit.
Anti-Semitism means hostility towards Jews as ‘Jews’. In other words, the
inverted commas tell us that the anti-Semitics’ Jews exist only in the anti-
Semites’ minds and not on our streets. Langmuir (1990b) has coined the
neologism chimeria3 to define this characteristic of anti-Semitism. 
However, we might ask why we just do not interpret anti-Semitism like
any other form of xenophobia. Langmuir has answered, ‘Chimerical asser-
tions have no “kernel of truth” while xenophobic have’ (1990b: 334). In
other words, xenophobic stereotypes manipulate real-life elements. To say
that all Italians are ‘Mafiosi’ is certainly xenophobic but it is not a chimeria,
since there is ‘a kernel of truth’ in the fact that some Italians are ‘Mafiosi’.
For the same reason Langmuir has described the hostility against Jews in
ancient Alexandria4 as xenophobic rather than anti-Semitic. By contrast,
chimerical stereotypes formed ideological Nazi anti-Semitism of the 1930s.
Certainly, some medieval myths were utilized to trap European Jews into
enduring chimerias. The historian Langmuir (1990b) has provided us with
some examples of historical chimerias, such as the ‘blood libel’ and ‘ritual
crucifixion’. The ‘blood libel’ accused Jews of killing and drinking Christian
children’s blood each year for the celebration of Passover (Jewish Easter).
Alternatively, the accusation of ritual crucifixion alleged that Jews ritually
crucified a Christian child to mock Jesus’ death. Surprisingly, some of these
chimerical beliefs, such as the blood libel, are still part of anti-Semitic fan-
tasies today. 
Langmuir has suggested that these chimerias started and spread because
of political interests. An example he has provided is that of St William of
Norwich’s beatification. In 1144, villagers in Norwich discovered a young
child’s corpse with alleged signs of crucifixion. Five years later, the local
authorities called the monk Thomas of Monmouth to investigate the murder.
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Thomas of Monmouth concluded that a local Jewish family had ritually cru-
cified the young William of Norwich. Probably, Thomas of Monmouth
turned the incident into one of the most disgraceful lies in history. Langmuir
has suggested Thomas of Monmouth’s interests lay behind his false claim, to
be a part and master of the canonization of St William of Norwich.
These medieval fables won the battle against time and dramatically they
have repeatedly surfaced in modern and contemporary times. The most
notorious example of modern chimeria against the Jewish people is the
Protocols of the Elders of Zion (also known as the Protocols). This was a proven
hoax that the Czarist police fabricated at the end of the 1800s and widely
publicized in 1905. The plan aimed to blame the Russian Jewish population
for the country’s ills. The Protocols purport to be the minutes of the Jewish
ruling clique’s secret meetings describing a complex plot to take control of
the world. Unsurprisingly the Protocols found a privileged place in Hitler’s
Mein Kampf (1933). Langmuir has acknowledged that the term anti-
Semitism might be useful to designate ‘the peculiarly horrifying example
that marked European culture for seven centuries and killed millions of
victims during the “Final Solution”’. But he has also observed: ‘If we con-
tinue to use that literal term, we as social scientists, should free “anti-
semitism” from its racist, ethnocentric, or religious implications’ (1990b:
352). Langmuir’s arguments have appealed to and influenced many stu-
dents of anti-Semitism such as Bergmann (1998), Chevalier (1998), Fein
(1987) and Poliakov (1993). Yet Langmuir’s position has attracted not only
praise but also strong, often ideological, criticism. 
Smith has branded Langmuir’s analysis as ‘significantly flawed’ (1996:
212). Smith has alleged that Langmuir’s chimeria have overgeneralized the
concept of anti-Semitism. She has polemically suggested that ‘chimeria’ is
so general that scholars might even apply it to witchcraft accusations (1996:
212). But this observation of Smith indicates the degree of her misunder-
standing of Langmuir’s ‘chimeria’. Smith has failed to notice that, following
Langmuir’s distinctions between chimeria and other forms of stereotype,
witchcraft accusations have a ‘kernel of truth’, something that anti-Semitism
does not. Witchcraft accusations often stem from exaggerations of ‘real
facts’ among people living in a superstitious society (see, for instance,
Evans-Pritchard 1956). 
Smith’s article reveals, however, less academic and more political reasons
for rejecting Langmuir’s viewpoint. Her concept of chimeria may deprive
anti-Semitism of its uniqueness. Indeed, Smith has warned her readers:
Not every exaggeration is equal. Not every lie is a Big Lie … Muslims and
Asians or Turkish migrants may be reviled, but currently only Jews have the mis-
fortune to be the object of a globally diffused conspiracy theory. … Not until fear
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of ‘fanatical Islam’ is as delusional as Manichaean antisemitism will it qualify as
a form of chimeria; and even then it would remain a minor chimera until it cap-
tures the imaginations of tens of millions of people. (1996: 225, emphasis
added)
Although Smith wrote before 9/11, it is certainly difficult to argue that
chimeria have not affected Islam and Muslims. Even a superficial knowledge
of medieval representations concerning Muslims and Islam or reading
Dante’s Divine Comedy or a casual visit to Bologna’s main church, San
Petronio, would disclose the chimerias that Muslims suffered.5 But for
Smith could anti-Semitism be regarded as a unique phenomenon? Because
according to Smith the ‘mythical Jew’ is the symbol of ‘democracy demo-
nized’. In other words, anti-Semities hate Jews because they hate democ-
racy:
The antisemite’s enemy is the authoritarian nightmare, the democrat perceived
as anarchist (personified as Antichrist). This is why the mythopoesis of anti-
Jewish chimeria has special appeal for antidemocrats. Democratic opponents are
eternally present in potentia. ‘The Jew’ as master metaphor for this eternal
enemy, can never be destroyed, no matter what happens to actual Jews. Every
new antiauthoritarian current can be subsumed under the rubric ‘Jewish’.
(1996: 233)
Smith’s point of view may sound very Judaeo-centric, but the reason we may
cast doubts on this theory is that some historical facts ask us to reject the
alleged axiomatic relationship between anti-democracy and anti-Semitism.
For example, not all Jewish people have been pro-democratic and not all
anti-democracies have been anti-Semitic. For instance, Fascism and anti-
democratic regimes fascinated Jabotinsky, a Zionist leader (Brenner 1983)
and in Chile, under the anti-democratic and oppressive Pinochet’s rule,
Jews did not suffer from anti-Semitic6 attitudes. 
Langmuir’s distinction between stereotypes and chimerias remains a valid
and good guide in our attempt to understand whether today Muslims are
becoming anti-Semitic or, as some commentators in Israel have suggested,
the international jihad is nothing other than a jihad against Jews and Israel. 
The Qur’an as the Muslim Mein Kampf? Discussing
Misleading Interpretations 
In the early 1980s, after the shocking Iranian revolution, Daniel Pipes (a
historian by training and a controversial journalist and politician by voca-
tion) together with Bernard Lewis (1986) called for a greater awareness
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within and outside academia of the danger that Muslim anti-Semitism may
present for Jewish people. Like Smith, Pipes, in his article ‘the politics of
Muslims anti-Semitism’ (1981) reminded us that anti-Semitism should
refer only to anti-Jewish sentiments and not, as some have suggested, to
Semites in general. He invited his readers to observe that Arabs7 ‘are as
capable of this [anti-Semitism] as anyone speaking an Indo-European lan-
guage’. Nevertheless, Pipes had to recognize that Jews, despite Muslims
considering them as dhimmi,8 had lived better and safer under Islamic rulers
than under Christian kings. Pipes’s historical interpretation of such an
‘unexpected’ phenomenon suggested that Islam, far from being tolerant,
had relegated the Jewish population to being second-class citizens. In the
article, he has argued that such a degrading status for the Jewish population
prevented Muslims from developing anti-Semitism, at least until the cre-
ation of the state of Israel. 
Let me say that, as with many other of Pipes’s articles, his argument mis-
leads more than it clarifies. The state of dhimmi did not imply a ‘second-
class citizen status’. Indeed, I doubt that Muslims even had the concept of
‘second-class citizens’ we possess today. In medieval kingdoms money,
power and knowledge, more than religion, ethnicity and nationality, made
status. Medieval Spanish documents prove that Islamic courts employed
Jewish teachers, military commanders and accountants. Reguer (2000) has
explained that in Muslim societies, although dhimmi, Jews could reach
influential positions. He has provided us with the example of Samuel ibn
Nagrela:
Samuel ibn Nagrela [a Jew], who rose to become vizier [adviser of the khalifa]
of Granada, was a statesman, poet, scholar and military commander. His polit-
ical career marks the highest achievement of a Jew in medieval Muslim Spain.
In 1027, the Jews conferred on him the title of nagid, designating him head of
the community. (2000: 134)
Pipes’s argument may suffer from faulty reasoning. Had the second-class
position of Jews within Muslim societies saved them from anti-Semitism, in
Christian Europe, where Jewish populations suffered ostracism and perse-
cution rather than second-class status, the pernicious and long-standing
anti-Semitism we can observe until today would have been non-existent.
The reason why this is not the case is that Pipes’s argument does not work. 
Surely Pipes has appeared more convincing while arguing that the eigh-
teenth-century colonial experiences had an influence on the formation of
Muslim anti-Semitism. He has argued that the colonial forces employed
Jewish people within their administration since Western colonizers trusted
the hated Jews more than the ‘barbaric’ Arabs. According to Pipes, Muslims
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saw their former Jewish dhimmi achieve power and control over the Muslim
population. Consequently, they borrowed anti-Semitic Western discourse to
attack the former dhimmi. Yet this ‘jealousy’ hypothesis appears very weak
and simplistic. Unfortunately, Pipes’s academic arguments stop here since
his ‘anti’ anti-Semitism is increasingly coloured by political anti-Arab and
anti-Muslim thinking. Pipes has aimed to show that Muslims and Nazis
share and shared their hate for Jewish people. Therefore, he has reminded
us of the collusion between Muslim (in particular Palestinian and Arab)
leaders and the 1930s’ German Nazi government. By contradicting his pre-
vious arguments, Pipes has suggested that such a controversial relationship
had its historical root in Islam itself because the Prophet, according to Pipes
had some ‘uneven relations’ with Jews.9
Pipes has reminded his readers of the contacts that some Palestinian
leaders had with Nazi and Fascist leaders. However, he has omitted another
grim side of the dirty political battle for Jerusalem. Both some Arabs and
some Zionist leaders (the so-called Zionist-Revisionists) had contacts with
the German Nazi and Italian Fascist regimes in the attempt to achieve the
same goal: a nation for their people in the contended Holy Land. While
Arabs attempted to contact the Nazi authorities, in November 1934 the
Zionist-Revisionists convinced ‘Mussolini [to] set up a Betar squadron at
his scuola marittima at Civitavecchia, where 134 [Jewish] cadets were trained
by the notorious Blackshirts; in 1936, Il Duce himself reviewed his Zionist
wards’ (Brenner 1983, but see also the Encyclopaedia Judaica 1972: 175).
Why should we be so surprised that both Arab and Zionists leaders tried to
bargain with what they considered European superpowers? Both sides were
only interested in the land rather than ethics. To read these historical events
as the ultimate evidence of Arab anti-Semitism derived from the Qur’an or
as the ultimate proof that Zionism is the Jewish version of Fascism would be
seriously misleading and unethical. 
In 1997, Pipes issued another of his ‘fatwas’ against Muslim anti-
Semitism. This time his title featured the word ‘new’ in front of the old
‘Muslim anti-Semitism’. In this more controversial article, he has labelled
as anti-Semitic not just Arabs but Muslims: ‘Antisemitism, historically a
Christian phenomenon, is now primarily a Muslim phenomenon … Muslims
today are the most vibrant and explicit antisemites … Jewish organisations
should devote less of their resources to the Christian right and more to fun-
damentalist Islam’ (1997: 2 emphases added). In this article Pipes has
appeared more interested in rehabilitating the extreme American Christian
right from its anti-Semitic ‘sins’ than in presenting a realistic analysis of
anti-Semitic attitudes among Muslims. Despite Pipes arguing that Islam
may facilitate anti-Semitism, he has at least avoided the common mistake of
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presenting the Qur’an as the Muslim Mein Kampf. By contrast, Kramer
(1998) has observed ‘It is a sign of the times that the study of Islam today,
far from being an escape from anti-Semitism, is more likely to be an immer-
sion in it.’ Kramer has ‘discovered’ ‘the origin of [Muslim] anti-Semitism’
inside the Qur’an and in Muhammad’s frustration with the Arabian Jewish
tribes that had rejected the Prophet’s message. Nevertheless, Kramer
himself has accepted that the Qur’an lacks the ‘eternal Jew’ that Christian
societies had developed.
Thus, Kramer has hypothesized that contacts with the Christian West
enhanced the anti-Semitic features of both the Qur’an and Sunna. Yet
Kramer, a scholar convinced of the beneficial effects of colonialism on
Arabs and Muslims, could not, as at least Pipes suggested, blame Western
civilizing campaigns for this ‘enhancement’. Kramer blamed the Muslim
immigrants invading Western countries, who, in this way, became exposed
to anti-Semitic ideas and, like an infection that found good terrain, brought
them back to their Islamic world. Kramer strongly believes that a solution
to the Middle East conflicts would not defuse Muslim anti-Semitism,
‘neither a break with tradition, nor a diminishing of the injustice, will stop
it. It exists above all because it is needed to complete an irrational logic’
(Kramer 1998), which, according to him, wishes the extermination of Jews.
But do not be mistaken, this has nothing to do with Hitler’s ideology,
rather Kramer has revealed that Muslims wish to exterminate the Jews to
revenge their arrogant denial of Muhammad’s prophecy. Here it is easy to
spot Kramer’s political reasoning composed as an academic argument.
Muslims are anti-Semitic just because they are Muslims, so do not blame
Israel’s occupation of Palestine and American policies in the Middle East.
Kramer’s argument may even suggest that Israel has the right to occupy
and civilize Palestinians; otherwise Muslims, with their endogenous anti-
Semitism, would wipe out the only democracy in the region (Kramer
1998). 
Kramer has an essentialist approach to Islam, and, as we have seen in
the introduction, his interpretation is based on the idea that the Qur’an
exists above and beyond Muslims’ interpretations. Although Kramer and
extremist Muslims would agree that Islam is only one, we know that
Muslims do have different opinions on Islam and anti-Semitism.
Emotions, feelings and environment influence the ways in which they read
the Qur’an, the hadith and live Islam. We may certainly find Muslims who
think exactly what Kramer would like them to think but these Muslims do
not develop their extremist views starting from Islam or, as Kramer and
others seem to suggest, because the Qur’an is an older version of Mein
Kampf. 
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The ‘Anti’ Anti-Semitism and New Chimerias 
Earlier we saw that Smith has suggested that Muslims never suffered from
chimeria. Smith has probably never read Bat Ye‘or (a pseudonym meaning
‘daughter of the Nile’). Bat Ye’or is certainly a less romantic scholar than
her name might suggest. She mixes concepts such as jihad, dhimmitude and
anti-Semitism to form what we can read as anti-Muslim Protocols (see Bat
Ye‘or 2004). To understand her ‘scholarly’ production it is necessary to
know that she is an independent Jewish scholar living in Switzerland who
suffered the emotional experience of exile when in 1948 Egypt expelled,
among others, her family. Reading her last production, incessantly less aca-
demic but increasingly influential in the discussion of Muslim anti-
Semitism, we may get the impression that Bat Ye‘or is crusading against
Islam and Muslims. 
Her argument is popularly straightforward; Islam means submission, all
contemporary Muslims dream of submiting non-Muslims and transforming
them into dhimmi. So, Muslims conduct two jihads, one violent and crim-
inal, the other manipulative in trying to Islamicize the European political
left. This is the gist of Bat Ye‘or’s main argument. Recently she has con-
cluded,
Europe’s hidden war against Israel is wrapped in the Palestinian flag, and is part
of a global movement that is transforming Europe into a new continent of dhim-
mitude within a world strategy of jihad and da’wa, the latter being the pacific
method of Islamization. The implementation program [sic] of this policy of
dhimmitude for the Euro-Arabian continent [sic] is set forth in the Rapport du
Comite de Sages submitted to the European Commission President Romano
Prodi in October 2003. This program, entitled ‘Dialogue between Peoples and
Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean region’ was accepted by the European
Union in December 2003. Unfortunately, the policy of ‘Dialogue’ with Arab
League nations, wilfully pursued by Europe for the past three decades, has pro-
moted European dhimmitude and rabid Judeophobia. (Bat Ye‘or 2004)
Not only does Bat Ye‘or have to decontextualize the Islamic concept of
dhimmi but she has also suggested that Muslims could use it in the same
way they have done since the time of the first khalifa. She has tried to create
new chimeria in which Muslims are the conspirators against the Judaeo-
Christian civilized world. A new ‘Protocols’, a new chimeria: a new
Holocaust? This, of course, is a provocative question, but the process
through which Europeans discriminated against Jews as the enemy within
and then persecuted them does not appear to be so different from the ways
in which some scholars and politicians have demonized Muslims as the
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‘anti-civilizing’ forces attacking our democracies. Someone who thinks that
these anti-Muslim chimerias would not have any impact on academia and
political circles might discover that such anti-Muslim arguments have
already found willing ears (see for instance Bodansky 1999; Wistrich 2002). 
Although we must reject such ideologized and misleading anti-Muslim
arguments, we have to acknowledge that something is going wrong among
young European Muslims. The European Monitoring Centre on Racism
and Xenophobia (EUMC) has recently observed (Bergmann and Wetzel
2004) that young Muslims have verbally and physically attacked Jewish
people and institutions. However, again politics has overwhelmed scientific
accuracy, the report that the EUMC commissioned from Bergmann and
Wetzel (2004) was supposed to be an analysis of all forms of European anti-
Semitism. On the contrary, Bergmann and Wetzel have written a j’accuse
against all European Muslims. Even worse, it has been discovered that the
Bergmann and Wetzel report is far from being an original piece of analysis;
it is a patchwork10 of other more politically and ideologically motivated
studies, among which the most dilapidated was Wistrich (2002). 
Wistrich (2002), in his approach to Muslim anti-Semitism, has quoted and
adopted the works of Pipes and Bat Ye‘or. Wistrich has tried to convince his
audience that Islam is as violent and anti-Semitic as Nazism had been. Like
others who before him decided to support such a false argument, Wistrich
(who is Neuberger Professor of Modern European and Jewish History at the
Hebrew University in Jerusalem) has fragmented and decontextualized the
Qur’anic suras and selected controversial hadiths to suit his argument. Then,
like Pipes, Wistrich has emphasized the historical links that existed between
Palestinian leaders, Arabs, Muslims and the Nazis in 1930s.11 Wistrich’s
work (on which the reputation of the EUMC’s report is based) has even sug-
gested that the perpetrators of 9/11 knew about Hitler’s dream of burning
New York and, as good Nazis, implemented it (Wistrich 2002: 15). 
Wistrich’s political discourse highlights another interesting argument
within some contemporary ideologically right-wing ‘anti’ anti-Semitism.
Wistrich has (probably rightly) argued that the majority of Muslims share
anti-Zionist and anti-Israel sentiments. Yet to support his viewpoint, he has
ventured into a very controversial syllogism to affirm that, since Zionism,
Israel and Judaism are the same reality, Muslims who criticize Zionism are
in reality spreading anti-Semitic propaganda. In other words, Wistrich has
supported the idea that Israel has substituted for the ‘Jew’, Israel embodies
Jewishness and Judaism. Consequently, Wistrich has told us that today anti-
Semitism ‘is nothing else that Israelphobia.’ 
Wistrich’s argument is flawed in many respects but what makes it unac-
ceptable is that he imposes a social ‘Israeli identity’ upon all the Jewish
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people, some of whom might have developed other identities and would
reject such a generalization.12 However controversial his idea might be,
Bergmann and Wetzel’s EUMC report has officially institutionalized it:
today ‘Israel is the “Jew”’:
In the form of anti-Semitism it could be said that the tradition of demonising
Jews in the past is now being transferred to the state of Israel. In this way, traditional
anti-Semitism is translated into a new form, less deprived of legitimacy, whose
employment today in Europe could become part of the political mainstream.
(2004: 10, emphasis added)
They end ten pages later by presenting anti-Zionism as anti-Semitism:
a form of anti-Semitism, because Zionism is described by the extreme right, the
extreme left and also by parts of Arab-Muslim circles as the evil of the world and
therefore can be used easily as a wanted scapegoat. This implies the fight against
the existence of Israel. (2004: 22)
Nevertheless, this new definition of anti-Semitism has not convinced the
majority of experts on anti-Semitism. Klug has gone even further and sug-
gested that such a parallel between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism may be
a political attempt to put Zionism and possibly controversial Israeli military
backlashes, beyond discussion and criticism:
In short, the empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports the view that hostility
towards Israel, at bottom, is not a new form of antisemitism; it is a function of
a deep and bitter political conflict … They [Arabs and Muslims] see the state
[Israel] through the lens of their own history and their own interests, and why
shouldn’t they? … But, if Palestinians and people who take their side are par-
tisan, this does not mean they are being anti-Semitic, they are just not being
Jewish. The mere fact that they are biased does not make them anti-Semitic, any
more than those whose sympathies lie with Israel are ipso facto Islamophobic.
(2003: 133)
I provide here an example that may support Klug’s view. In May 2004, the
Israeli army conducted some internationally condemned retaliation raids in
southern Gaza which killed and injured mainly Palestinian civilians. On 20
May, BBC News Online collected interviews from Israeli citizens;13 some of
their comments showed an appalling lack of sympathy towards the suffering
innocent Palestinian families. For example, Ranaan Bavli, forty-four, said ‘I
don’t think that collective punishment is the intention of this raid. But even
if it is, I think that this is justified because I think the whole Palestinian pop-
ulation supports the terror and you never hear voices against it.’ Could we
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label Ranna Bavil as Islamophobic or anti-Palestinian? To do so would be
misleading and cheap propaganda rhetoric. Mr Bavil, like others who have
expressed similar viewpoints, see themselves as involved in an endless con-
flict and, like many Palestinians and Muslims, as emotionally trapped in a
similar circle of panic. 
Today there is a need to understand what has been called (or miscalled)
Muslim anti-Semitism. Kressel (2004) has rightly observed that there are
few studies on ‘Islamic anti-Semitism’, particularly in the field of social sci-
ences. Nevertheless, I deeply disagree with Kressel’s general idea of ‘Islamic
anti-Semitism’ and particularly with his opinion that only Jewish and Israeli
scholars could successfully and without bias study the subject. Indeed, if we
do not distance ourselves from the political implications of anti-Semitism
and its entanglement with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, we could never
answer the question, why increasing numbers of immigrants and Western-
born Muslims use and develop ‘anti-Semitic’ attitudes. 
Anti-Semitism or Westernophobia? 
It is Friday, the day of the sermon: the imam of the mosque stands up in
front of the congregation. Bethlehem besieged, the Middle East in turmoil,
the congregation angrier than ever. The imam gives an impromptu speech,
something unusual for him. His voice emotionally sends a message of hope:
the Palestinians’ sufferings will be rewarded; and the oppressor’s arrogance
punished. This is Allah’s promise: justice. Pause, then he adds ‘In the same
sura Allah says that those following Jewish as well as Christian scripture with
a sincere heart, will be saved on the Day of Judgement’. Another emphatic
pause, then, the imam stresses slowly, ‘Allah will not punish a Jew only
because he is a Jew but because of his or her personal evil actions. Sharon
will not go to hell because he is a Jewish person but because he is a bad Jew
who is doing evil actions against his religion.’ As the imam ends his sermon,
I can hear some worshippers whispering, one of them clearly complaining to
another, ‘Is he really saying that Jews will be in al-janna [paradise]?’ The
other, smirking, ‘maybe he [the imam] likes to have pigs in paradise’. 
As Muslims differ in their nationalities, ethnicities and languages, so they
differ in their opinions and interpretations of their Holy Book. In that con-
gregation, many appreciated the imam’s khutba, some opposed it and others
denigrated it. I came to know that the imam had decided to say what he said
because he knew that the deteriorating conflict in the Middle East and the
besieged Church of the Nativity (in which some Palestinian gunmen had
found refuge) were exacerbating the congregation’s anger against Jews.
Although I believe that the end of the Middle East conflict might decrease
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Islamophobic and anti-Arabic attitudes among Jewish people, I am very
sceptical that it might stop ‘anti-Semitic’ feelings among immigrant and
Western-born Muslims. 
The end of October 2003, Ramadan: the shadows over a destabilized
Iraq, the constant deaths of Palestinian civilians, and the torments and suf-
ferings of Chechen Muslims irremediably mark this joyful event. I do not
know many people in this local Muslim community but the Holy Month is
the ideal time for starting new friendships and trying to find an inner peace.
After a while I visit the same mosque, I meet a group of North Africans.
Hakim, Samir and Rabah are Algerians, Mohammed and Sayf Moroccans
and Hazim Tunisian. We speak of this and that, when Hakim asks if I watch
al-Manar. They seem quite disappointed when I told them that I have still
not bought a satellite TV, 
Sayf: So you do not know Al-shatat? 
Me: No, what is it? (They seem to enjoy my lack of knowledge.)
Hazim: Well … it is a TV series written for this Ramadan. Al-Manar is broad-
casting the series and it’s such a success! You must …
Rabbah: (interrupting) I do not like it. You know, it says such incredible things
that I can’t believe the stories. I think that at the end these stories damage us,
I mean, us, the Muslims. 
Hazim: (pointing his finger toward Rabbah) You don’t know any Jews, do you? We
have lots of them in Tunisia and we know that they do lots of strange things.
Believe me I have heard lots of strange stories about Jews and their secret
rituals. 
Mohammed: Hey, I think that Jibril [my name in Arabic] needs some info about
the series. I don’t think he could understand anything of what we are saying,
(looking toward me) eh, Jibril you could not understand but it is simple … the …
Hazim: (interrupting) … look, Jibril, it’s [Al-shatat] the real history of Zionism,
that Allah will destroy all of them inshallah (the others say inshallah). The
authors knew that people would accuse them so they used only Jewish texts,
sources; to document the dirty things Zionists have done and do even today
everywhere they live. 
Sayf: They [Zionists] are so evil … you must watch it, we know that you are a
nice guy but if you see what these people do you cannot worry. They killed a
Christian child to drink his blood and even killed a Jew in such a horrible way
only because he refused to do what Zionists said … 
Me: Ermm, I see …
Rabbah: I don’t like it, but I will tell you the truth, there are some professors
working in prestigious universities that helped [to produce the fiction] … I
don’t know what to say … but maybe opening his arms …some of what they
say could be correct … well … I still think that today these things sound too
incredible … but what to say … today we read incredible things that then are
true like you and me …
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Mohammed: (to Rabbah) Be careful! You start to trust the West too much. You
are becoming like them [people in the West] and this is not good for you … 
Hakim: Rabbah look, Jews have infected the West with their wrong ideas and
practice but they became like that because they Westernized after the Romans
destroyed their temple. You see, they want everything, they cry and cry and
want to show that they are weak and victims, but in reality they are respon-
sible for lots of things. They [Western countries] lost their colonies so they
sent their Jews to take back our lands and control the region. Who has created
Israel? Americans. And they have done so because they hoped that these pigs
would spread the Western corruption to the Islamic world by force, but they
failed, or buying corrupt Arab and Muslim regimes, and they in this case
succeed. You know, Arab politicians are easily corrupted … is it not the same
in Italy, Jibril? 
Me: Well … we had our problems … uhmm … corruption is everywhere … 
Hazim: You are right Hakim, the Jews are the worst part of the West, they rep-
resent the worst, they are the worst colonizers and they like power but they
depend on Americans and Europeans … [the conversation goes on]
Although from the conversation, I expected that Al-shatat would be aston-
ishingly anti-Jewish, I could not appreciate the level of anti-Semitism the
series broadcast until I had occasion to watch some of it. Al-shatat employs
conspiracy theories similar to those presented in the Protocols as well as a
certain number of medieval chimerical aberrations such as the ‘blood libel’. 
The spread of xenophobic and chimerical stories are not limited to
Muslim men. Some Muslim women told me that Jewish soldiers system-
atically rape Muslim women because Jewish women are frustrated.
Palestinian houses are demolished without reason because Jewish people
believe that the destruction of a Muslim house brings fertility to their fam-
ilies and Jews even kill Muslim children in order to have transplant organs
to save their own children. Other stereotypes focus on the violence within
the Jewish families and the lust of Jewish men. I have also recorded dis-
approving expressions such as ‘I’m not a Jewish woman’, ‘These are things
that only Jewish women do’ and so forth. Many reasons might be brought
to the fore to explain why some Muslims may have resentments toward
Israel and Jews, such as the conflict in the Middle East, which has
acquired a global and symbolic meaning that goes far beyond the territo-
rial issues. Yet these arguments do not answer the questions that many
Western people and Jews seem to ask: ‘are Muslims (or some of them) as
anti-Semitic as the Nazis were? Is Muslim anger directed against Israel as
the “Jew”?’
My answer to both questions is negative. Analysing how Muslims speak
of Jewish people and Israel, I have found a constant that I can express in 
an equation Colonialism : Israel :: West : America. Yet, this equation needs to
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be flanked by a second: Islam : Justice :: West : a-Justice. I prefer the term 
a-justice rather than injustice because many Muslim respondents have often
emphasized that ‘the West’ lacks the very concept of justice which for
Muslims can only be divine. For instance, Qays, a 29-year-old Western-
born Muslim of Bangladeshi origin, told me that Americans and their allies
could not understand their ‘unjust actions’ because they ‘genuinely think
that they were bringing Justice when they were spreading unacceptable
injustice’. He explained that Americans could not have done it differently
because their justice is based on human values and is not divinely guided.
When I asked how Muslims could achieve the justice they needed, Qays
mentioned jihad as the way to impose what was right and forbid what is
wrong. 
Many Muslims see Jewish people as colonizers, Israel as a colony, and
both of them as Western products. Hakim’s idea that the Western powers have
replaced their direct colonialism with Jewish explicit and implicit colo-
nialism is not an isolated opinion, but a spreading commonplace among
young Muslims. For instance, Jamila, a 20-year-old girl of Pakistani origin
observed,
It was different before the al-nakba [the catastrophe]. Muslims and Jews had
many things in common, they shared places and lifestyles. Although they had a
lot of things in common with Muslims and they were part of the ummah for a
while today they have changed because they have become part of the West, and
the West today is against divine justice. 
From a Muslim perspective, a-Justice is nothing less than jahiliyya (a state
of ignorance, a term also applied to pre-Islamic societies). Some Muslims
fear that jahiliyya could spread among themselves and affect their identities.
By fighting Western jahiliyya these Muslims fight their fears, the most
threatening of which is to lose their sense of Islamic ‘I’. Some Muslims use
Western prefabricated discourses of anti-Semitism. Others, like Rabbah, are
aware that these anti-Semitic discourses are only propaganda. Yet they do
not speak against it. They feel that discrediting these chimerias against the
‘Jew’ would accredit jahiliyya and the most power symbol of it: ‘the West’. 
Conclusion
Some of the scholars we have discussed in this chapter have argued that
Muslims are anti-Semitic because of Islam. They have scrutinized Islamic
history, the Qur’an and the Sunna looking for the roots of such Islamic anti-
Semitism. Breaking up suras, isolating lines, employing weak hadiths, high-
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lighting some historical events and de-emphasizing others, they have cer-
tainly succeeded in finding what they looked for. Recent events such as the
kidnapping and brutal beheading of Jewish hostages such as Daniel Pearl
and Nick Berg have reinforced the idea of Muslims as dangerous people
because of their faith. These arguments originate from a sort of faulty logic,
arguing that human beings become the expression of their religions.
However, as with any other religion, people can find in the Islamic faith and
sources whatever they want to find. My criticism of the previously discussed
analysis of ‘Muslim Anti-Semitism’ is that the ideological and political
efforts to label Islam as anti-Semitic as Nazism fail to provide a real answer
to why some Muslim immigrants and their children increasingly employ
chimerical representations of Jews. 
Lewis (2000 and 2003) has argued that Muslims failed in their modern-
ization because they rejected the separation of church and state, the path
that brought Europe towards modern secularism. For this reason, according
to Lewis, the Islamic countries, which used to be the advanced societies,
witnessed the rise of Western culture and technology and the consequent
decline of their Islamic states. Lewis argues that Muslims have still not
found an answer to their decline but instead of blaming their religio-
political system, they have victimized the West, which for this reason they
have learnt to hate. Lewis’s historical reconstruction highlights what may be
called a ‘jealousy theory’. In fact, Lewis has suggested that the decline of the
Islamic state was just the effect of the structure of its religion, Islam, which
did not allow the state, as well as Muslims, a modernization comparable to
that enjoyed by the West. Lewis does not mention colonialism and the
Western post-colonial countries preserving their economic and geopolitical
interests as one of the most important factors contributing to the crisis of the
Islamic world. 
As an anthropologist, I prefer to suggest a different, if not opposite, sce-
nario. It was not the lack of adaptation to Western models that undermined
what Islamic societies had achieved, but rather the unsuccessful attempt to
mimic them. The attempt to mimic Western models prevented the Muslim
world from discovering its preferred route toward modernity. The mimicry
of the West is evident in the case of Arab nationalism. The religio-political
views of Islam do not promote the idea of nations, rather they exalt the
concept of ummah. 
Langmuir (1990b) has contributed to the understanding of anti-Semitism
by distinguishing between xenophobia and chimeria. We have seen that
‘Muslim anti-Semitism’ does not derive from an ideological and planned
anti-Semitism as in the case of Nazi ideology. Rather, these ‘anti-Semitic’
attitudes should be interpreted as a symptomatic expression of the ‘circle of
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panic’ spreading among many Muslims that Western jahiliyya could not
only wipe Islam from the earth but also erase their Muslim identity. Today,
Muslims wish to reject the passivity affecting the Islamic world. Some
Muslims feel threatened by the continuous contact they have with ‘Western
jahiliyya’. They see Jewish people as the negative example of a successful
assimilation within the imagined and so-called monolithic West. Jewish
people, who used to be an integral part of the Muslim world are not any
longer. These Muslims think that the same corruption thought to have
affected Jews could disrupt their Islamic identity. The circle of panic starts,
so the emotions and feelings connect. Indeed, behind the anti-Semitic atti-
tudes of some Muslims Westernophobia may epiphany. 
Notes 
1. Readers interested in a historical viewpoint may read Katz 1982, Langmuir
1990a and 1990b. 
2. Xenophobia is hatred of people that natives perceive as outsiders. 
3. The root of ‘chimeria’ comes from ancient Greek, referring to a hideous
monster. 
4. In 68 BCE, and again in 38 BCE, the Egyptians organized themselves against
the Jews of Alexandria. In particular, the 38 BCE revolt against Jewish people was
apparently caused by the privileges that some Jews had. 
5. In both, Muhammad is depicted as co-Lucifer in the Hell. 
6. But of course, the Jews opposing the regime were persecuted not as Jews but
as rebels. 
7. It is important to note that, despite using ‘Muslim’ in the title, throughout
the article, Pipes speaks of Arabs. 
8. Dhimmi indicates what Muslims called ‘the people of protection’: free non-
Muslims who were levied in Muslim countries. By paying a tax called jizyah, non-
Muslims were granted the freedom to practise their religion and the protection of
the Muslim army. 
9. I wonder whether it might be the Jewish tribes that initially had ‘uneven rela-
tions’ with Muhammad and his new religion. Indeed, as the case of Christianity
may show, from a Jewish perspective all these ‘new sects’ were only heretical ver-
sions of their true religion.
10. See, for example, pages 7–8 of the report. 
11. Of course, Wistrich did not mention the similar contacts that some Zionist
circles had. 
12. For instance, on 18 July 2004, during a meeting of the American Jewish
Association in Jerusalem, Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister, invited all Jewish
people in the world and in particular French Jews, to leave their actual countries
and move to their ‘real home’. Sharon was arguing that the five million Muslims
were an unacceptable threat to the French Jews. The French Jewish community
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has rejected Sharon’s fundamentalist appeal, arguing that their home is in France,
where Jewish people have contributed to establishing a democratic, multicultural
nation. 
13. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3728137.stm 
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CHAPTER 9
Conclusion: The Sword of Damocles 
Damocles lived in Greece under a despotic king, Dionysius, who was his
best friend. Indeed, the tyrant’s wealth only surpassed his cruelty. One day,
during a party, Damocles addressed his cruel friend with these words,
‘Lucky you! You can have everything that any man could wish.’ The king
asked Damocles if for one day he would like to be Dionysius. Damocles,
fascinated by his friend’s power and wealth, accepted the offer without
thinking twice. Dionysius exchanged the throne with Damocles, who imme-
diately started to enjoy the king’s life. However, when Damocles had the
chance to look up toward the ceiling of the room, he saw something that
frightened him to death: a sharp sword attached to horsehair hanging over
his head, ‘Get me out of here! I am your friend!’ screamed Damocles.
Laughing, Dionysius replied, ‘You wanted to be me, but I am not only the
most rich but also the most hated; my life is endangered each second I am
the king. So, I have a sword over my head all the time.’ Damocles under-
stood and was happy to give back the throne to his friend. Indeed, it is not
nice to live with a sharp sword over one’s head. 
Today, different swords are over our heads but we do not have someone
with whom we may exchange places. The throne that we wanted and
achieved is modernity, of which globalization represents the richest pearl.
During these last two centuries, our social life has changed as never before:
faster, global, entangled with unknown others. Yet in many aspects we,
human beings, are still the same. Despite the ‘evolution’ from Homo sapiens
to ‘Homo technologicus’, we still depend, as most of our ancient ancestors
did, on those bodily changes and reactions that our relationship with the
environment provokes. In this book, following Damasio’s observations, I
have called such automatic reactions ‘emotions’ and explained how they are
perceived in the form of feelings that may affect the human self (Chapter 3).
I have argued that emotions and subsequent feelings are fundamental to an
understanding of Muslim interpretations of jihad, because jihad can only
exists within a mind and without consciousness the personal mental object
we call ‘jihad’ would never have existed. 
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Today, a minority of individuals feel that to be Muslim allows one to fly
planes against buildings, kill children on their first day of school, blow them-
selves up among innocent people at a tube station and call it jihad. At the
same time a majority who feel they are Muslim reject and condemn these
actions and call them mass murder. In Jihad beyond Islam, I have argued that
it is only by focusing on that ‘feeling to be’ rather than the ‘Muslim’, that
we can go to the root of these tragic events. Traditionally, social scientists
have studied societies. Anthropologists, for instance, have relegated the
individual to the far-flung parts of their interpretations. For a long time, any
attempt to foreground an individual as part of a composite society would
expose the adventurous scholar to the denigrating label of being ethnocen-
tric. In the study of jihad this lack of focus on individual identities has, to
use a Batesonian (2002) expression, facilitated the mistake of seeing the
map as the actual territory. Many religious, social, political and economic
factors have been suggested for the different understandings of jihad among
Muslims. Yet by starting from the viewpoint of individuals, in Jihad beyond
Islam I have demonstrated that some radical Muslims do not speak of and
act for ‘jihad’ because they are Muslims but rather they feel Muslim because
of jihad (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). 
I have suggested that many Muslims today may be subjected to a schis-
mogenetic process that I have called ‘the circle of panic’. Through contacts
with different emotional triggers, such as pangs of guilt about the status of
Muslims and Islam, rejection from host societies (Chapter 4); shocking
images and particularly TV reportage of Muslim tragedies around the world
(Chapter 5); challenges of identity and loyalty (Chapter 6); emotional
dynamics of gender relationships (Chapter 7); and fear of Westernization
(Chapter 8), the idea has arisen that Islam (seen as religion but also as an
element of identity) is under attack from ‘the circle of panic’. The circle of
panic, being schismogenetic, changes the relationship between the autobio-
graphic self and identity, so that to stop the identity crisis an ‘act of identity’
becomes required. The rumour producing this circle of panic not only sug-
gests that Crusaders are attacking Islam but also that the West is spreading
jahiliyya among Muslims, weakening Muslims’ Islamic identity. In Chapter
8, I have explained how the fear of jahiliyya plays a role in the anti-Semitic
attitudes of some Muslim immigrants and Western-born Muslims. Rejecting
essentialistic theories, which tend to scrutinize the Qur’an to collect evi-
dence against Muslim anti-Semitism, I have suggested that some Muslims
interpret the creation of Israel and the support it receives as the final evi-
dence of the endogenous Western incapacity for justice. So, accepting the
distinction between stereotypes and chimeria that Langmuir (1990b) has
advanced, in Chapter 8, I have concluded that anti-Semitism is not the
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reason for Muslims’ jihad. This does not mean that some Muslims in the
West, while trapped within the circle of panic, have not used anti-Semitic
language.
In conclusion, the rhetoric of jihad, in certain contexts, becomes the most
suitable act of identity to break the schismogenetic circle of panic. I have
shown in this book that Muslims do not need to know very much about
Islam at the theological level to develop their rhetoric of jihad. Today our
global world subjects us (Muslims and non-Muslims alike) to unprece-
dented schismogenetic processes. Every morning, millions of us wake up
waiting for the next suicide bomber, war, extradition, kidnapping,
Guantanamo bay, Abu Ghraib torture, shoot-to-kill (the wrong man) poli-
cies, unjustified arrests, Islamophobic attitudes and terrorist threats. The
jihads that are inflaming our cities and countries are beyond Islam but part
of one of the many ‘circles of panic’ into which people are sucked. The
question is whether we will be able to avoid the fate of Damocles. 
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Glossary
Adhan: The call to prayer, which the mu’adhdhin (q.v.) chants five times per 
day. 
Al-janna: The Garden, i.e. Paradise.
Al-nasikh-ua-al-mansukh: Literally ‘the abrogating and the abrogated’, it indi-
cates the controversial practice that allows the abrogation of some early Qur’anic
verses and their replacement with others revealed subsequently. Nasikh indicates
the verse, which, abrogating, replaced the mansukh, the abrogated. 
Amir: Commander. Originally it was a military title, then it was also attributed to
caliphs and some sultans as amir al-muminin, the commander of the faithful’, i.e.
the commander of all Muslims. 
Baraka: Divine blessing. It is a characteristic of pirs and it can be transferred to
places and objects. 
Da‘wa: Propaganda or mission 
Dar al-harb: The abode of war. In Islamic jurisprudence it indicates the lands not
under Muslim rule. 
Dar al-Islam: The abode of Islam. In Islamic jurisprudence it indicates the lands
under Muslim rule or in which Muslim institutions were established. 
Dhimmi: Non-Muslim people living in Muslim countries which, under the
shari‘a, were granted protection and freedom of worship. Exempted from mili-
tary services, they had to pay jizyah. 
Din: Faith and religion. 
Du‘a: Supplication to Allah. It is also performed at the end of salat. 
Fatwa: Legal advice of a religious scholar or mufti. 
Fiqh: Interpretation of the shari‘a on which the Islamic legal system is based. 
Fitna: Chaos and temptation. It could also indicate historical times in which
Muslims did not respect Islamic teaching. For instance fitna also indicated the
Muslim civil wars that started 200 years after Muhammad’s death. 
Hadiths: Reports or narratives about the teaching, saying and actions of the
Prophet of Islam. 
Halal: What is permissible. 
Halqat: Circles often organized in the mosque to study the Qur’an recitation and
the teaching of Muhammad. 
Haram: What is forbidden in Islam. 
Hijab: Veil traditionally worn by Muslim women in public (its real Arabic
meaning is ‘screen’). 
Hur: Virginal female companions of the Islamic paradise.
Imam: The Arabic word means ‘the person who stands in front’ and indicates
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those responsible for the Muslim community, and also the person who is in
charge to lead the prayers. 
Iman: In Qur’anic language the word means belief in Islam. 
Isnad: The chain of authorities transmitting the hadiths
Istidsha: Martyrdom 
Jahiliyya: The pre-Islamic ignorance
Jihad: Striving physically and spiritually to achieve an Islamic result. 
Jizyah: Poll tax which dhimmi had to pay for their exemption from military serv-
ices. 
Kafir (often pl. Kafirun): The people who deny God. 
Khalifa: Deputy. During Islamic history it indicates the successor of Muhammad
as leader of the ummah. 
Khutba: The sermon that the imam delivers on yawm al-jum‘a. 
Madhhab: Movement or ideology. It indicates the five different schools of fiqh. 
Madrassa: Religious schools. 
mu’adhdhin: The person which intones the adhan. 
Mufti: Trusted religious scholars expert in shari‘a who is able to give fatwas. 
Mujahidin: Muslims who are conducting jihad. 
Munafiq (often pl. munafiqun): A person who declares that he is Muslim, but his
behaviour or intentions are not truthful, i.e. a hypocrite. 
Naf: Soul, mind, spirit but also a human being. This word needs to be contextu-
alized in order to find its proper meaning. 
Pirs: Sufi master considered to be an holy man 
Qadar: Predestination
Razzia: A pre-Islamic term, razzia indicated a quick raid against non-Muslim ter-
ritories conducted not for conquest but to provide essential resources for the
Muslim tribes, which at that time were living in hospitable places.
Sahaba: The companions of the Prophets. 
Salat: The Muslim worship which is performed five times per day. Salat is one of
the most important pillars of Islam. 
Shahada: The Muslim profession of faith, ‘I testify that there is no God but God
and Muhammad is the Prophet of God’.
Shahid: Martyr, the person who offers his or her life for Islam and will be
rewarded with immediate access to Paradise. 
shari‘a: Divine law. 
Shaykh: A respected Muslim, often an elderly person. Today even young devoted
Muslims are addressed with this title to show respect for their Islamic knowl-
edge. 
Sura: A chapter of the Qur’an. 
Tajweed: The correct recitation of the Qur’an. 
Ummah: The community of believers.
Yawm al-jum‘a: Friday. It also indicates the congregational prayer that Muslims
perform at midday. It is the only congregational prayer in which the imam
delivers a sermon. 
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